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I. INTRODUCTION
Elective associations' come in many sizes and shapes and serve
widely varied functions for their members and for society generally.
They are not equally amenable, in principle or in doctrine, to govern-
ment-imposed restrictions in their affairs, particularly in their advocacy
speech or activities.' For some associations the government may be (and
' Significantly different problems concerning the relationships between individuals
and groups and between the group and the larger society arise with respect to groups
that fairly can be called non-elective groups-i.e., groups to which people "belong," but
do not join, and that are defined essentially by reference to immutable, or at least invol-
untary, characteristics such as race, gender, age, physical or mental handicaps, ethnicity,
and associated cultural history and identity. While the membership characteristics of
some of these groups are not necessarily immutable, all, including religious and sexual
preference, may be treated for our purposes as non-elective. Members of non-elective
groups often form elective associations to develop and advance their perceived interests
as members of the non-elective source group (e.g., a religious society or a gay rights
association) or otherwise (e.g., golf clubs, swimming groups, etc.). The rights, obliga-
tions, and privileges of members of those associations and the entitlements of (and limi-
tations which may be imposed on) those associations differ from the comparable aspects
of the non-elective source group. Indeed, the efforts of members of the latter to form
exclusive elective associations, like the efforts of other elective associations to exclude
on grounds of ethnicity, gender, or religion, can present special problems. See Douglas
0. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1878, 1887-94 (1984); William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Asso-
ciation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68, 75-91 (1986); Jose A. Bracamonte, Minority Critiques
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297-447
(1987).
2 In this Article, "advocacy activities" refers to contributions, expenditures, or other
conduct in support of or in opposition to: (1) any candidate for any political office; (2)
any pending or proposed referendum; or (3) any pending or proposed legislation. "Ad-
vocacy speech" refers to public (i.e., not addressed only to association members) ex-
pression in support of or in opposition to any candidates, referenda, or legislation. More
precise delineation of those concepts is a subject for legislation and rules. The difficul-
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should be) virtually as indifferent to the exercise of the advocacy voice
or activities as it is (or normally should be) to the exercise of such activ-
ities or voice by individuals. For others, the government may select the
collective advocacy activities or voice of the group for special restriction
or limitation At first blush, the notion of government interference with
the advocacy activities or speech of organizations seems as objection-
able, both in principle and under the First Amendment, as government
efforts to restrict the speech of individuals. However, the problems gen-
erated by intervention in an association's speech are both significantly
different in policy and considerably more complicated in practice than
those generated by restriction of an individual's speech.4 This Article
addresses the policy and constitutional propriety (or impropriety) of
governmentally-mandated restrictions or limitations on the collective ad-
vocacy activities and voices of a variety of associations.
ties that a regulatory regime might encounter in separating advocacy speech or activities
from other kinds of speech or activities do not preclude easy recognition of the relevant
behavior in most cases. Nor do those same difficulties make administration of the limits
constitutionally impermissible for vagueness, at least under prevailing Supreme Court
opinions, possibly because speech or activity that is precluded or curtailed for the asso-
ciation is thereby protected for the individual who can provide it alone or in an associa-
tion formed for the purpose. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,
514-19 (1991); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-61 (1990); Chicago Teachers Union, Local
No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 85, 435, 445-48 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
236-37 (1977). Indeed, the cases cited above suggest that the broader concept of "ideo-
logical" speech or activity may describe the content of speech or activity that is consti-
tutionally regulable in the context that this Article addresses. But cf Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1976). Compare United States South-West Afr./Namibia Trade &
Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 768-74 (D.C. Cir. 1983) with Lebron
v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 811 F. Supp. 993, 1001-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2098 (1994).
See supra note 2 (citing union shop and integrated bar cases).
For analyses of tensions among rights of members and associations in various cat-
egories of associations, see generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGA-
NIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986) [hereinafter DAN-
COHEN, RIGHTS]; Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Pro-
tected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1229 (1991) [hereinafter Dan-Cohen, Freedoms]; Ronald R. Garet, Communality and
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Richard B. Stewart,
Organizational Jurisprudence, 101 HARV. L. REV. 371 (1987) [hereinafter Stewart,
Organizational Jurisprudence]; Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The
Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983).
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II. CATEGORIES OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMBERSHIP
Associations have been described, analyzed, classified, and evaluated
from different angles by sociologists, social psychologists, organization
theorists, political scientists, and practitioners of other disciplines--on
the basis of size, structure, social function, class and other characteristics
of members, intimacy of contact among members, sources of support,
and a variety of other factors.5 Examination of possible categories of as-
sociations will situate the kinds of organizations with which this Article
is concerned.
Measured by reference to numbers, dispersion, and impersonality of
members,6 elective associations may be said to range from the "inti-
mate," like the nuclear family, to the non-intimate but more or less "pri-
vate," like a local poetry reading society or bocce club, to the "public,"
like business corporations, professional associations, unions, or chambers
of commerce.' The Supreme Court has indicated that association all
' For a useful collection of references, see CONSTANCE SMITH & ANNE FREEDMAN,
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITERATURE (1972). For a compre-
hensive, if not exhaustive, listing of minority associations, see MINORITY ORGANIZA-
TIONS: A NATIONAL DIRECTORY (4th ed. 1992). In theory, at least, the concept of asso-
ciation extends to such varied relationships as ordinary commercial contracts between
two or more persons (whether of the one shot buy-sell variety or of the long term "rela-
tional contract" variety) and classes of litigants.
6 For example, affinity of personal relationships and relevance of personal charac-
teristics of the members in conducting the group's activities.
' For purposes of determining the constitutionality of government intervention in
organizations' affairs, the difference between the contours of the "intimate" association
and the others is, at least at the extremes, reasonably clear, even though Supreme Court
opinions do not offer much help in deciphering differences at the margin. See Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1, 8 (1974) with Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) and
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973). Although the
line between "private" and "public" associations so characterized is more a band with
rough edges than a bright line, the distinction is generally visible. The public-private
distinction among non-intimate associations often is made explicitly to define the limits
on the scope of legislative prohibitions of racial or gender discrimination by associa-
tions. Legislative proscriptions often allude to criteria like numbers of members or pro-
vision of service and openness of facilities to non-members. Courts have often adverted
to characteristics like size, selectivity, or transience of membership and degree of con-
trol over internal governance by members. See Joshua A. Bloom, Comment, The Use of
Local Ordinances to Combat Private Club Discrimination, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 478-
79, 485 (1989); Margaret E. Koppen, The Private Club Exemption from Civil Rights
Legislation-Sanctioned Discrimination or Justified Protection of Right to Associate?,
20 PEPP. L. Ri, v. 643, 654-77 (1993); Kimberly S. McGovern, Case Comment, Board
[Vol. 4:1
1995] ASSOCIATION, ADVOCACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5
along the intimate-private-public spectrum thus conceived is entitled
to constitutional protection as "liberty" protected by the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; but although the
matter is subject to substantial debate,8 association located at the inti-
mate end of the spectrum is entitled to considerably more rigorous pro-
tection against government restriction or intrusion than is association of
the more public kind,9 and possibly of the private kind."0 It is not nec-
essary for the purposes of this Article to explore the rationale of the dis-
tinctions thus made, or the justification for the difference in levels of
constitutional protection." The associations with which this Article is
concerned are located well at the public end of the spectrum. 2
The vast bulk of such large elective associations are not formed to
engage primarily (or indeed more than peripherally) in advocacy, or
ideological activities or speech that is protected by the speech provisions
of the First Amendment, even though significant numbers of such associ-
ations expend portions of their energies to do so. Many of the most pow-
erful elective associations, like large business corporations, unions, and
trade and professional associations, focus principally on providing and
offering more or less impersonal monetary returns, 1" goods or servic-
es,' 4 and facilities 5 to members and possibly to the public generally.
Others are engaged solely, or almost entirely, in activities that are grist
of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Prying Open the Doors
of the All-Male Club, I I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 134-35 (1988).
8 Compare, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 197-231 (1993) and
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 33-35, 237-89 (1985) with JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
' See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to 15-21 (2d ed. 1988).
'0 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1968) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
" This is not to say that varying degrees of constitutional protection of associa-
tion-or refusal to associate-may (or should) not be accorded varying strictness of ju-
dicial scrutiny for claims of infringed rights based on gender, racial, or ethnic selectivi-
ty.
2 The state rarely seeks to intrude upon the advocacy speech of members of "inti-
mate" or "private" associations individually or collectively.
13 For example, business corporations or producer cooperatives that offer economic
returns to stockholders or members.
14 For example, services offered by consumer cooperatives or associations like un-
ions, health maintenance organizations, or universities.
"s Associations like hospitals and medical societies also offer access to facilities and
other advantages like professional comity; bar associations offer educational and profes-
sional facilities to members; and enterprises like the Junior Chamber of Commerce or
Rotary Club offer commercial contacts and networking.
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for the First Amendment mill-such as the print and electronic media,
political parties, or ideologically organized groups that are engaged al-
most exclusively in advocacy activities.' 6 Still others, like fraternal or-
ganizations, veterans associations, automobile associations, associations
of the elderly or of ethnic groups, or clubs like the Lions or Rotary Club,
occupy marginal territory that houses both non-advocacy benefits (e.g.,
community service, network opportunities, or collateral economic bene-
fits) and substantial advocacy speech and activities, at least if measured
as a proportion of their agenda.
Attempts to restrict the advocacy speech and activities of associations
that offer benefits in addition to advocacy activities and voice (hereinaf-
ter "multi-purpose" groups or associations) reflect and generate problems
for their members and society generally that differ significantly from
those generated by attempts to regulate the advocacy speech of expres-
sive or advocacy associations. To the extent that the multi-purpose
association's function for members is predicated considerably more on
the monetary returns or goods, services, and facilities it offers than on its
speech or advocacy activities, the question arises whether it is necessary
or appropriate from the individual member's viewpoint to sever the
member's obligation to contribute to the latter activity in order to obtain
the benefits of the former. In addition, because multi-purpose associa-
tions obtain their funds and advocacy power by reason of the benefits
their contributors expect from the association's offer of returns, goods,
services, and facilities, there are the further questions whether such
group's resources and incentives fuel a speech or advocacy role that dif-
fers from that of expressive, ideological, or advocacy associations (here-
after sometimes simply "expressive" associations), whether that differ-
ence can justify restriction by government in the former case that is not
6 The distinction between such expressive associations and non-expressive or multi-
ple-purpose associations is plain enough at the extremes. Business corporations engaged
almost entirely in manufacturing, mercantile operations, or finance (or any combination
of them) can be categorized as non-expressive groups-notwithstanding that they often
engage in ideological or advocacy speech to help fulfill their non-expressive functions
and aspirations. The print and electronic media (whether or not engaged in activities for
profit), political parties, or ideological groups (like the American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, or political action
committees (PACs)) can be categorized as expressive groups. However, large numbers
of significant enterprises engage substantially in both advocacy speech and non-expres-
sive activities-e.g., many unions, occupational and professional associations, trade as-
sociations, and enterprises like the Jaycees or the American Association of Retired Per-
sons (AARP). Some of them attract members and offer them substantially more by rea-
son of their non-expressive activities (services or facilities) than because of their advo-
cacy programs. Others may attract members more to support their advocacy programs
than to enjoy the benefits of their non-expressive activities.
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permitted in the latter, 7 and if so, to what extent.18
For expressive associations, as the Supreme Court has suggested, en-
tirely different considerations determine whether it is necessary, appro-
priate, or permissible for the government to intervene in internal deci-
sion-making processes or their advocacy activities or voices.' 9 If the
association's sole or essential function is to aggregate the advocacy voic-
es of its members or to provide communication or expression, the com-
mand of the First-Amendment engages directly the association's raison
d'etre. As we shall see, for such groups both (a) conflicts between the
expressive or advocacy preferences of a group and its individual mem-
bers, and (b) issues involving the distortion in the quality or impact of a
group's speech pose radically different questions than do similar con-
flicts and issues in the case of multi-purpose groups. Even so, expressive
or advocacy groups are not immune from government-imposed restric-
tions on their activities."
'7 For multi-purpose groups, as for others, problems generated by bureaucracy also
may invite government intervention. Protecting the preferences of individual members
with respect to advocacy speech may be justified even if the leadership of the group is
in some sense adequately responsive to the members' preferences (and the mechanism
by which membership exercises its choice is otherwise acceptable) with respect to the
group's non-advocacy activities. It does not necessarily or systematically follow that
leadership will be equally adequately responsive with respect to decisions about the
group's advocacy role.
18 Interventions that affect or curb the collective ideological voice of the multi-pur-
pose group may take a variety of shapes-a requirement to fracture individual
members' contributions so as to rebate (ex ante or ex post) a proportion of dues equal
to the proportion of the group's expenditures, or a requirement of super-majority con-
sent to advocacy speech or activities, or even a prohibition of such activities or speech.
Intervention may be effected by judicial action, or by legislative or administrative ac-
tion. The legislative or administrative process offers significant advantages over judicial
intervention by way of flexibility, detail, monitoring, and adaptability to particular insti-
tutional configurations and changing circumstances. However, judicial intervention may
be the only remedy available to protect discrete and insular minorities for whom legisla-
tion is more likely to be the problem than the solution.
"9 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-61 (1990);
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-28 (1989); New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-
18, 622-23 (1984).
20 The extensive government regulation of political parties, see infra notes 203-06,
illustrates both the responses to perceived bureaucratic distortion and corruption by
leadership, and the tension generated by the conflict between government intervention in
the party's internal processes and the import of the mandate of the First Amendment to
protect the members' freedoms of association and speech. The considerations that justi-
fy the balance struck with respect to political parties may not, however, justify a similar
balance for other advocacy groups or ideological associations, like political action corn-
1995]
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Several variables in the composition or role of a multi-purpose asso-
ciation are relevant to assessing the validity of government interventions
in the association's advocacy activities and of its claim to be free from
those interventions. One concern is the extent to which the individual
member's support of the association, and pro tanto of its advocacy activ-
ity, is compelled rather than voluntary. The most obvious form of com-
pulsion is that imposed by a government mandate to join or contribute
funds to the group, such as the integrated bar.21 Less obvious, but often
no less effective a form of compulsion, is the economic necessity to ob-
tain the "goods" that an association offers.22 On still another level are
the contributions induced to obtain the kinds of non-speech economic
benefits offered by enterprises like business corporations, some profes-
sional and trade associations, and other organizations like the Elks or the
Junior Chamber of Commerce. Such benefits do not rise to the level of
"practical necessities," and their pursuit does not rise to the level of
compelled support. Yet a member's support for the group's advocacy
voice is not as voluntarily given as if it were not induced in fair part by
the pursuit of those other benefits or were induced solely by the
association's advocacy voice.
Other relevant variables include the extent to which the group is ef-
fectively a delegee of government power, or one whose structure and
operation are dependent upon a pattern of special government authoriza-
tion and support or subsidy, and have public import.23 Some groups,
mittees or religious associations. Still other considerations determine the appropriate
level of government intrusion into the expressive activities of for-profit communications
enterprises like newspapers or broadcast media, or of other kinds of enterprises like uni-
versities, whose activities normally engage the First Amendment.
2 The integrated bar is an arrangement prescribed in many states, sometimes by
statute, often by court pursuant to statute, and occasionally by the state supreme court
by rule acting under its "inherent" powers. Under the arrangement, a person's admission
to practice law or continued permission so to practice is conditioned upon joining and
paying dues to the state bar association. The existence of that association is directed by
statute or judicial action, and the association is given certain privileges and powers in
addition to its entitlement to acquire as members all persons licensed to practice law.
22 Even in the absence of any government mandate, or imputed government mandate
for an individual to join a group, an individual fairly may be said to be compelled to
join or support the group if doing so is a condition precedent to gaining access to the
services, facilities, or credentials of the group, and those benefits are a practical neces-
sity for earning a living in the individual's chosen occupation, trade, or profession that
only the group affords. Such conditions have historically characterized access to local
medical associations, and may well be true of access to associations of medical special-
ists or other kinds of occupational or professional associations. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 100-08.
23 The public import of the group's activities (i.e., is it "affected with a public inter-
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like investor-owned business corporations, certain farm organizations,
many professional associations and hospitals, veterans organizations, and,
in some circumstances, trade unions, could not offer the non-speech
benefits that attract participants without special government assistance. If
organized only by private contract among the participants, such groups
could not function because special government empowerment through
protective rules and tailored arrangements or subsidies is necessary for
the creation and operation of the enterprises. Other groups (like the Jay-
cees, the Rotary Club, possibly voluntary bar associations, many business
and social clubs, trade associations, and, in some circumstances, trade
unions) that offer benefits other than advocacy activities to induce partic-
ipation are not supported by such an array of special government ar-
rangements.
At the margin it may be difficult to separate an association whose
members are compelled to join by government mandate or by the need
for the practical necessities that it (and often it alone) offers from associ-
ations that offer less essential benefits. 4 Among the latter, distinctions
may be drawn to turn the color of legal litmus paper based on the extent
of government support of the enterprise or on the relative weight in the
enterprise's agenda (and in its attraction for members) of the non-advo-
cacy benefits it offers as compared to its advocacy activities. The diffi-
culties in drawing lines at the margin among such activities25 as well as
in degrees of government support" may make the distinctions unfeasi-
est"?) has been urged as a significant predicate to justify government efforts to regulate
the internal affairs and external activities of some groups. See, e.g., Matthew 0.
Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1253-54, 1256-63 (1967). That concept is
somewhat amorphous, but is less ambiguously delineated when it is tied to the notion of
special government empowerment of the group.
24 See, e.g., Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283,
287-92 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992); Washington Legal Found.
v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 795 F. Supp. 50, 54-55 (D. Mass. 1992). The fact that
"coercion" can fairly be said extensively to dominate many relationships in society and
that no one enjoys quite the free choice pictured in the libertarian model does not pre-
clude recognition of different degrees of freedom and volition in behavior by each indi-
vidual in response to stimuli from others. There is wide room to argue about the differ-
ent consequences that should attend behavior produced by debatably different levels of
coercion or volition, but recognition of differences in the levels or kinds of inducements
producing behavior is inescapable in the process of urging or assessing norms for any
society.
25 For example, in order to distinguish a multi-purpose enterprise with an expressive
role that so permeates its affairs as to justify according it the same First Amendment
protection as an expressive association from one whose expressive role is so slight as
fairly to preclude treating the enterprise as equivalent to an expressive association.
26 Compare, e.g., the extent of government "enmeshment" in voluntary state bar as-
1995]
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ble as predicates for government intervention. Before so concluding, it is
appropriate to inquire whether, in the polar cases, some sort of mandated
disconnection of a multi-purpose association's advocacy voice and activi-
ties from its other activities is justifiable in policy and acceptable consti-
tutionally.
III. INTERVENTION IN ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES OF MULTI-PURPOSE
ASSOCIATIONS
A. Preliminary Considerations
Intervention in the advocacy speech of multi-purpose associations
rests essentially on either or both of two justifications-first, protecting
individual members' preferences, or enhancing their freedom of choice,
to refrain from supporting the group's advocacy voice (a kind of "nega-
tive speech interest"),27 and second, protecting society from a collective
advocacy voice that is powered by compelled member contributions or
by voluntary contributions offered for functions other than advocacy
sociations with its role in the integrated bar. Consider also publicly-built and operated
housing projects, government-subsidized housing projects, and private housing projects
that do (or do not) receive special tax encouragement.
2 As a formal matter, a distinction may be drawn between the act of a person in
using assets to pay others to express (or amplify) what the person wishes expressed and
that person's own act of expressing. There is debate over whether the former may be
treated as the equivalent of the latter and thus be subject to the same protection against
government restriction under the First Amendment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 197-
231. Compare J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 631-42 (1982)
[hereinafter Wright, Money] and J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005-13 (1976) [hereinafter Wright, Politics] with
Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1052-65 (1985). See also Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 787-95 (1988); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
414, 420-25 (1988); Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980). That debate becomes more complex if the individual pays or
contributes dues to an organization which pays others to express (or amplify) what the
organization wishes expressed. In that case, questions arise as to (a) whether the
group's use of funds to pay others to express is equivalent to expression by the group,
and (b) whether the individual may be deemed to be engaged in expression by reason of
his or her dues contribution to the group. Constitutional doctrine appears to answer the
former question in the affirmative. The latter question implicates the meaning of the
concept "negative speech interest" and its constitutional value if the government legis-
lates to protect it. See Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitu-
tional Discourse over Corporate and Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDOzO L. REv.
1343, 1358-70 (1993).
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speech and for which the group's advocacy speech is peripheral. Justifi-
cation of government intervention designed to protect individuals' nega-
tive advocacy speech interest requires, preliminarily, examination of the
nature of that interest. Justification of government intervention on behalf
of society's interest in the group's advocacy speech requires, preliminari-
ly, examination of multi-purpose groups' claims to freedom of choice
and of finance in matters of such speech.
1. The "Negative" Speech Rights or Interests of Individuals
Individuals may be said to have a negative speech interest-i.e., an
interest in remaining silent and not being forced or "improperly" pres-
sured to speak. That interest may become involved when the individual
joins or contributes to the support of an association. The collective voice
of the association is, to be sure, not the same as the speech of the indi-
vidual. But there is a connection that implicates the latter in the former,
sometimes strongly and sometimes weakly; a connection that fruitfully
may be examined by beginning with the situation in which individual
support of a group is commanded by government.
The bulk of First Amendment case law on free speech is concerned
with the limits on government actions that impede or curtail expression,
i.e., interfere with a person's positive interest in uttering or receiving
communication.2" Both jurisprudence and political philosophy generally
address those limits in terms of the consequences to society and to indi-
viduals (both speakers and listeners) of forbidding the communication.29
2 There is great force to the view that the values of freedom of speech cannot be
optimally, or even adequately, realized unless "private" power (at least that power gen-
erated by wealth) over expressive action is curbed or the expressive opportunities of the
less wealth-empowered elements of society are subsidized. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 197-256; J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Ap-
proaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L. REV. 375, 410-12; Thomas Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 223 (1972); Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1138-64 (1993). However,
it is not necessary for purposes of this Article to confront the problems that view poses.
This Article assumes the narrower premises of conventional free speech concepts and
doctrine in a private property economy in a modest welfare state. Cf infra notes 122,
126, 127, 173.
29 For a sample of the literature explicating values underlying the First Amendment,
see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREE EXPRESSION (1970); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH (1994); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS (1984); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
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As has been pointed out, not all the limits on government power to sup-
press speech nor all the justifications for those limits are equally applica-
ble to government power to compel speech.3" Indeed, there may be
good reason to treat such government compulsion as an intrusion on
"liberty" if not on the speech protected by the First Amendment." In
any case, in parsing a claim to resist such an infringement of "liberty,"
the closeness of the interests involved to interests protected by the First
Amendment Speech Clause suggests significant protection by that
Amendment. Government compulsion of individual speech intrudes on
the right to freedom of speech to the extent that freedom of speech im-
ports the speaker's freedom of thought, belief, and conscience, and the
audience's (both the individual listener's and society's) interest in the
integrity of the communications that it receives. The intrusion on these
rights by government-compelled speech requires justification under the
jurisprudence of the First Amendment as well as under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.
The considerations that support protection of the speaker's persona
against the injury caused by forbidding his or her expression also sup-
port, if they do not equally require, protection of the speaker against the
injury entailed in government compulsion to speak--whether the compul-
sion is to carry a particular message or to forbid the person from declin-
ing to express any views.32 The interests of the audience in receiving33
(1982); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE
(1990); SUNSTEIN, supra note 8; Balkin, supra note 28; Scanlon, supra note 28; T.M.
Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV.
519 (1979) [hereinafter Scanlon, Freedom].
30 For thoughtful, albeit differing, views of the relationship of the compelled contri-
bution to compelled speech and the deference to be paid to what Gaebler describes as
"negative rights" under the First Amendment, see David B. Gaebler, First Amendment
Protection against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV.
995, 996 (1982); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Con-
stitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3 (1983);
Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to
Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817 (1986).
3 Such compulsion might plausibly be said to intrude on a "fundamental element of
personal liberty"-privacy, cf Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957),
or personhood-that claims special constitutional protection and strict judicial scrutiny
of the kind that would be accorded under the First Amendment. See supra notes 8-10.
32 E.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943); cf Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind,
487 U.S. 781, 787-95 (1988); Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1, 11-14 (1986). The individual's will to communicate with others is equally thwarted,
whether his or her speech is suppressed or compelled, and the communicative aspect of
the "self' is equally invaded by government coercion. See TRIBE, supra note 9, §§ 15-5,
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and of society in exchanging ideas34 is also touched by such govern-
ment compulsion. Less of either the audience interest or the social inter-
est in free speech may be affected by compelling an individual to speak
than by forbidding her from speaking. But, there is no doubt that com-
pelled speech tends to distort the total mix of speech to be digested by
the audience, whether the audience's interest is defined by reference to
the individual listeners or to society as a whole.35
The problems associated with government-compelled speech become
complicated when the power to speak exists in an association that is pri-
vately organized, whether or not specially empowered by government,
and the government "compels" the individual to join and/or support the
15-16. To be sure, the locus of injury is more the individual's belief, thought, or con-
science than expression. However, the individual's beliefs, and therefore expression in
the future, are not less likely to be affected in that case than in the case of suppression
of speech. See Harpaz, supra note 30, at 902. Arguably, the individual's speech may be
curtailed because he will refrain from some expression if faced with the possibility of
government mandate to utter other expression to offset what he has said. See Mitchell
C. Tilner, Government Compulsion of Speech: Legitimate Regulation or First Amend-
ment Violation? A Critique of PG & E v. Public Utilities Commission, 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 485 (1987).
Moreover, in the case of compelled speech, the individual's ability to define his or
her public identity, see Gaebler, supra note 30, at 1004-05; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-5,
is impaired, and indeed that identity is apt to be no less substantially distorted by com-
pelled speech than by suppressed speech. The individual may thus be required to endure
the fact, and the knowledge, that the public has a false impression of him, or that the
public has an accurate view of beliefs about which she may prefer to remain silent. In
the former case, he may be under some pressure to explain his views-a task which
may present costs and difficulties in effectuation or risks by way of public exposure of
attitudes.
3" That audience interest embodies, in part, respect for the listener as an autonomous
individual who is able to hear and enabled to make reasoned choices. See Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969); Scanlon, Freedom, supra note 29.
" Society's interest in the exchange of ideas embodies the enriching social or com-
munal (including political) values of the free exchange of ideas in a society, particularly
a democratic society. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-83 (1978);
Scanlon, Freedom, supra note 29, at 520-28; cf EMERSON, supra note 29, at 6-9 (dis-
cussing speech as a safety valve for violent discontent); REDISH, supra note 29, at 14-
19; Balkin, supra note 28, at 387-94; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 544-67.
" Quite apart from the possibility of government "drown-out" resulting from com-
pelled speech, if the government can compel individuals to utter particular ideas, it has
power to influence social choices with a potency that it is a function of the First
Amendment to deny. The cost of meeting the social interest in the subject matter of the
views thus expressed is increased by the need to offset them, even if only to dilute their
psychologically conditioning effect.
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organization by dues or similar payments. In such circumstances, the ut-
terance about which individuals complain is not "made" by them, but is
"made" by the organization they are forced to support. Insofar as the
injury to the individual comes from the act of associating with or con-
tributing funds to the group (rather than "participating" in its speech), the
issue is more one of protection of "liberty" than of a First Amendment
violation.36 Insofar as the injury to the individual comes from associ-
ation with the group's advocacy speech or ideological activities, ques-
tions are raised under the First Amendment. To the extent that the
group's advocacy activities are enabled by the claimant's contribution,
can the group's use of dues or "in lieu" payments which the member is
compelled to pay be transformed into individual expression "compelled"
by the government, such that the propriety of forced financial support for
the group's expression can be said to entail intrusion on individual
members' First Amendment negative speech rights?37
36 See supra note 27. It may be argued that individuals' forced "formal" association
with the group that speaks, even if none of their funds is used to support the group's
advocacy speech, so identify them with that speech as to invoke the considerations that
implicate their negative First Amendment rights against a government command to
speak. Cf Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990). If this is so, questions arise (a)
whether a claim to "speech" under the First Amendment rather than a claim to "liberty"
tests the propriety of the command to join the group, and (b) whether the group's
claims under the First Amendment should trump the individual's claim.
3" One argument against such transformation rests on the premise that the existence
of, and the necessity for, a process by which a group reaches the decision to speak dis-
connects its members from its speech and justifies treating its utterance as emanating
from "it" rather than from any of its members or any aggregation of them. See Dan-Co-
hen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1234-44. Group action affecting public choice in a de-
mocracy may indeed implicate transformation of individual preferences of members and
integration of those preferences to produce a collective voice that not all, or even most,
members desire. Yet the democratic process does not require all groups to be authorized
to invoke that transformative voice in affecting public choice.
Groups lack the autonomy conventionally claimed for individuals. Some groups are
said to have a solidity that requires respect for them as something more than merely an
instrumental aggregation of individuals; yet they are entitled to less than the respect to
be accorded to an individual human being. See MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, REASON AND
NATURE 386 (2d ed. 1953). The role thus envisioned for groups as institutions operating
in some space not occupied by individuals or government, and functioning as essential
to individual self-realization and definition and to pluralist democracy, contemplates
some indeterminate sort of status for the collective. Cf LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS
(Michael Sandel ed., 1984). The indeterminacy is mirrored in uncertainty about how the
legal system can accord adequate respect for the group without scanting the "rights" of
individuals and the claims of the rest of the society. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 9, §
12-26, at 1010-15, §§ 15-1 to 15-3, at 1302-12, § 15-17, at 1400-09; Balkin, supra note
28, at 384-87; Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1241-44; Jane Rutherford, Be-
yond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 627, 638-
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Viewed solely in terms of the impact on a complaining member who
is compelled to contribute to support the group, an affirmative answer
may be urged persuasively. To be sure, there is no government effort to
compel any particular communication, belief, or line of thought. Yet the
thwarting of the individual's will and the intrusion on the individual's
conscience by the group's expression that the individual is forced to en-
able is as present in the case of restricting individual speech as in the
case of "compelling" speech. The frustration of conscience may be less
intense if one is made to pay for a joint product that includes group
speech rather than being forced to speak personally, but the intrusion on
the individual's will to speak is real,3" and the jurisprudence of the First
Amendment is properly invocable.39
40 (1987); Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 383-84.
However that uncertainty may be resolved, to the extent that individual members
do, or are forced to, contribute to the support of the group, they enable the group voice
and can fairly be said to bear, and can reasonably expect that they bear, some responsi-
bility for that voice. Hence an individual's unwillingness to contribute or bear responsi-
bility for the advocacy voice is plausibly entitled to protection analogous to the protec-
tion given to the individual against being mandated to speak. The function of an expres-
sive or advocacy group requires limits on the protection that may be given to individual
members in this regard. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. However, as we
shall see, such limits are not required for multi-purpose groups.
38 Less apposite is the claimed distortion of the individual's public identity. See su-
pra note 32. However, that too may be affected by one's forced participation in the
group. In the clearest case-that of the integrated bar-one's public identification with
the content of the group's speech is more remote than it would be with the content of
personally uttered views. The distortion may be less remote in the case of enterprises
that the individual is compelled to join or support by institutional considerations-as
with a local professional or trade association or the union shop. Whether the reason for
not wanting to facilitate the group's speech is a desire to be silent on the matter under
discussion or opposition to the views expressed, there is enough of a public connection
between one's known participation and the speech to require one either to endure the
public's uncertain inferences about him or her or to make his or her own statement. To
make one's own statement involves either losing desired silence or incurring the cost of
making the statement and revealing one's views.
There is likely to be a closer connection in the public mind between the group's
speech and the individual compelled to join the group than there is between, for in-
stance, a public utility corporation and the consumer's message that the utility was un-
constitutionally "forced" to carry. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9-12, 20-21 (1986).
'9 If the government-created or sponsored association is organized, albeit "privately,"
for the principal purpose of communicating, and individuals are directed by government
to contribute to the organization, the claim of intrusion on the individual's First Amend-
ment speech rights is considerably stronger than it is for members of a multi-purpose
association. It may be possible to justify such an intrusion if, for example, only com-
mercial speech is involved. See United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1130-39 (3rd
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The fact that the target of governmental compulsion is the
individual's pocket rather than his or her voice does not make persuasive
the analogy to taxation in assessing the propriety of the coercion on the
individual contributor, or in disconnecting the coercion from the claim of
violation of the claimant's speech protection."n The homogenization of
tax money in the government's till serves to disconnect the taxpayer
from particular government expenditures that may be necessary to enable
the nation, of which all must (in some sense) be members, to function. If
every government expenditure were required to mesh with every prefer-
ence of every individual taxpayer for use of his or her tax money, collec-
tive action for the common good would be difficult, if not impossible.4
But the reasons which require persons to yield to collective decision-
making by government do not require them to yield to all collective de-
cisions in special organizations which they join or are forced to join for
special purposes.42 The analogy to government, which people are com-
pelled to support, is inapposite because other organizations that people
are compelled to join are not formed in order to, and do not, represent
the whole society and deal with all its problems.43 More importantly,
other groups are not subject to the restrictions on their power to act,
including their power to speak, that restrain government.44
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). Even so, more is required by way of
justification than in the case of forced membership in a multi-purpose association. The
problems involved, and an unsatisfactory rationale for upholding such a mandate, are
discussed in Frame, 885 F.2d at 1119.
40 See Cantor, supra note 30, at 29-35; Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
UCLA L. REV. 565, 590-95 (1980); cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 864-65 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
41 While problems exist about limits on government speech, see MARK YUDOFF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA (1983); Shiffrin, supra note 40, at 588-95, they do not sensibly arise from the
claim of the protestant as contributor to the fisc.
42 It does not detract from this conclusion that an obligation to yield to many of the
group's decisions should exist for members of "voluntary" groups. In order for the
group to perform its essential functions, it is necessary to permit the group to spend col-
lective assets on its functional operations without requiring it to satisfy each member's
preferences about the expenditure. However, such deference to a majority with respect
to collective conduct that is not essential to the group's function (e.g., much of advoca-
cy speech of many multi-purpose associations) is unnecessary.
" Cf Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1990); Frame, 885 F.2d at 1129-37.
4 The government is constitutionally and politically more confined in its ability to
spend funds than it is in the range of activities it can authorize for groups that it com-
pels citizens to join and fund. Government is also more confined by procedural rules for
making decisions. The person forced to join and contribute to an integrated bar is thus
subject to looser procedural safeguards and a wider range of decisions made by fellow-
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Concern for audience interests and for society's interest in the ex-
change of ideas expressed by the group implicates considerations that are
comparable to, but far from identical with, those affecting assessment of
compelled speech by an individual. If the government dictated the con-
tent of the group's speech,45 the objections from the audience's view-
point would be the same in the one case as in the other-if not to
drown-out, at least to systematic government-ordered distortion of the
mix that the audience is offered as the basis for social choice. The fact
that government leaves the organization free to make its own speech
alters the import of the distortion because the content of the message is
not government-dictated. 6 However, the group's utterance of a commu-
nication which the individual member was forced to help the group to
utter exposes the public to a louder voice and to an impression of larger,
and possibly more diversified, support than exists for positions which the
individual does not wish accepted. Although the government's compul-
sion in this circumstance does not address the content expressed, the
likelihood of public acceptance of that content is affected and probably
enhanced thereby; and the dissident is forced by the government to con-
tribute to that enhancement.
The decisions of the Supreme Court are not entirely consistent, and
the Court's rationale is not clear in cases involving government "com-
pelled" personal speech through association. 7 The same may be said of
members than is the citizen compelled to pay taxes or to subject herself to the discipline
of a government organization. To be sure, there may be some constitutional limitations
on the conduct of an association thus created that would not restrict the conduct of an
otherwise "private" group performing a comparable function such as a voluntary bar
association. See Larry W. Yakle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the Feast
of St. Patrick, 73 B.U. L. REV. 791, 796-811 (1993). The powers vested in the integrat-
ed bar association, including its power to determine the subject matter of its speech, are
considerably less restrained by constitutional considerations than are the powers of a
government organization. But compare Richard D. Silberman, The Compelled Contribu-
tion in the Integrated Bar and the All Union Shop, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 138, 142 with
authorities cited infra note 79.
" Cf Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-17; West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-802 (1988).
46 Compare Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-17 (1977) with Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 21-26
and Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980).
"' The bulk of the cases involving speech claims in connection with association orig-
inate in the "right to remain silent" about association membership. E.g., Gibson v. Flori-
da Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 540-58 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66 (1958). But cf. Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-98 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 60-84 (1976).
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decisions interpreting the Constitution to require that A (an association)
not be compelled by government to distribute B's speech through A's
facilities. 8 But even if the decisions were consistent and their rationales
offered clearer support for the proposition that to compel an individual to
speak is likely to entail as much a violation of the First Amendment as
to suppress his or her speech, the analogy in the claim to First Amend-
ment protection between compelled personal speech or compelled formal
association and compelled contribution to support a multi-purpose
The cases dealing with compelled personal speech like Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-17,
and Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, and those dealing with pressures on persons' political at-
tachments or views like Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 68-79 (1990), Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 513-17 (1980), Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-17, and Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-73 (1976), rest uneasily alongside cases dealing with loyalty
oaths (involving the right to remain silent), e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 678-
87 (1972); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15-17 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 373-74 (1964), and the non-communist oath cases, e.g., Law Students Research
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 164-66 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 593-95, 597-604 (1967); Nelson v. County of L.A., 362 U.S. 1, 4-9
(1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 470-79 (1958). Principles to reconcile them all
are hard to find, if indeed they exist. But see Harpaz, supra note 30.
48 Most decisions involve the problems raised by compelling an institution to carry
the speech of another, rather than compelling an individual to utter another's prescrip-
tion. Compare, e.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 787-95, Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 9-18, and Mi-
ami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1974) with decisions
dealing with broadcast media like Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2456-58 (1994), CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-97 (1981), and Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969), and compare those decisions
with that in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-14 (1973). To be sure,
the amenability of the broadcast media to government regulation may differ from that
of the print media or other modes of communication, and the problem is the subject of
much debate in the industry and in the academy. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 495-666 (1988); LUCAS A. POWE, AMER-
ICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11-45, 197-215 (1987); Charles D.
Ferris & Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears: Broadcast Content Regula-
tion and the First Amendment, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 299, 304-07 (1989); Weinberg,
supra note 28, at 1138-64; see also City of L.A. v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476
U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986); United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555
F.2d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 435 U.S. 679, 696-99 (1978).
See generally Tilner, supra note 32, at 494-513 (critiquing the Court's conceptual pre-
supposition that corporations enjoy "freedom of mind"). But the cases do not reconcile
easily, if at all.
Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 85-88, touches the problem but is slightly off center be-
cause in Pruneyard, the government was not compelling transmission or utterance by
the coerced person of any message or expression, or subscription by that person to any
belief, or even appearance (except possibly to some in the audience) of such subscrip-
tion or utterance. See also Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888,
904-06 (Ist Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
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group's speech is not perfect. The likelihood of the individual being as
intimately affected in belief, in persona, in repute, or in compensatory
behavior (i.e., in the perceived need to engage in counter-speech) is
plainly not as great in the one case as in the other.49
It has been suggested that even if government-forced contributions or
formal association can be metamorphosed into government-compelled
speech, the impingement on any particular contributor's speech rights by
reason of the meagerness of the individual's contribution to enabling the
group's speech is too slight, and the connection between the government
mandate (which is neutral as to the fact or content of the group's speech)
and that impingement is too remote to permit a finding of a First
Amendment violation." When balanced against the social value of (i.e.,
the compelling state need for) the forced contribution to, for example, a
union or the integrated bar in order to fund the benefits that the associa-
tion confers, the curtailment of the individual's liberty or speech is said
"9 By the same token, even if it is valid to treat use of funds as the equivalent of
speech when the issue is the propriety of government effort to prohibit or limit a
person's contribution to a political candidate or cause, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59, it
does not follow that a contribution of funds is speech or its equivalent when the issue is
the propriety of compelling payment of funds for a service function and allowing use of
part of the funds for political communications that are relevant to the service function,
see, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 514-19, 522-24 (1991); Robin-
son v. State of N.J., 741 F.2d 598, 610-14 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228
(1985), or even for ideological communications that are more remotely relevant to the
group's .service function, see Shiffrin, supra note 40, at 588-95. But cf Stark, supra
note 27, at 1362-78.
" See Cantor, supra note 30, at 27-28; Gaebler, supra note 30, at 110-14; Shiffrin,
supra note 40, at 588-95; see also Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060, 1069-71 (3d Cir.
1985) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986). Relevant in this con-
nection is the possibility that the individual's contribution to the group's speech may be
more imperatively commanded and may be assimilated more closely to personal speech
(and public perception of personal speech) in some group settings than in others. Thus,
for example, the ratepayer's contribution to the utility's speech in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980), or the student's contribution to
the group's speech in Galda, 772 F.2d at 1060, Smith v. Regents, 844 P.2d 500, 519-33
(Cal. 1993), and Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 995-1003 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 300 (1993), is considerably less assimilable to compelled personal
speech in its impact on the persona of the forced contributor or the public's perception
of his participation than is the lawyer's contribution in the case of the integrated bar or
the dissident employee's contribution to the union in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 332-37 (1977). Hence, the protection of the individual (whether by Con-
stitution or by legislative or judicial action) against being "forced" to make such contri-
butions may be appropriate or "necessary" in some settings of compelled association but
not in others when a court is required to balance the cost to the individual and society
against the state's "need" for imposing the compulsion to contribute or for relieving the
individual of the obligation to contribute.
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to be not enough to tip the scales against either the propriety or the con-
stitutional validity of the requirement to contribute. Much may be said
for that view;5 but if the Supreme Court's repeated rejection of it 2
prevails, substantial questions arise with respect to the resulting impinge-
ment on the group's freedom of speech.
Quite apart from an individual's possible claim to a "right" to First
Amendment protection against being compelled by government to sup-
port an association, and therefore its advocacy activities, is the "interest"
of the individual in being relieved of the obligation to support the advo-
cacy speech of an association that he or she is compelled by circum-
stances to join, or wishes to join, in order to obtain the other benefits it
offers. 3 In such circumstances, the constitutional "right" of individuals
(if any)54 to be protected against government-compelled contribution to
a group's speech is not involved; but the individual's negative speech
"interest" is involved. Even if the individual's support of the group is not
compelled, he or she may find it objectionable to participate in, or con-
tribute to support, the association's advocacy speech as a condition of
obtaining the other benefits the association offers. If individuals' nega-
tive speech interests are protected by the state by, for example, legisla-
tion restricting the funding or subject matter of the group's advocacy
speech or activities,5 the question arises whether such legislation un-
If the impingement on the protestant's negative speech rights is driven by non-
communicative considerations such as those that underpin the integrated bar and the
impact is not viewpoint-based, the impingement's propriety may be tested under adum-
brations from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-82 (1968). See TRIBE, supra
note 9, §§ 12-2, 12-3, at 789-804; John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1482, 1482-1507 (1975). On that view, the propriety of the impingement is easier
to accept.
52 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2. The lower courts uphold the even more attenu-
ated claims to First Amendment protection made by students in state universities who
resist contribution to student activities funds that implicate political action. See cases
cited supra note 50.
" It does not detract from the importance of that negative "interest" that imputation
of the group's view to the individual is more likely if his or her participation in the
association is voluntary than if it is compelled.
"' The connection between contributing and speaking may be deemed to be broken
by reason of the pooling of contributions in a general fund to be spent for a range of
functions of which advocacy speech is only one, often quite peripheral, function. See
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 102-13.
" See, e.g., Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742-44
(1988); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 746-49 (1961);
Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1956). But cf Novosel v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983).
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constitutionally interferes with the group's speech. Such legislation
would seek to resolve the conflict between the negative speech interests
of individuals who prefer not to support the group's advocacy activities,
and the speech interests (or indeed rights) of the group and those mem-
bers who wish to support the multi-purpose association and its collective
voice."
2. Freedom of Choice and Uses of Wealth to Affect Advocacy
Activity--Restrictions on Individuals and on Associations
a. Freedom of Choice of Individuals in Associations
As an abstract proposition, unbundling a multi-purpose organization's
political or ideological activity and related advocacy speech from its
other authorized behavior should lower the barriers to individual contri-
butions and membership. In theory, such unbundling should make a
rational individual more willing to contribute, join, or continue member-
ship in the enterprise than if the activities of the enterprise were bun-
dled.57 However, advantages may be offered by a bundled enterprise
that are worth more than the opportunity to assemble the equivalent
bundle by acting through separate enterprises. If the contribution to the
56 It may be argued that the individual's interest at issue is not a "speech" interest
but merely a "liberty" interest in the transfer and use of funds that he or she is contrib-
uting to the association. See supra note 27. If that argument is valid, the claim of the
association to use (i.e., transfer) the funds for expression (i.e., to pay someone to ex-
press notions that "the association" wishes expressed) would seem to be more a "liber-
ty" interest than a "speech" interest. Except for the difference between the negative and
the positive character of the claimed interest, it is problematic to treat the former as not
a speech interest and at the same time treat the latter as a speech interest, for purposes
of determining whether the First Amendment precludes the government from limiting
enjoyment of the interest. See Stark, supra note 27, at 1362-78. To be sure, as Dan-
Cohen has argued persuasively, it may not be necessary or appropriate to protect all
associational speech identically with individual speech. See Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, su-
pra note 4, at 1241-44.
" Individuals may oppose the use of collective funds to advocate all or some kinds
of government action that would further those professional, occupational, or investment
aspirations that impelled them to contribute to the organization. Use of the association's
funds and energies to urge consumer acceptance of a proposed program by the associa-
tion may well be acceptable even if one disagrees with the proposed program; but use
of those funds to seek enforcement of the program by government coercion may not be.
Moreover, to the extent that government power is sought to prescribe regulation or
deregulation with respect to externalities (such as environmental protection, taxes, race
relations, political processes, or health, military, or foreign policy) that affect members
as citizens apart from their interests as members, individuals may well be unwilling to
furnish the funds for such proposals, particularly if they disagree with them.
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
group is induced by the offer of material benefits, individuals may be
more willing to let a portion of their contribution be used for such activi-
ties than if they were solicited for funds only for such activities. The
logic of collective action suggests that such bundling helps to solve free-
rider problems.58 However, depending on the kind of association and
the form of intervention, the net benefits to society from mandatory
unbundling may exceed its costs to participating individuals.
The cost-benefit question is not answered by generic arguments about
freedom of choice, such as the argument that if both bundled and
unbundled associations are available to persons who wish to form or join
one, the parties and the public are free to join one or the other, and the
virtues of unbundling are available, but the limitations of mandatory
unbundling are avoided. That theme implicates two kinds of issues. Nor-
matively, even if such private arrangements can be made with sufficient
cognition and volition appropriately to reflect the parties' free consent to
bind themselves, are there societal reasons to deny such freedom by
mandating unbundling?59 Moreover, as a practical matter, is it possible
for sufficient freedom of choice to be available to the parties to such
private arrangements to meet the consensual norm embodied in the indi-
vidual autonomy that entails freedom of contract, let alone freedom to
make choices about public matters?60
Both the normative and the practical questions have been debated and
answers have been offered by free market economists and libertarian phi-
losophers as well as by those devoted to republican virtues or
communitarian values. Few would deny that to some extent government
intervention is necessary to take care of "externalities" created by wholly
volitional private arrangements. Others would raise the question whether,
'8 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 76-91 (1965).
" E.g., will the advocacy voice of the collective drown out or obscure the opposing
voices of members acting individually, or if there is dissent in the group, will the col-
lective voice distort (i.e., overstate) the power of the message the group sends? Does
formation of one group alter the menu available to the public if formation of competing
groups is thereby required but costly and often impossible?
60 For example, are there pressures on individuals to join or support the group (e.g.,
government mandate) that can be said to deprive them of adequate freedom of choice
with respect to supporting the group's advocacy activities? Does the association have an
actual or effective monopoly on necessities normally sought by individuals? Does the
lure of the material inducements to join the group so far outweigh the cost of yielding
to the group's political voice as to obscure the latter or make it de minimis in deciding
to join, resulting in a mirror image of the free-rider problem? Will the incentive to form
a political action group be so muted by the need to avoid free-rider problems that ex-
pressive groups are not likely to be formed as competitors unless multi-purpose groups
are forced to unbundle?
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in principle, the fully volitional private ordering advocated by libertarians
is ever possible or always an unrestrictable "good" even from the point
of view of its participants.6 Still others, perhaps most, also would be
concerned with whether there should be limits on private ordering, if
only to vindicate the volitional and cognitive premises underlying the
free choice ascribed to the participants.62
The debate does not signal that government should never (or often)
intervene to impede or restrain collective advocacy choices of members
of multi-purpose associations. Even if those debating the issue suggest an
a priori tilt against government-imposed restraints in general, the debate
contemplates some sorts of intervention on some occasions, and leaves
open many crucial questions-such as questions about the kinds of im-
pediments (publicly or privately imposed) to individuals' free choice to
contribute in support of a group's advocacy activities that government
may counter, and by what mechanisms government may do so consis-
tently with the commands of the First Amendment. Answers turn on
61 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites and Tradition in the Making of Cor-
porate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1712-47 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 43-47 (1989);
Mark Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Em-
pirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 205-14 (1988);
Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Re-
view?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 487-99 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131-38 (1986). Quite apart from
the problems that arise because individuals may lawfully exercise "coercive" power
over other individuals in a "free" society, some sort of coercive state action-i.e., gov-
ernment intervention-is required to enable private ordering. If such "minimum" gov-
ernment intervention is necessary, to what extent do the considerations that justify inter-
vention require, or at least permit, additional government intervention to restrain or
prescribe some of the terms and consequences of the private ordering that is enabled by
the underlying rules of contract, property, etc.?
62 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhouser eds., 1985); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403-10 (1985). Even if preferences
are exogenous, but cf supra note 61, their exercise requires volition and cognition. The
requisite volition is lacking if the associational arrangements are compelled, and is
problematic if they are effected between one person or a coherent group, on one side,
and a dispersed multitude of individuals, each with relatively trivial stakes, on the other.
Resolution of the intractable problems encountered in attempting to define "volition" of
an individual on the ambiguous assumptions of individual autonomy is not necessary for
present purposes. It is sufficient to recognize that there are degrees or levels of volition-
al behavior, and to focus on the purpose for which definition is sought-e.g., what de-
gree of individual volition should society protect by law, subsidy, or otherwise against
impairment by others and for what purposes?
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more particularized examination of kinds of association and of interven-
tion.
b. Restrictions on Uses of Wealth that Impede Individuals' Freedom of
Choice
In the American vision of democratic society, the validity of collec-
tive political decisions or public choice generally turns on the number of
individual human beings who signify that they favor (or oppose) a pro-
posal or candidate. The underlying assumptions are that such individuals
choose knowledgeably and freely, and that all should be bound by the
majority (or super-majority) choice thus made.
If the premise is added that it is proper to multiply each vote by
some measure of the intensity with which each person seeks the deci-
sion, the wealth of individuals may be relevant to the validity of the
decision. Expenditure of that wealth may be seen as an appropriate im-
plementing measure of the intensity of the individual's preference. On
that assumption, individuals are entitled to expend lawfully as much or
as little of their wealth as they wish on expressive activities or to further
political or advocacy results they seek. To be sure, the free-choice as-
sumption and the wealth expenditure proposition are subject to consider-
able disagreement,63 even if they are embodied in current constitutional
doctrine." The considerations that justify individuals' use of their
wealth to power the intensity of their advocacy preferences and magnify
their advocacy voices (in elections, referenda, public support of legis-
lation, or otherwise) may appropriately justify the voice of an advocacy
63 The notions of "one human (citizen): one vote" and majority rule subtend an arc
of possible operational rules that need not include wealth as a permissible measure of
intensity. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 29, at 45-46; SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 163;
Bruce A. Ackerman, Crediting the Voters. A New Beginning for Campaign Finance,
AM. PROSPECT 71 (Spring 1993); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Judicial Review, 17
STAN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1982); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitution-
al Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206-13 (1994); Wright,
Politics, supra note 27, at 1005-13. The impact of the use of wealth in advocacy activi-
ty by some individuals on the knowledge and freedom with which others are able to
make choices has induced occasional discussion of a need for restrictions on such use
or for subsidies of those who lack wealth. See supra note 28. The phenomenal expendi-
tures by some individual candidates in the 1994 congressional elections suggest a cer-
tain grotesquerie in the notion that wealth may appropriately be a proxy for intensity in
making public choices.
4 The message of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is neither clear nor graven
in stone, as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-66 (1990)
suggests. Cf Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the "New Cor-
ruption": Waiting for the Court, 44 VAND. L. REV. 767, 767-76 (1991).
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group organized and funded to act collectively to amplify the individual
participants' voices. But the same considerations do not justify the advo-
cacy voices of multi-purpose associations.
Members of associations often do not all agree with their
organizations' collective choice. Such dissonance poses a problem inher-
ent in collective decision-making even when a purely advocacy associa-
tion is involved and only one issue is to be resolved.65 That problem,
which is solvable tolerably in an advocacy organization, is exacerbated
(and not equally solvable) if funds are contributed by individuals to an
association under compulsion (by reason of government mandate or eco-
nomic necessity) or in order to obtain goods, services, or other non-advo-
cacy benefits that the enterprise offers, and those funds also fuel the
enterprise's advocacy voice.
If the individual's contribution is compelled or indisputably made
solely in order to obtain the goods or collateral benefits and the contribu-
tor is ignorant of, or effectively indifferent to, the group's uses of collec-
tive funds for advocacy activities, that contribution can fairly be said not
to constitute, and that use not to reflect, volitional support of those activ-
ities by the contributor. If the contribution is not forced and is indisput-
ably made to support the advocacy activity of the group by the contribu-
tors who are relatively indifferent to the collateral benefits, the
contributors' support of the advocacy activities is not relevantly less
volitional than their support of the activities of a purely advocacy organi-
zation. In the "real" world, although the polar cases are not infrequently
approximated, many kinds of multi-purpose associations exist between
the poles. The magnitude of the compulsion or collateral rewards induc-
ing individuals to join or remain members of particular kinds of multi-
purpose associations (both in absolute terms and in relation to the advo-
cacy activities on the association's agenda) affects the volitional char-
acter of the individual's support of the particular group's advocacy activ-
65 An organization's speech is apt to be the result of different, sometimes contradic-
tory, preferences of its members (or agents), and therefore may well not constitute the
speech of any of its individual participants. To recognize this difference does not deny
the separateness of the individual participant's claim (and if the government yields to
that claim, his or her entitlement) to be free from the obligation to support, by funds or
otherwise, the organization's capacity to offer "its" speech. If that claim or entitlement
is a negative speech interest protected by the First Amendment (as the Supreme Court
states in cases of mandated membership and implies for other forms of membership by
its reasoning in those cases), see cases cited supra note 2, there is often a sharp conflict
between the individual's speech interest and that of the group which may have effects
on the audience and on society. Analysis of the various speech interests involved, which
suggests different values for each, has been offered by Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra
note 4, at 1234-67.
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ities. That the logic of collective action may require some selective in-
centives or collateral inducements to individuals to support even an ad-
vocacy group's advocacy activities 66 does not mean that any and all
such inducements or tie-ins are necessary or appropriate in order to solve
free-rider problems or to enable interest groups to perform such of their
functions as may be claimed, praised, or deplored.
Doubtless an interest group's advocacy voice will be more powerful
if it is fueled by the funds raised through a multi-purpose association
than if it is effected through the more modest funding induced by emo-
tional or affective appeals67 of an association formed solely to give a
collective advocacy voice. However, at least with respect to compelled
support, and possibly to some kinds of collateral inducements or tie-ins,
the cost to individuals of having part of their advocacy voice held hos-
tage to their need or desire for the tied-in goods is not trivial. That cost
deprives the individual's advocacy voice of the volitional character that
may appropriately be deemed necessary to give it validity in matters of
public choice, if not also in matters of private choice. In decisions on
matters of public governance, the effect of one person's choice on how
the state's coercive power should be exercised (or restrained) over all
persons gives each an interest in preserving the freedom of others to
choose that is lacking for choices made about private exchanges or re-
turns.
Moreover, the resulting power in the group supports a collective
advocacy voice that lacks the justification of an individual's expressive
role. Wealth gives power to individuals to color the mix of information
and advice the audience receives in favor of the expressions or views the
wealthy person prefers, particularly in matters on which the audience is
asked to make an advocacy choice. The argument that airing of offset-
ting or contrary views by others enables public decisions to be made
appropriately by reason of the resulting mix in the marketplace of ideas
is less persuasive today than it may have been historically.6" Such justi-
' See OLSON, supra note 58, at 5-52; MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF NATIONS 17-35 (1982) [hereinafter OLSON, NATIONS].
67 That such appeals have power, notwithstanding the impulse of "rational" actors to
see only their self-interest and to free-ride, is the suggestion of a growing body of liter-
ature that does not question the basic premise. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION 101-24 (1982); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 24-30, 233-
44(1980).
" Justification for the coloring power of wealthy individuals on public discourse, or
at least for forbidding government to limit that power, sometimes proceeds on the as-
sumption that disagreements among those with wealth will result in the audience receiv-
ing a full (or at least a broad enough) range of conflicting views. That assumption may
be valid for many matters on which the public is addressed. However, that assumption's
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fication as exists for entitling the audience to receive and act upon a mix
of information and advice that is so colored is to be found less in the
notion of possible expressive offsets to the advocacy power of wealthy
individuals or expressive associations than in other considerations. Those
considerations stem from the notion of individuals' entitlement to spend
their wealth and exercise "disproportionate"69 power in advocacy activi-
ties and expression, and society's interest in freedom from government
efforts to control or influence the viewpoints in that mix or to prohibit
individual inputs to that mix, whether made personally or collectively
through expressive associations.
Whatever the validity or reach of those arguments,7" they do not
justify empowering the advocacy voices of multi-purpose associations, or
the use of their wealth to enhance the power of their voices over the
voices of individuals or purely expressive associations. Nor do they pre-
clude fettering the voices of multi-purpose organizations. Such enterpris-
es obtain their funds for non-advocacy activities by contributions from
individuals who, although they wish to (or must) support those activities,
need not, and may not wish to fund the group's advocacy voice apart
from the non-advocacy activities that induced the contribution. To pre-
clude collective voices so funded from affecting the mix of advocacy
voices that the public receives does not mean that the public will be
denied views funded by those individuals who wish to give, or add,
particular color to advocacy messages, or that those individuals will be
precluded from so using their wealth. Those persons remain entirely free,
collectively or individually, to provide such colors-by spending person-
al funds for advocacy activities or contributing them to advocacy enter-
validity is far from self-evident on the many important matters in which those with
wealth have views more congruent with one another than with the views of those with-
out wealth or the capacity to form interest groups. See, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSNEIDER, THE
SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 34-35 (1969); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 398-410 (1986); David
Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541,
568-77 (1991). Nor can the power of those with wealth to tint the mix of views and
information presented to the public be offset (individually or in interest groups) general-
ly by the possibility that those who lack wealth can somehow (by banding together or
otherwise) acquire access to communication mechanisms or persuasive powers to dis-
solve the tint, or at least materially affect the colors of the mix. See, e.g., CBS v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973); Weinberg, supra note 28, at 1138-64.
69 That is, more than the power of others who have little or no wealth.
70 There is room to argue over the quality and quantity of information and persua-
sion that is appropriate to influence citizens in making public choices in a democratic
society, and particularly over the extent to which an individual's wealth or lack of
wealth should affect the menu offered to those making the choice. See supra notes 28,
63.
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prises uninfluenced by the inducement to receive the benefits from the
enterprise's non-advocacy activities.
The considerations that justify prohibition of vote-buying in the elec-
toral process (notwithstanding that such prohibition precludes Pareto
superior exchanges), may not deny all uses of wealth by individuals in
electoral contests or referenda or the like, including purchase of advo-
cacy voices. However, those considerations suggest problems with forc-
ing individuals' advocacy support or inducing it by offering collateral
benefits which necessarily obfuscate the extent to which advocacy choic-
es of individuals are made when they contribute to associations orga-
nized principally for non-advocacy purposes. The state need not be con-
fined in protecting individuals' freedom of choice in advocacy matters to
forbidding coercion or fraud by multi-purpose associations7' in acquir-
ing funds that may be used for advocacy activities. Other kinds of ob-
structions to choice in the contribution of funds for advocacy activities
may also be deemed improper by a society that respects individuals'
freedom to have, and to make, advocacy choices. Moreover, a democrat-
" The assumption that the source or existence of an individual's wealth is irrelevant
to, and may not qualify, his or her right to use or spend it on expression protected by
the First Amendment, including advocacy activity, see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684-85 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Larry E. Ribstein,
Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 125-59 (1992), does not
protect him or her from sanctions for acquiring it improperly. In some cases, such sanc-
tions may entail impediments to the individual's speech, such as ordering the return of
improperly acquired property (e.g., a speech amplifier) or even an injunction against use
of misappropriated cash to fund speech if the misappropriator is an agent and the victim
his principal. Cf Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-16 (1980).
In any event, the multi-purpose association's acquisition of its collective assets
from individuals is more closely related to the multi-purpose association's expenditure
on advocacy speech than is an individual's acquisition of assets, contractually or other-
wise, in discrete arms-length transactions with another. That both transactions may be
characterized as contracts does not make their entailments the same. In the latter case,
the relationship of the parties to the exchange is not continuing, and the acquirer's use
of the assets acquired does not generally involve any asset in which the contributor
continues to be implicated, or have a residual interest, at the time of the expenditure on
speech. In the former case, collective assets are acquired from individuals in exchange
for continuing membership or participation in the collective, and continuing interest in
use of the assets. Moreover, if the individuals do not, or may not, want the assets to be
expended for advocacy speech, that speech interest would not be protected, except trivi-
ally, by permitting the group to spend the collected funds on advocacy speech and be
punished later for violating its promise or a prohibition against soliciting funds for such
use. This is not to say that the First Amendment would not preclude government inter-
diction of such expenditures by the group if the interdiction were applied or aimed
discriminatorily at certain viewpoints or were designed to, or effectively did, suppress
the content of the speech.
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ic society may also be concerned that the flow of funds to such activities
be the result of a more or less self-conscious choice by individuals to
expend funds for effecting value preferences for governance of the soci-
ety. The harmful effects of vote trafficking on the individual and on
society72 are echoed in the linking by a multi-purpose association of
support for its advocacy voice to the necessities or other non-advocacy
benefits that it offers and that are not otherwise available. The same is
true, although to a lesser degree, of linking advocacy support to obtain-
ing benefits whose magnetic attraction overwhelms and effectively ob-
scures the advocacy support thus given.73 The metaphor of a market for
political results is no more than a metaphor.74 It does not suggest that in
matters of public governance society should be precluded from acting on
72 Pamela J. Karlan, Not by Money, But by Virtue Won?: Vote Trafficking and the
Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1464-75 (1994); see also Robert C. Clark,
Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 804-05 (1979).
" The principle that underpins government decisions to protect individuals from
being forced or induced by incentives that mask the support of a group's advocacy
voice to give such support does not require government to protect individuals against
the compulsion that disadvantages in their social or economic condition, like poverty,
may impose upon them to give aid to candidates or causes that promise them govern-
ment benefits. The considerations underlying the First Amendment that permit, and
indeed support, the former do not require the latter, even if they support or permit it. In
short, not all impediments to free choice in advocacy matters need be removed by gov-
ernment (by proscription, subsidy, or otherwise) even if some are removed and the
removal of others, such as disadvantages resulting from disparities in education, health,
or the like, may also be desirable. Nor is freeing individuals' opportunities for advocacy
choice from being tied to their need for, or desire for, other goods incompatible-in
principle or in practice-with preserving individuals' freedom to seek or support gov-
ernment action (or inaction) in order to obtain personal benefits that will result from the
government action (or inaction) that they support. Cf Karlan, supra note 72, at 1460-
61. Nor does providing such protection to individuals even implicate limiting the expen-
ditures of wealthy individuals for advocacy activity in order to even the playing field
for those lacking such wealth, or restricting "the speech ... of some ... in order to
enhance the relative voice of others." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
" Even metaphorically to analyze the choices embodied in exchanges between inter-
est groups (or individual voters) and elected officials as buying and selling "goods," cf
Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 341-51, 363-64
(1988), assumes volitional behavior on all sides. That assumption implicates inquiry into
the funding of those exchanges, and in particular whether the funds that associations
obtain and use for advocacy action are freely given or are obtained by government
mandate, economic necessity, or even merely tie-in sales of goods that are desired but
not necessary for the purchaser. Cf Kelman, supra note 61, at 204-15. The shadow on
the volition that fuels the advocacy views of an association funded by compelled con-
tributions or by a tie-in process does not equally darken the volitional character of an
individual's gift to a political association or personal expenditure on behalf of a candi-
date or cause.
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the premise that people who contribute to advocacy action without the
inducement of immediate collateral rewards for making the contribution
are more likely than those offered collateral rewards to evaluate the
relationship of their contributions to their advocacy preferences.75 Even
if society is not required-or permitted-in every case to enforce that
conception of free choice in the exercise of advocacy action, it should
not be precluded from protecting that vision in such matters, at least as
the compulsion or lure of the collateral inducement increasingly obscures
the import of the accompanying advocacy action.
Degrees of compulsion and obfuscation to infbrmed and free individ-
ual choice in affecting an association's advocacy voice vary with associ-
ations.76 The cost of implementing protection of such freedom on the
circulation or distribution of advocacy voices to the public also varies
with the scope and mode of protection proposed. The wisdom and the
constitutionality of a proscription of the u se of funds for collective advo-
cacy action by multi-purpose associations turn on examination of the
institutional role and the operation of particular kinds of multi-purpose
associations and particular types of intervention.
B. Intervention in Advocacy Activities of Compelled or Pressured
Association
To discuss in the abstract the existence or import of a "negative"
speech right or interest of individuals, or society's legitimate interest in
having multi-purpose associations' advocacy speech undertaken by its
members individually or collectively in a separate expressive association
does not solve the problems that assertion of those interests generates in
" A requirement of full disclosure by the multi-purpose association of its past or
contemplated uses of funds for specified advocacy activities may mitigate the obscuring
effect of the non-advocacy incentives to contribute to or support it. Nevertheless, the
problem is not one that disclosure will cure. Ex ante relief is hard to effect, and ex post
relief by way of damages does not prevent the ex ante failure to disclose or use the
funds. Cf supra note 72. More important, disclosure of a potential use of funds does
not remove the fetters on the contributor's freedom of choice in advocacy matters, al-
though illumination of the choice may in some circumstances unfetter the constraints
enough to be relevant in measuring whether the government intervention is narrow
enough.
76 For example, where smaller "private" associations are involved, the lure of the
tied-in benefits is less likely to obscure or overbear the import of the group's advocacy
activities. A relatively small multi-purpose association will offer higher visibility for its
advocacy activities to aspirants who are more likely to contemplate active participation
in its affairs. In such enterprises, the free-rider problem is less serious and unbundling
less needed to enhance individual choice. OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 66, at 53-65.
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specific institutional or operational contexts. In each of those contexts
honoring, or deferring in whole or in part to, the individual's claim or
society's interest in protecting it entails curtailing the right of the group
to speak and of its audience to hear its communication. Assessing the
propriety of that curtailment requires examination of particular associa-
tions and particular government interventions.
1. Integrated Bar
We begin by examining constitutionally-begotten court-imposect limi-
tations on the advocacy speech of associations whose members are di-
rected by government to join or support the organization. A flowering
garden of jurisprudence on the problem of such associations and their
advocacy speech-albeit cultivated largely in state law-has grown from
the claims of members of integrated bars.77 The claims are made pri-
marily by dissident individuals seeking to be excused from membership
in the state bar association, seeking rebate of a portion of their dues pay-
ments, or seeking to curtail the public utterances that the bar association
makes-generally in the form of lobbying and urging public acceptance
or support for particular policy proposals.
Generally the association functions primarily for the licensure, educa-
tion, and discipline (including promulgation of ethical standards) of the
members of the bar. In addition, however, almost all such associations
are empowered in very general terms to seek to improve the administra-
tion of justice, to provide legal research in areas of substantive and pro-
cedural law, and to provide for discussion of law reform. Under those
general provisions, integrated state bar associations acting either by their
boards alone or with approval of their membership have used portions of
the associations' funds, largely supplied by compelled dues, to lobby and
otherwise to publicize positions in support of or opposed to proposals on
public questions before the legislature or the voters."
That membership in such associations is compelled by government is
not disputed by anyone, notwithstanding that the sanction for failure to
join may be only denial of access to a reasonably chosen mode of work
(and the personal fulfillment, as well as the material returns it brings)
rather than imprisonment or other criminal sanction. The considerations
supporting an integrated (rather than a voluntary) bar association have
" See supra note 21. There are many variations in the formulae (contained in the
charter or rules creating the bar association) defining the powers and authority of such
organizations. See infra notes 90, 92, 93.
78 See, e.g., Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 463-64 (D.N.M. 1982) (listing 16
bills on which the New Mexico State Bar expended funds for lobbying).
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been deemed "reasonable" by the Court, even though a case certainly
can be made that a voluntary bar association may reasonably achieve the
same societal goals and, therefore, a mandate to join is not necessary.79
Delegation by government of power to regulate substantial areas of
professional conduct of the legal profession to a "private" association
subject to implicit restrictions against "arbitrary" action" raises no
" Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 842-43 (1961); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S.
1, 7-9, 15-17 (1990). The wisdom of requiring an integrated bar is far from obvious.
The impact of bar associations on the politics, reforms, and ideology of the society, see
TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY 41-47 (1987), argues for voluntary rather
than integrated bar associations to serve those functions. The conflicting policy consid-
erations have been the subject of continuous debate and research by practitioners, judg-
es, and academics. See In re State Bar, 485 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Wis. 1992). Compare
Anthony Murray, The Unified Bar Serves the Public Interest, CAL. LAW., May 1983, at
13, 13 and W. Reece Smith, Jr., In Support of the Integrated Bar, 5 FLA. BAR J. 258,
258-59 (1980) with Edward L. Lascher, Dismantle the Unified Bar, CAL. LAW., May
1983, at 12, 12 and Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept,
1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 1, 79-96.
Although the Supreme Court, in assessing the claim of infringement of freedom of
association, noted the distinction between the compulsion to become a member and the
compulsion to pay dues, see Keller, 496 U.S. at 17, state courts do not make much of
that distinction. However the claim is cast, the opinions seem to proceed on the premise
that the requirement to associate should be upheld if the state has a reasonable basis for
forcing the association. E.g., In re Chapman, 509 A.2d 753, 755-56 (N.H. 1986); Report
of Comm. to Review the State Bar, 334 N.W.2d. 544, 546-47 (Wis. 1983) ("[A] unified
bar association is more likely to administer its programs in the public interest [and]...
the performance of such functions is more efficient and economical if conducted by a
single association financially supported by all lawyers . . . ."); see also Cheryl A.
Cardelli, Casenote, Falk v. State Bar of Michigan: First Amendment Challenge to Bar
Expenditures, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 737, 738-39,.747-50.
Occasionally there are imputations that the First Amendment is the source of the
complaining individual's entitlement to freedom of association and of the limits on
government power to restrict association. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d
1564, 1567-69 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Arrow, 544 F. Supp. at 462; Falk v. State Bar, 342
N.W.2d 504, 506-14 (Mich. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984); Chapman, 509
A.2d at 757-58; cf Gibson v. Florida Bar, 906 F.2d 624, 631-32 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 499 U.S. 918 (1991), cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 104 (1991). However, the logic
of the apparent standard of judicial review (i.e., reasonable basis) is that, apart from its
relation to speech activities, the claim of freedom not to associate derives from the
liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and is to be so tested. See
Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1569; cf Gibson, 906 F.2d at 631-32; cf Kidwell v. Transportation
Communication Int'l, 946 F.2d 283, 299 (4th Cir. 1991). For the Supreme Court, the
substantive judgment about the propriety of coercing membership, at least in a more or
less "impersonal" association, is derivative because the case comes to it with the state's
"reasonable" preference already expressed. Cf Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
80 See Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Asso-
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questions that have not been answered in upholding such delegation for
other trades or professions.8 Being forced by government formally to
join or to contribute to the support of a government-sponsored profes-
sional or occupational association goes a step further but presents no
'significantly different constitutional or other normative obstacles. Com-
pelling a person to join, or at least support, a self-regulatory organization
is reasonable in order to solve free-rider problems and to assure that the
association can educate, prescribe standards for, and discipline the pro-
fession. 2
The Supreme Court has divided claims to be free from such compul-
sion (at least insofar as the association effectively consisted only of pay-
ing dues to the bar association) into claims for freedom to decline to
associate and claims for freedom to decline to support the group's
speech.83 The former was apparently reviewed as a claim to deprivation
of "liberty" (not implicating the First Amendment) and rejected.84 The
ciations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 994 (1963).
8 See, e.g., J.F. Barron, Business and Professional Licensing: California, A Repre-
sentative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 651-53 (1966); Walter Gellhom, The Abuse
of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 10-13 (1976); Louis L. Jaffe, Law
Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 247-53 (1937); George W.
Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J.
650, 701 (1975).
82 See, e.g., In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 374 A.2d 802, 803 (R.I. 1977); In re
Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709, 713-14 (N.H. 1968).
To the extent that lawyers' activities in initiating or conducting litigation implicate
petitioning the government, the validity of restraints on those activities implicit in com-
pelling support of, or membership in, a professional association may require testing
under the strict scrutiny jurisprudence of the First Amendment rather than under the
"reasonable basis" jurisprudence dealing with intrusions on liberty. Compare In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 433-34 (1978) with Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Sur-
vivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1985) and Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457
(1978). But cf Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 795 F. Supp 50,
55-56 (D. Mass. 1992). For protection of association as an implementation of the right
to petition, see United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971); UMW v.
Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963); In
re New Hampshire Disabilities Rights Ctr., 541 A.2d 208, 215 (N.H. 1988).
83 See, e.g., Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-17; Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 842-43.
84 See Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 842-43. The sources of protection of association or
associational relationships for individuals and for associations are not easily found in
the Constitution. The Constitution contains no explicit reference to association, possibly
because of a reluctance to offer too protective a stance against government for some
associational relationships. See Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., The Open Window and the
Open Door, 35 CAL. L. REV. 336, 341-42 (1947). Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madi-
son); THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 190 (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed., 1950) (1651).
Both the individual's and the group's claims to protection of association seem to be
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latter was reviewed as a claim of interference with speech and therefore
as a violation of the First Amendment, and was upheld.8" Hence, while
based upon the assumption of a more or less "natural right" of individual human beings
to associate-i.e., to relate to others in intimate affiliation or in private or public groups
and to act collectively. See ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 323
(Henry S. Commager ed. & Henry Reeve trans., Oxford University Press 1947) (1840);
ROBERT A. HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1956); JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 109-10 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859); CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION 1-18 (1962); TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-3, at 1308-12; cf United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875). But cf Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Condi-
tions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the
Problem of Dibartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 149, 180-88. For a suggestion that the "right"
of association is independent and not merely instrumental in implementing other indi-
vidual rights, see TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-26, at 1010-15; Reena Raggi, An Indepen-
dent Right of Freedom to Association, 12 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1977).
See also DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 177.
Possibly the principal source of constitutional protection for the "right" of associa-
tion (which, as we have seen, entails several substantially different kinds of relation-
ships) is the "liberty" which is protected in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25
(1989); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Notwithstanding the
sweeping language in many opinions about the protection that the First Amendment
offers for freedom of association, those particular cases involve behavior that impli-
cates, in addition to the freedom of association, First Amendment speech and religion
claims, as the Court later suggested in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965), and Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 23-25. But cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387
(1978). Support may also be found in the "privacy" concept suggested by additional
protective provisions in, and adumbrations from, the Bill of Rights. TRIBE, supra note
9, §§ 15-3, 15-4, at 1308-14; see William 0. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1368-70 (1963). The limitless Ninth Amendment has also been
urged as a source of the right of association. See Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated
Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have?: The Case of Association Freedom, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 110-12 (1987). But cf Wyzanski, supra, at 341-42. The
claim to protection of religious liberty is likely to be a more substantial, if narrower,
source of some associational rights. Another viable constitutional source of protection of
association or refusal to associate may be found in the ricochet off the equal protection
concept that is explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and implicit in the Fifth Amend-
ment. See Stanglin, 440 U.S. at 25-30.
" Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-17. The First Amendment is increasingly the source of a
claimed freedom of association that first unfolded in Supreme Court opinions that pro-
tect a group and its members against government threats to its members' freedom to
speak and to join as groups engaged largely in communication or advocacy speech. See
supra note 47; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1945); De Jonge V. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
363-65 (1937). To be invoked, the First Amendment presumably requires a claim that
the government intervention that impairs freedom of association (whether by compelling
a person to join a group, by compelling the group to accept outsiders, by seeking to
deter persons from joining, or otherwise) in some sense also impairs speech or related
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the portion of the compelled dues payments that was used to implement
the association's professional activities could constitutionally be exacted
without involving any speech right or violating any "liberty" right of the
payor,86 the portion expended on "activities of an ideological nature
which fall outside of those areas of [professional] activity" violate the
payor's First Amendment speech rights.87
In Keller v. State Bar," the Court barely acknowledged the difficul-
ty of administering the constitutional regime thus created, which requires
distinguishing between expenditures for ideological or political activities
and expenditures for professional activities. It referred to the elaborate
jurisprudence generated for "compelled" dues payments under union or
agency shop arrangements to illuminate the methods for administering
the distinction so as to protect individual objectors without unduly inter-
fering with the group's First Amendment speech rights.89 The Court's
opinion in Keller offers a constitutional solution that substantially tracks
assembly or petition rights of the claimants. The relationship thus protected is more
public than private, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1030-40 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and
Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 99 (1987), and it en-
tails more the protection of public activities and the social value of exchange and devel-
opment of ideas and information than fulfillment of the persona of the individual mem-
ber. But cf Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1251-54.
86 See Keller, 496 U.S. at 11-13. But see id. at 17. On the assumption that joining
the state bar association was mandated by government, the Court in Lathrop treated the
complaint as raising a question under the Fourteenth Amendment as to the scope of the
imputed First Amendment's prohibition against government interference with freedom
of association. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 842. Apparently on the assumption that the only
obligation of membership was to pay dues, id. at 843, the propriety of the compulsion
to associate was reviewed under a less strict standard than is said to be required for
measuring a claimant's rights (certainly for measuring free speech rights) under the
First Amendment. Id.; see Levine v. Heffeman, 864 F.2d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989). The Lathrop Court relied expressly on Railway Employes'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and simply found that the state "might reason-
ably believe" that regulating its bar by requiring membership in the state bar association
was preferable to leaving the matter to a voluntary association and that a "legitimate
end of state policy" overshadowed any claims of individuals that they not be required to
join or become members of the association in order to practice law. Lathrop, 367 U.S.
at 843; cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1976) (suggesting that freedom of
association differs from freedom of speech and is, at least when not connected to
speech, entitled to less protection).
87 Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
88 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
89 Id. at 11-15. But see Jennifer Friessen, The Costs of "Free Speech ": Restrictions
on the Use of Union Dues to Fund New Organizations, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603,
606-14 (1988).
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the results reached in some jurisdictions in addressing comparable chal-
lenges to the integrated bar-i.e., pro-ration of members' dues.9" The
Court's solution does not expressly preclude the integrated bar associa-
tion from engaging in ideological or political speech so long as it sup-
ports such speech only by voluntary contributions from members.9
Such a solution leaves the association with greater freedom than do solu-
tions adopted by states that "interpret" the powers of the integrated bar
to be so limited (either by reason of the authorizing mandate or by the
court's supervisory authority) as to preclude the association from engag-
ing in political or ideological activities.92 Those states rely on the same
kind of ambiguous distinction between permissible and impermissible
expression as does the Supreme Court. However, they invoke the dis-
tinction to limit the subject matter of the group's speech rather than to
limit the funds with which it can fuel its ideological speech.93
The conclusion of those states, as well as the question left open by
the Supreme Court in Keller, implicates the constitutional right of the
group to speak at all on ideological or political questions. If the associa-
tion were not created under special government auspices as an institution
which all lawyers must join and support, it might plausibly urge that the
limitations on ideological or advocacy activities that the Court's ruling
creates violate its rights and its complying members' speech rights under
9 See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Bar, 906 F.2d 624, 631-32 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Gibson v.
Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11 th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados,
682 F. Supp. 674, 690 (D.C.P.R. 1988), aff'd in relevant part, 917 F.2d 620, 640 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865 (1992); Virgin Islands Bar Ass'n v. Virgin
Islands, 648 F. Supp. 170, 180-81 (D.C.V.I. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded, 857 F.2d 163, 168-69 (3rd Cir. 1988); Reynolds v. State Bar, 660 P.2d 581,
581 (Mont. 1983).
9" But in Keller, the Court expressly left open a question that casts a shadow on
such engagement. Keller, 496 U.S. at 17. The Court referred back to the California
courts the question whether notwithstanding the limits placed on the group's use of the
forced dues payments, the speech rights of persons who were compelled to become
members of the association were violated if the organization engaged in any ideological
or political activities. Id.; cf. Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union,
946 F.2d 283, 299 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992).
92 See, e.g., In re Chapman, 509 A.2d 753, 758-59 (N.H. 1986); On Petition to
Amend Rule 1 of the Rules Governing the Bar, 431 A.2d 521, 529-30 (D.C. 1981); cf
Arrow v. Dow, 554 F. Supp. 458, 462-63 (D.N.M. 1982); Florida Bar ex rel. Frankel,
581 So. 2d 1294, 1299 (Fla. 1991); Sams v. Olah, 169 S.E.2d 790, 798 (Ga. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970); In re The Committee To Review The State Bar, 334
N.W.2d 544, 547 (Wis. 1983).
13 Some states have rejected the claimant's First Amendment claim and authorized
the integrated bar association to engage in ideological activities. See, e.g., Falk v. State
Bar, 342 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1983). But Keller vitiates the premise of those rulings.
Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-17.
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the First Amendment. But it is hard to validate the argument that the
government, by curtailing the group's ideological or advocacy speech
and limiting its activities to matters necessary to fulfill the functions
which alone justify creation of the compelled association, cannot protect
the speech interests of those whom it expressly directs to join or contrib-
ute to a group that it specially authorizes and empowers.94 And the jus-
tification for government thus protecting individuals' speech interests
makes that protection not unduly restrictive of any possible "rights" that
the other members may have to act or speak collectively,95 since those
other members are free to form a voluntary association to communicate
their advocacy views.96
The contention may be made that an audience's interest in the
group's speech precludes the government from curtailing that speech.
Whether the argument is cast in terms of respecting the autonomy of
individual listeners97 or of the social value of allowing ideas to be ex-
pressed in order to be exchanged or considered,98 it has no power as a
basis for compelling an individual personally to speak or to contribute
toward the utterance of speech. The enlightenment of A, either individu-
ally or for political or general societal purposes, does not justify coercing
B to speak-both because of the considerations that entitle B as an au-
tonomous human being to be free from such coercion, and because the
enlightenment of A achieved through coerced speech is questionable.99
Thus, if the audience interest is not sufficient to require the government
94 The fact that the government mandates the existence of, and empowers, the group
does not entitle the government to restrict the group's conduct by imposing unconstitu-
tional conditions such as authorizing or directing the group to exclude members on
grounds of race or gender, or to support some but not other ideas or political views or
candidates. However, neutrally precluding the government-mandated group from engag-
ing in advocacy speech or ideological activities, and confining the group narrowly to the
technical aspects of the functions that impelled its creation, does not reach any of the
troublesome areas shadowed by the notion of unconstitutional conditions.
" Even if the Constitution did not of its own force require such protection, the gov-
ernment could as a matter of policy offer protection (as some states do) without violat-
ing the constitutional rights of those members who wish the association to engage in
advocacy activities. Cf supra note 90.
96 See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874-75 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
9 See supra note 33.
98 See supra note 34.
9 Moreover, even if the notion of free speech and the terms of the First Amendment
required government, on occasion, to subsidize speech, see supra note 28, nothing in
the considerations justifying such a subsidy for the benefit of the speaker or the audi-
ence could justify compelling a person to speak or contribute to an association to sup-
port speech.
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to compel persons to speak, the audience interest has little more power
as a basis for compelling persons to pay money to an organization in
order to furnish the wherewithal for that organization to provide speech
for an audience.
2. Professional and Occupational Associations
There are also reasons to limit the advocacy activities of associations
that, often because they exert effectively monopolistic power, offer bene-
fits that constitute practical necessities for members. The power of such
groups to induce membership is frequently enhanced by the special rela-
tionship of their activities to government function.'00 Membership in
such associations is not significantly less compelled if driven by eco-
nomic necessity than if mandated by government;' 0' pro tanto, the
00 The roles delegated to professional or occupational associations by the govern-
ment often include participation in the fashioning of examinations for admissions to
practice, supervising licensing of practitioners, accrediting professional schools or prac-
tice facilities, and monitoring compliance with licensure and other requirements im-
posed by the government (generally fashioned with the advice of the association). See
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE
STATES 88-90 (1952). The extent to which medical societies and some occupational or
labor unions are intertwined with government licensure or accreditation procedures and
monitoring of government-required standards for the profession or trade has been the
subject of considerable comment. See, e.g., OLIVER GARCEAU, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 103 (1941); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 168 (1982); Jonathan Lang, Toward a Right to
Union Membership, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 40-49 (1977) (discussing medical
societies); Clyde W. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33, 35
n.8 (1947); Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics
in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J., 938, 939-53, 959 (1954); see also Louis L. Jaffe,
Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 229-34 (1937); Note, Exclusion
from Private Associations, 74 YALE L.J. 1313, 1320-21 (1965). So too have the access
practices of private hospitals that are the beneficiaries of substantial government subsi-
dies. Cf Desai v. St. Barnabas Medical Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 667-68 (N.J. 1986);
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 183 A.2d 878, 882 (N.J. 1962); Woodard v. Porter
Hosp., Inc., 217 A.2d 37, 39 (Vt. 1966). Compare Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 715
(4th Cir. 1964) and Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1963) and State ex rel. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen.
Hosp. Ass'n, 140 S.E.2d 457, 462-63 (W. Va. 1965) with Ascherman v. Presbyterian
Hosp. of Pac. Medical Ctr., Inc., 507 F.2d 1103, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1974) and Kiracofe
v. Reid Memorial Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
10' For example, failure to join county medical societies in the past and, more recent-
ly, societies of medical specialists, frequently denied physicians access to hospitals,
referrals from colleagues, and other professional benefits so that practice of the profes-
sion without being a member was either impossible or severely restricted. See Ezekiel
v. Winkley, 572 P.2d 32, 39 (Cal. 1977); see also Blende v. Maricopa County Medical
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individual's negative speech interest is no less impinged.
In addition to its interest in freeing the compelled member from the
obligation to support advocacy activities with which he or she does not
agree, society may be concerned with narrowing the agenda of such
associations to only those activities necessary to support the
organization's professional or occupational functions. For example, a
legislature, which by comprehensive delegation of authority has facilitat-
ed a medical society's "strangle-hold" on access to the profession in
order to serve professional purposes, might reasonably believe that the
association should be confined to serving those professional purposes by
expressly defined activities, and should not be able to function as a
mechanism that obtains coerced financial support for advocacy of ideo-
logical positions from doctors who do not wish to give such support.
Society may also be concerned that the government-supported internal
structure of the association permits bureaucratic distortion of the
membership's voice in effecting the group's advocacy speech. Hence the
legislature might reasonably require a medical society to focus its activ-
ities on technical, ethical, and educational problems in the practice of the
profession"2 rather than to address the public on political or ideological
questions.
To be sure, the audience interest in the medical association's advoca-
cy speech may be deemed more legitimate than its interest in the inte-
grated bar's expression because the medical association is not a speaker
created by the government. In the case of the medical association, it is
less doubtfully "the willing speaker" that engages the individual audience
Soc'y, 393 P.2d 926, 930 (Ariz. 1964); Reiswig v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Medical Ctr.,
634 P.2d 976, 980 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodon-
tists, 460 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1969); Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 170
A.2d 791, 796-97 (N.J. 1961); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 250 N.E. 2d 892,
895 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969).
Although membership in such enterprises is effectively compelled, in theory the
members are free to agree that the association would not engage in advocacy activities.
In the absence of a nonadvocacy agreement, it can be argued that the group's engage-
ment in advocacy activities is voluntary even if membership is compelled. That the
potential for advocacy activities is part of the incentive for the existence of the associa-
tion does not mean that dominating collateral incentives should be permitted as tie-ins
to induce participation, particularly for late-comers who cannot easily alter the terms of
reference, even if they wish to do so. The difficulty of forming competing associations
which do not have the collateral incentives of the initial enterprise implicates the inade-
quacy of the volition with which members support the initial venture's advocacy activi-
ties.
102 See supra notes 100-01. Activities that focus on professional problems may in-
volve responding to requests by the legislature or licensing agency for information on
such professional matters.
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and the society interested in exchanging views. However, the association
funds its expression by contributions from members who are "com-
pelled" to be members whether or not they desire to support or partici-
pate in the enterprise's advocacy speech. To the extent that the message
is thus supported by coerced contributions, the audience receives a signal
of magnified intensity if not also of distorted content.
The economic imperative that compelled membership in local medi-
cal societies has been considerably diluted in most areas of the country
since the first half of this century. Still, the magnetic attraction of associ-
ations of medical specialists continues to reflect the "practical necessity"
of belonging to them." 3 Doubtless similar pressures exist to join other
professional and occupational associations, °4 some of which are spe-
cially supported or empowered by government. The pressures on stock
brokers to join the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD)"°5 derive from such practical necessities. So too may the pres-
sures to join some farm organizations, stock or commodities exchanges,
state or local associations of real estate agents or brokers,0 6 optome-
trists, '7 pharmacists, architects, or accountants-particularly if the
association's magnetism for members is strengthened by government
support, such as empowering the association to accredit candidates for
government-imposed license requirements.0 8 To the extent of such
"03 See supra notes 100-01. Physicians' access to medical care providers like HMOs
may require membership in "accredited" specialist associations.
104 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 58, at 132-67.
0S NASD is statutorily authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78A-7811 (1988) and is closely regulated by the government. Although membership
is not compelled by government quite as directly as it is in the case of the integrated
bar, the role of the government in the authorization, supervision, and regulation of the
NASD is pervasive, see generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 2794-816 (1992) (describing pervasive regulation of NASD); [June 1983] Nat'l
Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc. Reprint of the Manual (CCH) 101 (same); SHELDON M.
JAFFE, BROKER DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 132-67 (1977) (same), and consid-
erably more extensive than in medical societies and in most other trade or professional
associations.
'06 See, e.g., FTC STAFF REPORT BY Los ANGELES REGIONAL OFFICE, THE RESIDEN-
TIAL BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 80-100, 107-42 (1983); Arthur D. Austin, Real Estate
Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1325,
1363 (1970); Michael K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Estate Bro-
kerage Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 30 AM. BUS. LAW J. 271, 305-19 (1992);
Mark D. Murr, Note, The Professionalization of Real Estate Brokerage and the Problem
of Multiple Listing Service Exclusion: A Sherman Act Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REv. 125,
128-31 (1980).
1o7 Compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) with Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979).
"08 See Note, Exclusion from Private Associations, 74 YALE L.J. 1313, 1319 (1965).
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"compulsion" to join, the considerations that justify severing the group's
advocacy activities from its other operations, as discussed above in the
case of local medical associations, are relevant to support intervention to
curb such groups' advocacy speech." 9
Vindication of the community's interest by legislation requiring
"compelled" professional associations to unbundle advocacy speech from
their other activities or otherwise to restrict the compelled funding of (or
decision-making process for) such speech would not deprive members of
the occupation or profession of the power to amplify voluntarily their
voices by collective action in advocacy speech. Nor would such legisla-
tion deny their message to any interested audience. Doctors and securi-
ties brokers, for example, would remain free to band together in organi-
zations other than the specially empowered medical association or the
NASD and amplify their voices by such collective action."'
Many states authorize professional societies to design and grade licensing examinations
for their professions. For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants (AICPA) is authorized to create and grade licensing exams in every state. Id. Pos-
sibly there are organizations that are not empowered by special government support but
that do have a stranglehold on a trade or profession so that their membership may fairly
be deemed to be "compelled." The stranglehold is not often likely without government.
However, if it occurs, government regulation of the membership rules and intrusion on
advocacy activities of such associations is more readily justifiable than is comparable
regulation of groups that do not offer practical necessities to aspirants. Cf. Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993,
1022 (1930); Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Private Associations,
76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 993-94 (1963).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 100-03. Even if membership in, or support
for, many such associations cannot fairly be said to be compelled by economic neces-
sity, the incentive to join may be almost entirely powered by the professional or occu-
pational benefits that membership offers. In such cases, the advocacy voice of the enter-
prise, if not an afterthought in inducing membership, may well not be a factor whose
absence would diminish membership or materially alter function. The propriety of
unbundling support for the advocacy activities of the group from support for its other
activities would turn on considerations affecting that question in the case of voluntary
associations. See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 66, at 28; see also text accompanying
notes 186-90.
"0 It is difficult to envision circumstances other than government-mandate which
could compel a person to join or support a wholly advocacy enterprise. See supra text
accompanying note 39. But in such circumstances, cf. infra note 203 (discussing "white
primary cases"), legislation severing individual members' obligations to support is at
odds with (and may be trumped by) the enterprise's entitlement to protection under the
First Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. The reasons that pre-
clude unbundling in the case of wholly advocacy organizations are not applicable to the
case of multi-purpose associations that people are compelled to join. In the former case,
advocacy activities would effectively be suppressed by mandated unbundling because of
the obstacles to carrying on the advocacy activities in newly-created advocacy associa-
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The Constitution of its own force does not require medical or other
professional or occupational association's advocacy activities to be so
confined, even if it might so confine comparable activities of the inte-
grated bar, and, more doubtfully, those of unions with union shop ar-
rangements. However, if the state imposes such a requirement, constitu-
tional issues are raised.
The most rigorous criterion for assessing government proscriptions
affecting speech-the "strict scrutiny" standard that requires a compel-
ling need for the government restriction and imposition of the least re-
strictive alternative--does not easily fit the context of proscribing advo-
cacy activity by professional organizations."1 Neither the consider-
ations nor the circumstances which should determine how "compelling"
the state's need must be to justify restricting the group's advocacy
speech," 2 or how narrowly drawn those restrictions must be," 3 are
clearly delineated. Applying those criteria to assess the propriety of re-
stricting the advocacy speech of associations of the kind here considered
presents a particular puzzle. The same doubts that afflict the integrated
bar cases as to whether dues payments or memberships are the equiva-
lent of speech by the individual are present in cases of effectively "com-
pelled" membership. If those doubts are similarly resolved, society is
confronted with conflicting claims for protection of speech interests. On
tions. In the latter case, the advocacy activities can readily be carried on in newly-
formed voluntary enterprises.
.. As we shall see, restrictions on the activities of purely expressive associations
present different problems than do restrictions on the advocacy activities of multi-pur-
pose associations. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. Restrictions on the activ-
ities of purely expressive organizations demand the strictest judicial scrutiny and can
rarely, if ever, be justified. In the case of multi-purpose associations, such restrictions
present a call for a somewhat different, and less demanding, review. The formulae by
which the Court couches the degrees of deference it accords to the legislature produce a
nominally varied array of standards for testing the propriety of different kinds of pro-
tected speech in different contexts. See, e.g., Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & Edward V.
Heck, The Battle over Strict Scrutiny: Coalitional Conflict in the Rehnquist Court, 32
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1049 (1992). There is much room to argue over whether differ-
ent results under the different standards are driven by the particular standard invoked, or
by the special circumstances or content which are said to call for different standards, cf.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 532-767, 1257-337 (1991), or
whether the standards are simply conclusory devices to bless results driven by other
considerations. In any event, it is not necessary for our purposes, if indeed it is possi-
ble, to mark or justify all the lines the Court has thus drawn among strict scrutiny re-
view, intermediate scrutiny review, deferential scrutiny review, review of restrictions on
commercial speech, and other patterns of review.
12 See, e.g., Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-
89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113 See infra note 176.
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the one hand are the claims of persons who effectively are compelled to
support the group and, pro tanto, its advocacy speech with which they
may disagree. Their claim is not lessened if the compulsion is a function
of the often monopolistic power that the government specially delegates
over practical necessities sought by individuals from the associations. On
the other hand is the claim for protection of the speech interests of the
association and its complying members. Which claims present the com-
pelling need? How does the conflict between the claims affect the com-
pelling character of the government's "need" and the scope of permissi-
ble restrictions?
The integrated bar and union shop cases"1 4 provide some clues to
answers. In those cases, considerations of individual autonomy support
the judgment to relieve members of such groups from obligations to help
support the groups' advocacy speech. Those cases also argue for confin-
ing the role of the enterprise to the more or less technical, professional,
or occupational activities that were instrumental in calling it into being
and empowering it so that membership in it a practical necessity. The
government may reasonably seek to protect individuals against being
forced by economic compulsion (generated in fair part by government
privileging of associations) to contribute to those associations and there-
by to advocacy activities that the Constitution forbids the government
from mandating them to support.
To be sure, such government interventions address only advocacy
speech, the core expression that is at the heart of the First Amendment;
but they do not purport to impinge on expression of viewpoints. Inter-
ventions that thus focus solely on subject matter and are neutral as to
viewpoint have been upheld in many contexts in which the impact of
subject matter restriction on viewpoint expression is closer than it is in
the context of multi-purpose associations' advocacy speech and individu-
al members' possible speech preferences." 5 That distinction has also
"4 See supra note 2; infra note 134.
"1 For example, the longstanding denial of income tax deductibility for a range of
advocacy expenditures, I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1994), and the .denial of charitable tax ex-
emption to otherwise exempt organizations if a substantial part of their activities con-
sists of attempting to influence legislation, id. § 501(c)(3). See also Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 512-13 (1959). But cf George Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grass Roots
Lobbying: Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
801, 810-16 (1968); Anne B. Carroll, Religion, Politics and the LR.S.: Defining the
Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV.
217, 227-29 (1992). Consider also the exclusion of such expenditures in computing
permissible utility rates in e.g., Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 304 F.2d 29, 36-38, 42-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 924 (1962), and
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been invoked to justify government restrictions on political speech in a
variety of contexts," 6 including protecting the negative speech interests
of compelled members." 7 The distinction between subject matter-based
strictures on speech that are viewpoint-neutral and those that are not
suggests testing regulation of the former by less critical standards than
test regulation of the latter-at least insofar as the regulation of the
viewpoint-neutral speech does not either suppress the content of the
speech or seek or effect restriction of viewpoint expression under the
guise of content-neutrality.
Whatever the possible levels of scrutiny for the standards of judicial
review of content-neutral restrictions of expression, something less than
the strictest scrutiny is called for where the regulation operates at the
point of conflict between the speech interests of individuals and those of
the group. The threat to the association's speech interest by such a re-
striction is offset (even if not entirely) by the gain to the negative speech
interest of individuals forced to support the association. The courts inevi-
tably must compare (or balance) the value of the association's speech
interest against the value of the individual's speech interest in a context
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 51 N.Y.2d 823, 825 (1980), and
the recently validated prohibition against corporate electoral expenditures in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
116 See authorities cited supra note 2; see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (prohibiting only political advertising on municipally-
owned buses whose captive audience may be likened to "compelled" membership; com-
pare Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); but cf United States South-
West Afr./Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 773-74
(D.C. Cir. 1983)); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 834-38 (1976) (involving political
speakers on military bases); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 799-806 (1985) (involving solicitation by advocacy for association contri-
butions from federal employees); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-83 (1987) (ad-
dressing persons engaged in "political propaganda" on behalf of foreign powers); United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554-67
(1973); United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96-103 (1947);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609-18 (1973). Compare CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126-30 (1973) with FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 386-95 (1984). The restrictions with which this Article is concerned affect a
public audience that is broader than that affected in many of those contexts; and they
may limit speech by a stronger form of obstruction than do the restrictions upheld in
those contexts. But they do not seek to prohibit communication of particular messages
or preclude the human participants in "the speaker" from expressing the message indi-
vidually or through another collective mechanism. Nor do they generate the probability
of effective suppression of speech that normally justifies a requirement of strict scrutiny
to find a compelling need and the narrowest feasible restriction.
..7 Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1990); see also infra note 134 (citing
union shop cases).
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that contemplates possible substitution of expression by individuals or
expressive associations for the expression of the multi-purpose group-a
process that implicates a standard less critical of the restriction than
"strict scrutiny." ' i
1"8 The Court's opinions on subject matter and content-neutrality are somewhat
opaque in defining what makes a restriction on expression content-neutral and what
makes the restriction non-neutral or content- (i.e., viewpoint-) based. The jurisprudence
addressing proscriptions on time, place, and manner of expression is aimed at some-
thing other than the communicative impact of conduct or expression, and is relevant
only as it monitors those proscriptions to prevent their being used to affect content.
Proscriptions aimed at the communicative impact of expression but not at affecting
communication of particular viewpoints (i.e., addressed to an area of subject matter
rather than a point of view) may be imposed on some speakers or in some places, but
not others; communication on some subjects, but not others, may be restricted if not
wholly suppressed. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543-47
(1992) and Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988) with Burson v. Freeman, 112
S. Ct. 1846, 1849-51 (1992). See Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amend-
ment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-
Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 38-45; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 81-86, 108-15 (1987) [hereinafter Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 207-17 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content
Regulation]; Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 615, 650-55 (1991). Moreover, even when the Court concludes that a
particular restriction is content- or subject matter-neutral, but is nonetheless subject to
"heightened scrutiny" because of its communicative impact, a less "compelling need"
sometimes seems to suffice to uphold the restriction than would otherwise be required
to uphold a restriction more plainly addressed to viewpoint. Compare Turner Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458-59 (1994) and Burson, 112 S. Ct., at
1856-58 and Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 58-61 (1976) with Boos,
485 U.S. at 329-32 and Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-
31 (1987) and Carey v. Brown, 447 US. 455, 459-71 (1980) and Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980) and Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 94-102 (1972). But cf Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-23 (1991).
The nascent distinction between the rigor of review of formally content- or subject
matter-neutral restrictions and of viewpoint restrictions is sensible, if not always com-
pelled, notwithstanding the disagreement among commentators. See SMOLLA, supra note
29, § 3.02[2][c][i]; Kagan, supra, at 58-77; Note, The Content Distinction in Free
Speech Analysis after Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913-20 (1990). Compare
T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Content Regulation Reconsidered, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS
MEDIA 331 (1990) [hereinafter Scanlon, Content Regulation] and Paul B. Stephen, Con-
tent Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 223-31 (1983) and Stone, Content Regulation,
supra, at 190-200 with SHIFFRIN, supra note 29, at 17 and Martin A. Redish, The Con-
tent Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128-42 (1981) and
Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly-Owned
Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131-43 (1982).
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If the requisite "need" to protect the speech interests of individuals
by impeding or restricting the group's advocacy speech can be found, the
union shop and state integrated bar decisions also suggest varied modes
of drawing sufficiently narrow restrictions on the group's speech."9 Ar-
guably the narrowest restriction that would serve to protect the individual
is offered by the dues proration prescriptions. 2 ' A broader, but possi-
bly necessary restriction, may be a requirement that the association ob-
tain the consent of a majority or super-majority of its members for each
item of group advocacy speech,"' or even a limitation of the advocacy
Categorization of speech by reference to its content without implicating its view-
point is difficult to effect, and to the extent that consequences follow therefrom the
categorization is dangerous to make operative. See, e.g., Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458-59;
Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils.of an Emerging
First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 29-39 (1990); Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic De-
liberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 603, 667-84 (1990).
Nevertheless, some kind of categorization, either by content or by context is unavoid-
able, see Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466; Scanlon, Freedom, supra note 29, at 537-42;
Scanlon, Content Regulation, supra, at 343; STONE ET AL., supra note 111, at 1256-57;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 233-34; Hon. John Paul Stevens., The Freedom of Speech,
102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1308-13 (1993), even if the categories cannot be clearly delineated
and differential treatment for speech among categories cannot easily be justified. See
cases cited supra note 2; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1511 (1993) (involving commercial speech); Richard Hiers, Public Employees' Free
Speech, 5 U. FLA. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 169, 171-72 (1993).
'9 As in the case of the integrated bar, the professional functions of the association
may require speech that borders on advocacy speech. Thus, to the extent that the state
delegates to the association a significant role in licensing procedures and examinations
and in monitoring state-prescribed standards of conduct, some such speech to govern-
ment will be necessary and appropriate. Associations dealing with the legislative and
administrative process will require exchange of information and explanation of policy,
but it need not require lobbying or public pleading. Cf. 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905) (state-
ment of Theodore Roosevelt urging legislation limiting corporate contributions in elec-
tions); Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees before House Comm. on
Election of the President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1905).
20 Disclosure requirements alone are inadequate. See supra note 75. The Supreme
Court has recently left open the question whether even dues proration prescriptions are
narrow enough, if formal membership is required. Keller, 496 U.S. at 17. The mere fact
of being formally associated with the group, and therefore its speech, may be thought to
be such an interference with the individual's negative speech rights that it is not cured
merely by pro-ration of dues. This argument may raise somewhat different questions
than are implicated in a First Amendment choice. See supra note 36.
.2 Advocacy speech by the group may reasonably be regarded by the legislature as
so peripheral both to the function for which the association was specially empowered
and to the individual "compelled" to join that rules requiring such consent will not
interfere materially with the group's principal functions. These rules will offer protec-
tion to the individual members (even though not to every member) who are forced to
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speech of the association.
If the compelling need is understood to be not only to protect the
"compelled" individual member but also to limit the power of enterprises
that the state specially authorizes to collect funds and membership for
particular purposes, the narrowest feasible restriction to meet that need
appropriately could encompass confinement of the group to those func-
tions for which it has been empowered, thereby wholly precluding its
advocacy speech. That is the suggestion of some state courts in defining
the powers of the integrated bar. To be sure, the integrated bar is both
more formally and substantively a creation of the state than is a volun-
tary professional or occupational association like county medical associa-
tions, and pro tanto, the integrated bar should be entitled to less autono-
my. However, so long as the association has "a strangle-hold" on access
to (and continuation in) a trade or profession, at least in part because it
enjoys special government support, it is hard to find a valid substantive
distinction between the integrated bar and enterprises such as county
medical associations with respect to the state's power to limit the advo-
cacy activities of the group.'22
3. Trade Unions with Agency or Union Shop Arrangements
The union or agency shop agreement operates to deny employment
with a particular employer unless the worker joins or pays dues or their
equivalent to the contracting union. Toleration of the union or agency
shop agreement by common law courts or authorization of the phenome-
non by legislation entails some government support, but not the elaborate
join without imposing upon the public the loss of the message that a majority of the
group's members wish to convey.
2 No different conclusion is suggested if, because of the significance of special
government support or empowerment, the restriction on advocacy speech is challenged
as a claim of an unconstitutional condition. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist (and
occasionally a majority of the Court) have signalled views to the contrary, it has been
powerfully urged that the judicial test of the propriety of conditioning government assis-
tance on the recipient foregoing a preferred liberty should be no less strict than the test
of the propriety of express government regulation of that liberty. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1505-06 (1989). Even
on that premise, as we have seen, there is good reason to uphold a restriction on advo-
cacy speech. But it may well be appropriate to test limitations on the advocacy or ideo-
logical speech of a multi-purpose association that is created or specially empowered by
government to perform limited non-speech functions by a less demanding standard than
should govern the propriety of conditioning a benefit to an individual (like employment
or a subsidy) on his foregoing advocacy speech. See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 717-39 (1992); infra note 173.
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
legislative scheme, subsidy, or intertwining encountered in the case of
many other professional or occupational associations.123 Indeed, such
support is not necessary to underpin the conclusion that an individual's
membership or support is effectively compelled even if not by govern-
ment command. Where union shop arrangements are industry-wide, the
worker's obligation to join or pay is no less compelled than is the
lawyer's support of the integrated bar or than may be the need of the
doctor or plumber to join the association of his profession. Even when,
as is increasingly common, the union's control over jobs is less than
industry-wide,' the loss of employment opportunities is likely to gen-
erate more than trivial costs. Not only is there the problem of geographic
dislocation, but other costs (like loss of health care benefits or the firm-
specific asset embodied in the specialized accommodation to particular
jobs and routines that comes from work experience) make it likely that
exclusion from the union (or expulsion from employment for failure to
pay the equivalent dues) should no more be permitted arbitrarily than
should exclusion from the integrated bar or the medical association.'25
123 To be sure, the union's existence reflects the government's willingness through
the judiciary to respect, to a limited extent, the employees' private ordering. The
union's role as collective bargainer is facilitated by reason of the government-granted or
government-respected exclusive bargaining power of the union, the government-autho-
rized requirement of dues or "in lieu" payments, and the imposed requirement of collec-
tive bargaining. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-65 (1975); NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 740 (1963);
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-39 (1944). But there is also ground to argue
that the government's support of unions does not reach that level of special empower-
ment offered to many professional or trade associations or to business corporations. See,
e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665 (1990); PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 105-33 (1990); Kohler, supra note 84, at 180-
88; Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive Character
of American Labor Laws, 1990 WIs. L. REV. 1, 99-117; Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 351, 364-82 (1984); Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights of Self Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1774-87 (1983).
'24 For the most part, the worker, particularly the less skilled worker, is excluded
from working for a particular employer or group of employers, but not necessarily from
all employment for which he is equipped. On the other hand, in many cases the union
controls access to employment in an entire industry or a substantial part of the entire in-
dustry for which the individual is equipped to work. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 58, at
75.
125 See, e.g., Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 320
P.2d 494, 497-98 (Cal. 1958); James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329, 334-35 (Cal.
1944); Moore v. Local Union No. 483, 334 A.2d 1, 2-4 (N.J. 1975); Miller v. Ruehl, 2
N.Y.S.2d 394, 395-96 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1938); Dorrington v. Manning, 4 A.2d
886, 889 (Pa. 1939).
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There is much room to argue over whether an individual's contribu-
tion to the support of a labor union under an agency shop or union shop
contract is compelled by the government.'26 That argument need not
detain us. If the individual's obligation to contribute to the union is
deemed not to be government compelled, it is nevertheless compelled by
social and economic pressures which derive in part from government
authorization for the union and employer effectively to mandate union
membership.
Whether or not government-compelled speech is deemed to be in-
volved, 7 there are good reasons to protect the employee against the
26 Possibly the notion of "government action" should extend beyond mandates to
join an integrated state bar association to other arrangements that are less dependent for
their existence upon government mandates than the state bar association, but more de-
pendent upon government-mandated infrastructure than simple contract enforcement.
Those possibilities raise questions that have been much debated. See STONE ET AL.,
supra note 111, at 1499-500. It stretches the concept of "government action" almost to
the breaking point to make it embody the union's and employer's action in "compel-
ling" dues payments to the union in agency shop arrangements under the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1988), and even further to make it embody compelled speech in
agency shop arrangements. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRO-
CESS 213-64 (1968). It goes beyond that point to extend the concept to agency shop ar-
rangements authorized under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Communica-
tions Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), or at common law. See Ken-
neth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements under the National Labor Relations
Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 51, 57-63 (1990). For the government to be the actor legitimately charged with
compelling speech, it must be involved not merely with supporting the association, but
also with the activity that caused the injury. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d
Cir. 1968); Lang, supra note 100, at 47-49. Arguably, the government's connection with
the speech of an individual in a union shop arrangement is so much less than it is with
the forced dues payment that its impingement on the individual's speech rights in union
shop arrangements is too attenuated to offset the need to authorize a union shop. See
Cantor, supra note 30, at 51-52; cf. DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 187
P.2d 769, 773-76 (Cal. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (a need that was found
sufficient to justify compelled dues payments quite apart from the use of some portion
of them for union advocacy activities or public speech).
For an employer (whether government or private) to seek the non-speech benefits
of a union shop at the cost of allowing the union to spend dues on intra vires union
advocacy speech does not entail employer dictation of content of speech that is support-
ed by dues. Absent such dictation of content, the case for government-authorized union
shop arrangements violating the employee's speech rights under the First Amendment is
weakened considerably.
127 If the union shop arrangement is seen, as it well may be seen for enterprises cov-
ered by the Railway Labor Act and should be seen for others, as not entailing govern-
ment compulsion to join or pay dues, the argument certainly does not entail government
compulsion to speak. No constitutional objection can seriously be raised against the
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use of his or her compelled contributions supporting the union's advoca-
cy speech, but they do not stem from the same considerations that are
urged to protect him or her from government-compelled speech. A soci-
ety, particularly an industrial society, could reasonably make the judg-
ment that exclusive bargaining power in the union, compulsory collective
bargaining, and union shops offer a desirable regime for optimal collec-
tive bargaining and achievement of industrial stability, or at least indus-
trial peace. 28 Because the legislature "has great latitude in choosing the
methods by which [industrial peace] is to be obtained," '29 it could also
reasonably conclude that the reasons for a union shop arrangement do
union's use of institutionally- (as opposed to government-) coerced dues for its public
or advocacy speech.
.28 See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1956).
There are good reasons, in principle, to limit the employee's freedom not to associ-
ate with the union. Hence, even if an employee may properly challenge as government
action the arrangements to which he is thus compelled to submit, it does not follow that
the Constitution requires that he prevail. Employees may be required to support (by
dues payments or their equivalents), if not to join, a union in order to avoid free-rider
problems and to promote labor peace. Non-union members may reasonably be required
to pay for benefits from wage scales and working conditions for which the union bar-
gained and which are enforced by use of teams of officers, lawyers, and others who are
paid from union dues. Because it is not feasible and not lawful to set terms that do not
cover union and non-union employees alike, the latter may appropriately be required to
contribute their fair share to meet the financial and organizational burden. There is also
reason to believe that many persons who would normally form or join a union will not
do so if free-riders are permitted. See OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 66, at 21-22.
Indeed, at least in England, the notions of "effective and stable organization" and
full workers' bargaining strength are said to require union shops or their equivalents.
ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS, 1965-1968,
at 160-63 (The Rt. Hon. Lord Donovan, Chmn., 1968). It also has been pointed out that
there are advantages to management in dealing with a union representing all its employ-
ees, if only to lessen the likelihood of unrest resulting from the competing unions and
jurisdictional disputes.
29 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233. The Court apparently treated the employee's claims
to be relieved of the obligation to associate, which were cast in terms of the First
Amendment, as asserting a deprivation of liberty rather than an interference with
speech. See id. at 233; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760-63
(1961). The Court in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), used the
rhetoric of the First Amendment with respect to the dues payment obligation, but re-
viewed the issue under a "reasonable basis" standard, id. at 217-32, in contrast to the
strict scrutiny standard applied to the speech support question, id. at 222-35. But see id.
at 244-67 (Powell, J., concurring). Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988), implicitly upheld the associational obligation without even discussing
the question of the constitutionality of applying the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) to limit the obligation to pay dues under an agency shop contract. Id. at 761-
62.
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not require, and moreover the effectuation of the arrangement would be
impeded by requiring, individuals to contribute to the support of the
union's advocacy speech. Implementation of that judgment may be em-
bodied in statutes or court orders separating support of the union's advo-
cacy speech from the obligations of membership.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's constitutional view,13 society
could equally reasonably conclude that industrial peace and economic
efficiency do not require (but on the contrary preclude)' separation of
the obligation to join or pay dues and the obligation to support union
advocacy speech. That judgment could be implemented by legislation
expressly requiring payment of dues in solido, by legislation expressly
authorizing the union and the employer to enter into such arrangements,
or merely by failure of the legislature to forbid common law enforce-
ment of such arrangements between union and employer.
On either view, the government can be said to be intruding on
individuals' freedom of speech--of members who do not wish to con-
tribute to support the group's speech or of the group and its members
who do wish the group to speak. The validity of the intrusion on the
speech of either the dissident individual or the group raises substantial
questions under the First Amendment. Striking the balance between the
conflicting claims is not without difficulties.132 As with the integrated
bar or the economically compelled association of many professional or
occupational organizations, to the extent that the government's mandate
or the economic pressure on the individual to join or pay "in lieu" fees
is seen as remote from a compulsion to participate in the union's advo-
cacy speech, the weight of the individual's claim that his or her speech
is impaired diminishes. Nevertheless, the burden imposed on the
individual's speech interest is, as in the case of other compelled associa-
tions, considerably heavier than if no mandate or economic compulsion
to make such payments is imputed. On the other hand, legislation reliev-
ing members of the obligation to support the union's advocacy speech
impairs the union's (and its complying members') speech. Indeed, be-
30 See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 514-19 (1991); Abood, 431
U.S. at 223-37. The Court's opinions dealing with labor relations statutes permit, if not
require, legislatures to limit union advocacy activities by restricting the use of union
funds for advocacy purposes. See infra note 134. These decisions do not go so far as to
prohibit union speech in advocacy matters, but the opinions do not forbid such a prohi-
bition either, and at least some of the Justices suggest the propriety of such a prohibi-
tion. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 550-62 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
131 Cf., e.g., DeMille, 187 P.2d at 773-76.
32 Cf Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 904-06 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
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cause the union is neither a government-created institution like the inte-
grated bar, nor, arguably, a specially empowered enterprise like the med-
ical association or the NASD, its (and its majority members') claims to
freedom of speech for its collective voice may be stronger than the
claims of either of the others.133
Such claims by unions may not be doctrinally incompatible with
legislation preventing unions from freely using dues compelled (by gov-
ernment or institutionally) for its advocacy speech. An uneasy tension
exists, however, between the suggestion of constitutional protection for
union speech and the teaching of cases authorizing (or indeed requiring)
union speech to be impaired by restricting the use of portions of
members' dues payments. 34 The level of tension would be raised if all
union speech were confined by legislation to the speech for which the
Court allows the dissidents' funds to be used. Such a limitation would
impose a greater cost on society and the union (or its non-dissident
'3' The Supreme Court has suggested that "the gravest doubt" would arise from a
prohibition against publication "by corporations and unions in the regular course of
conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or custom-
ers of danger or advantage to their interests from adoption of measures, or the election
to office of men espousing such measures." United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121
(1948). Powerful arguments to the same effect also were urged by dissenters in a later
opinion dealing with a different application of that statutory prohibition. See United
States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1945).
'34 The Court's opinions construing the labor relations statutes are less than clear
either in theory or in the reach of their holdings. Aggregately, they require limiting the
union's use of employees' "compelled" contributions to the collective bargaining activi-
ties for which the contributions were forced, but in defining those activities they inter-
dict much more than is required by concern for the First Amendment rights of individu-
al members. For cases wrestling with delineation of the proper amount of interdiction
under the Railway Labor Act, see Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232; compare Ellis v. Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 443-55 (1984); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963); Street, 367 U.S. at 750-70, under state employment
agreements, see Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 507; Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hud-
son, 475 U.S. 292, 301-04 (1986); Abood, 431 U.S. at 303, under the LMRA, see Beck,
487 U.S. at 744-62. See generally Friessen, supra note 89, at 610-11 (analyzing the
effects of placing restrictions on the uses of contributions to the union).
The requirements that the Court has fashioned effectively place the burden on the
union to prove the correctness of its expenditures. The requirements thus surprisingly
place a burden on the victim of speech restriction to prove the speech's entitlement-a
burden that may be substantial. Compare Rex H. Reed, Revolution Ahead: Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635, 645-47 (1990) with Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 126, at 53 and Friessen, supra note 89, at 610-14. On the other
hand, the requirements appear to place on the dissenting member the burden of coming
forward to reveal his or her dissent. See Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
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members) because it would narrow the area of permissible union advoca-
cy speech. The Constitution does not require that result, as the Court's
decisions make clear. Whether it does or should permit that result to be
mandated by a legislature 35 is a more difficult question.
An affirmative answer is supported in this context by the same con-
siderations that support an affirmative answer in the case of other com-
pelled associations, particularly since such a limitation on the union's
speech does not preclude the members from making their collective
voice heard through a separate, voluntarily formed expressive associa-
tion. If the union's functions evolve to include a larger role for advocacy
activities on behalf of its members and a lesser role for benefits from
traditional collective bargaining activities,'36 and its membership re-
mains effectively compelled, the problem of unbundling individual sup-
port for advocacy activity is somewhat different. 3 ' Even if collective
bargaining and resulting economic benefits dominate the role of the
union for its members, and its expressive voice is peripheral, the claim
for protection of the collective voice at the expense of the individual's
'" Cf. supra note 92 (citing state court decisions in the integrated bar context).
136 See Dan C. Heldman, Unions, Politics and Public Policy: A (Somewhat) Revision-
ist Approach, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 575-76 (1990); Kohler, supra note 84,
at 180-88; James E. Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1118-24 (1987); Joseph L. Rauh, Legality of
Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 152, 153-56 (1961); Comment, Of
Politics, Pipefitters and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modern Context,
51 TEX. L. REV. 936, 981-83 (1973). It has been reported that "in France and Spain,
unions have concentrated on political lobbying and have gradually withdrawn from the
messy business of representing real people with real concerns over job security and
pay." Wintry Whiff of Discontent, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at 15.
3 As the relationship of members to unions more closely approximates that of polit-
ical party members to the party, the union's and its members' claim for First Amend-
ment protection becomes a more significant obstacle to severing individuals' contribu-
tions from the group's advocacy action whether by proration or otherwise. For an advo-
cacy association whose membership is voluntary, it is difficult to find constitutional
justification for legislative severance. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202. If
membership is compelled by government mandate, the validity of severance turns on
the considerations that would constitutionally justify government mandate to support or
join such an enterprise, if any can do so. But see supra note 39. It is difficult to envi-
sion a purely advocacy enterprise whose membership is compelled by social or econom-
ic pressure, because the compulsion is'generally a function of non-advocacy benefits.
The more compelling the pressure to join, the less likely is the enterprise to be an advo-
cacy, rather than a multi-purpose, enterprise. However, the compulsion may be a func-
tion of the monopoly power of the advocacy association, such as may be true of a polit-
ical party or parties with respect to access to the ballot. A union which is simply an
advocacy association, no less than a political party, is constitutionally amenable to a
wide range of regulatory restrictions. See infra text accompanying notes 203-06.
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speech interest is at its strongest when the union is not able to compel
support by an agency or union shop agreement. At that point, govern-
ment intervention entails restrictions on a less compelled, even if not
entirely voluntary,'38 association, and the focus then shifts to examining
the propriety of intervention to restrict the group's use of funds acquired
through the offering of desired, but non-essential, non-advocacy benefits
to finance advocacy activities.
C. Intervention in Advocacy Activities of Voluntary Association
Most large multi-purpose associations (like investor-owned business
corporations, many farm organizations, some trade or professional associ-
ations, environmental groups, and groups such as the Elks or the Jaycees
that offer networking contacts, social activities, or community activities)
do not attract their members because they are the sole or principal source
of practical necessities that members are under considerable social or
economic pressure to acquire. Although the material benefits such enter-
138 Cf Kidwell v. Transportation Comm'n Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 291-92, 297
(4th Cir. 1991). In theory, and notwithstanding the impact of the Railway Labor Act on
state "right to work" laws, employees start with freedom to join or refrain from joining
"voluntary" unions that may be compared with investors' freedom to invest in a busi-
ness corporation or the freedom to join social or "network" associations like the Jaycees
or the Rotary Club. While they therefore cannot be said to be "forced" to support the
union's advocacy speech by joining the union, these employees have economic incen-
tives that are not less powerful than those of an investor if the object is to measure the
power of those incentives against the lure of supporting the union's advocacy speech. In
part, the more intense free-rider problem in the case of unions impels the union mem-
bers to put pressure on outsiders to join. See OLSON, supra note 58, at 66-97; OLSON,
NATIONS, supra note 66, at 21-22. In part, outsiders are likely to feel more need to join
in order to have a voice in decisions that affect wages and the terms of employment.
See Summers, supra note 100, at 49. Apart from the items of considerable value ac-
quired by union membership, see Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 813, 815 (Ct. App. 1961), there may also be items of property like health benefits
and pensions; see also Minnesota Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
280-88 (1984). Those incentives constitute stakes for the employees that may well ex-
ceed those for investors, and certainly represent higher stakes for the employees than
the benefits offered by many professional or "network" associations to their members.
Moreover, the benefits offered by such associations, such as improving the skills and
opportunities of members, do not depend upon collective action in bargaining with a
single well-informed and intensely motivated employer or group of employers. To have
a voice in defining the terms for employment bargains may be seen as more important
than obtaining the more diffused benefits offered by the Jaycees or Rotary Club. See
Mitchell, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 815. Thus, the obligation to support the union's advocacy
speech comes at a higher cost to the individual whose need to join and remain with the
union is greater than his or her need to join or remain with the Jaycees or Rotary Club.
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prises offer to members individually are real enough, those benefits do
not rise to the level of "practical necessities," and indeed are often sim-
ply modest components of a social-economic-political pie. While some
of those groups (like investor-owned business corporations, some veter-
ans associations, farm organizations, and occupational associations) may
depend in large measure on an elaborate scheme of government legisla-
tion and administration to facilitate their formation and enable their
operation, others (like the Elks, the Rotary Club, the Jaycees, and the
Sierra Club) function without such a filigree of authorization and protec-
tion. In assessing the permissible scope of government restrictions on the
advocacy activities of such "voluntary" associations, it is relevant to
consider the significance of their non-advocacy activities in their agenda
and as inducements to join them and the significance of government
support to their operation.
1. Investor-Owned Business Corporations'39
"' The constitutional validity of restricting advocacy speech or activities of large,
publicly held business corporations in deference to the speech interest of its relevant
stockholders does not imply the validity of a similar proposal to restrict corporate
speech or activities in deference to the speech interests of its other stakeholders-i.e.,
creditors, employees or customers, suppliers, or the community. To be sure, analytically
it is possible to decompose the enterprise, and focus separately on each type of
contributor to its operation. On one level of abstraction, stockholders may be said to be
no more (or less) contractual parties or necessary contributors to the enterprise's
operations or viability than are creditors, employees, customers, or other suppliers of
goods, services, or capital.
Undoubtedly, distinctions can be made in policy among the kinds of contributors
who ought to be required to be consulted when the corporation's public voice is to be
exercised, and those who could otherwise be made hostage to "the corporation's"
speech preferences. Cf Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898-90 (3rd Cir.
1983). It is not necessary now to examine whether the First Amendment does, or
should, limit the kind of consultation which might thus be made a condition to
advocacy speech by large public investor-owned enterprises in order to reflect, or at
least respond, to the views of those other constituencies. Notwithstanding claims on
behalf of other constituencies, see Ribstein, supra note 71, at 126-27, 152, nothing in
either policy or the Constitution requires the enterprise's public voice to echo all
possible constituencies merely because the stockholder constituency, with its passive
role in assuming the residual risk of the enterprise, is singled out for resonance.
Moreover, the investor-stockholder's claim for government action to limit collective
decisions in corporate advocacy activities (in the making of which he has at least a
nominal role) differs from the claim of an individual for government to limit
comparable decisions by another individual to whom she lends funds or with whom he
transacts. Cf. Karlan, supra note 72; Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1243. At
stake in the latter case is the speech interest of the autonomous human being who is the
borrower in a discrete transaction. No comparable interest exists for the collective
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An individual who "voluntarily" joins a multi-purpose association has
a considerably weaker claim to government action to relieve him or her
of the obligation to support the association's advocacy activities or
speech than does the individual who is "compelled" to join the associa-
tion. Unlike the multi-purpose associations whose membership is com-
pelled, investor-owned business corporations' attraction for stockholders
may fairly be characterized as voluntary. Nevertheless, stockholders'
support of the enterprise's advocacy activity by reason of its use of the
stockholders' proportionate interest in the collective assets may not fairly
be so characterized. 4 ' Indeed in some, if not many, matters stockhold-
ers may well oppose the advocacy position of the enterprise.
It is said that investors "know" that business corporations engage in
advocacy activities in which they have little or no input, and therefore
must be taken to consent to those activities when they invest. 4' But the
consent of a purchaser of stock to the business corporation's advocacy
activity is even less volitional than is the consent of a purchaser of a soft
drink to the form of the label on the can or bottle or to the chemical
composition of the label. The difference (as an incentive for choosing an
investment) between the strength of the appeal of expected return on
what is often a form of savings, and the weakness of the investor's con-
cern about corporate advocacy activity is, in most cases,'42 likely to be
so great that investors normally (and "rationally") resolve the latter con-
cern simply by their choice of the former, without much consciousness
speech of the corporation in which the stockholder has a continuing interest.
140 It should be noted that an investor whose corporation engages in advocacy speech
that he opposes cannot "exit" costlessly. If he exits after the speech, he has to bear the
cost (or enjoy the gain) resulting from the speech. In any event, transaction costs and
the cost of finding equivalent investments (notwithstanding efficient market theory)
create a certain "stickiness" in changing investments. That "stickiness" grows as institu-
tional investors increasingly intermediate between individuals and portfolio companies
and thus force individuals' choices to a third level. Nonetheless, investors in such shares
enter into those contracts, if not wholly knowingly and willingly, at least more "volun-
tarily" than those who join unions with union shop arrangements, some medical societ-
ies, or similar "compelled" membership enterprises.
'1 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686-67 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:
An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 587, 625 (1991); Ribstein, supra note 71, at 126, 138-40.
42 Opposition by churches or "cause" groups to the products or the operations of a
corporation (e.g., environmental or race discrimination concerns) generate campaigns
that have some modest spillover' effects on investors. However, rarely are the
corporation's advocacy activities the subject of such campaigns or effects. Moreover,
disclosure of the advocacy activity is quite beside the point. The problem is more one
of adhesion. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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about the import of the corporate advocacy activity. 43 The notion of
"consent" to finance the firm's advocacy activities in such circumstances
is particularly problematic when the activity whose consent is thus pur-
chased entails advocacy of political proposals for which society generally
provides that the consenter could not lawfully be paid to vote.'" Even
if a person's support (but not vote) for a proposal or candidate may law-
fully be purchased by another individual, the lawfulness of the purchase
requires knowledgeable and freely given support in exchange for the
purchase price. The extent to which such support is freely "sold" turns in
part on the relative visibility of the advocacy voice purchased.
In the case of such tie-in sales by business corporations, the extent to
which support is freely "sold" also depends upon whether alternative
choices for investing without yielding advocacy voice are generally
available. Few business corporations unbundle investment and advocacy
voice. The aspirations of those who form and expect to control investor-
owned public business corporations suggest that unbundled enterprises
will not be (and in fact are not) formed sufficiently frequently (or exten-
sively) to offer to passive investors any real choice.'45 Hence, in the
absence of a prohibition against bundling, those who prefer unbundled
investments effectively will not have such a choice. That a person's
economic interests may appropriately affect his or her personal voice in
support of (or opposition to) candidates or government policies does not
require those interests to be given collective voice in a joint purpose
association by tie-in sales of non-advocacy benefits that intrinsically
obscure the advocacy support thus given.
The limitations on individual investors' freedom of choice in advoca-
cy activities thus resulting from corporate advocacy power raise the
question whether society should intervene to relieve individual investors
of the necessity to support financially corporate advocacy speech and to
encourage freer investment. Corporate advocacy power also raises the
' On the opposite side of the investment transaction (i.e., corporate expenditure on
advocacy speech as a percentage of revenues or profit), the amounts involved rarely
exceed sums the loss of which would result in disciplining managers or the expenditure
of which would, under governing corporate law norms, be found to be "waste," even if
their utility to corporate ends was nil. Cf Stem v. General Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472,
474-77 (2d Cir. 1991).
'4 See supra note 72.
' Cf( Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 156-58 (1974). The
marginal role of advocacy activity in investors' choices of investments that makes com-
petition among business corporations with respect to that activity remote and unlikely
does not negate the societal interest in effecting the freer choice for individuals that
comes from prohibiting tie-in sales in such circumstances.
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question whether society should intervene because of the impact on the
audience of speech funded by contributions made (and augmented) only
for purposes other than advocacy to an enterprise that lacks the autono-
my of a human being-particularly if the enterprise's specially autho-
rized internal structure entails a bureaucratic arrangement that filters out
the influence of members' voices in the group's advocacy decisions.
a. Protecting the Individual's Voice
Not only do institutional arrangements normally preclude the
stockholder's entry into the corporation (i.e., the act of investing) from
providing the consent to corporate advocacy activities that would be the
equivalent of the volitional act of advocacy by the stockholder, but those
arrangements give the investor little or no power to affect the corporate
voice"' and little more to exit costlessly. Those limitations on stock-
holder power result from the rules that the government provides for cor-
porate governance and operation.
It may or may not be accurate to characterize many of the require-
ments of corporate statutes as embodiments of clauses that rational per-
sons would have negotiated in contracts among themselves if they could
.46 The impotence of stockholders to affect corporate action in general, resulting from
both the legal allocation of decision-making authority and rational apathy, is specially
marked in matters of corporate advocacy because of the marginal economic character of
such conduct.
The breadth of managerial discretion allowed by the business judgment rule needs
no elaboration when there is no showing of management diversion of assets or similar
self-serving use of corporate property. Regarding management's freedom to engage in
political speech, see Joseph L. Naar, Open Politics, A New Problem, 40 AM. J. ECON.
& Soc'Y 221 (1981); The Corporate Image: PR to the Rescue, Bus. WK., Jan. 22,
1979, at 47, 48-54.
The notion that management that uses assets for advocacy purposes will be dis-
placed by stockholders who disagree with management in such matters, see, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978); Ribstein, supra note 71, at 136-40,
is simply not consonant with either observed reality about proxy fights and motives for
take-overs, or with decision theory. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 58, at 55-57. While
the movement toward empowering and inducing institutional investors to participate in
corporate governance is growing, its ultimate success does not solve the problem of
separating corporate political and economic power.
Most corporate decisions, particularly those affecting the profitability of normal
business dealings in free markets, can only be made effectively and implemented effi-
ciently if stockholders "delegate"-i.e, relinquish-to management decision-making
power over the use of contributed funds. However, when corporate power is exercised
in the form of advocacy speech, there is more reason to require express stockholder
approval, if only because it is less costly to seek advance stockholder consent for such
action, which is not a matter of daily routine.
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have bargained freely and knowingly.'47 Those statutory clauses are
said to be preferable to negotiated clauses struck among rational wealth
maximizing individuals because they save the transaction costs that
would be involved in negotiating such multi-faceted contracts among
thousands, perhaps millions, of dispersed participants.' It is precisely
because of the risk consequences to the investors posed by savings in
transaction costs thus effected by the corporate form that the necessity
exists for the state to intrude into the terms of the arrangement more
than it would (and possibly more than it constitutionally could) into sep-
arate contracts between individuals.
149
14' FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-25 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372
(4th ed. 1992); Ribstein, supra note 71, at 121-22.
141 It is said that in order to overcome the obstacles to individuals contracting inter
se, an elaborate scheme of laws (e.g., the state corporation codes) is required to embody
in standardized form crucial portions of the contracts that theoretically might, but practi-
cally cannot, be struck by bargaining among the participants. See supra note 147. Those
laws (e.g., providing limited liability, easy transferability of participations, centralized
management, unlimited duration, personification of the corporation for some purposes,
and fiduciary strictures) are not attributes or "natural rights" of individuals acting singly
or in concert. They are fashioned by the state as necessary conditions for corporate
power. So too is the stockholder's insulation from tort liability and regulatory sanction,
an insulation that could not be achieved by contract among stockholders. Historically
and functionally, the limits that the state imposes upon the exercise of corporate power
by those who wield it, and the modes of decision-making within the enterprise that it
prescribes, are of the same "essence" of corporateness as the state's offer of special
arrangements embodied in its corporation codes that enable such power.
The state plays a crucial role in setting the terms of the corporate governance ar-
rangements, a role that goes much deeper into, and is much more essential to the func-
tioning of, those arrangements than its role in enforcing simple contracts or in offering
protection for property, contract rights, or tax benefits, cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), that are the predicates
for accumulation of wealth by individuals. See William W. Bratton, The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489,
1508-09 (1989); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill
of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990). See generally Symposium, Contractual Free-
dom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
The mechanism by which transaction costs are saved exposes the dispersed stock-
holder participants to governance uncertainties (e.g., of agents or controllers changing
the investment risks of the enterprise and of the stock, diverting assets for their personal
benefit, altering the terms of the arrangement, etc.) with which they might deal if they
had negotiated their "contracts" on a one-on-one basis. As dispersed atoms they cannot
negotiate to reduce or diminish those risks. Hence, the state that authorizes the mecha-
nism (including its voting and management arrangements, perpetual duration, corporate
"personality," stockholder limited liability, and liquidity) for exposing the stockholders
to such risks may appropriately restrict the terms of the mechanism in order to protect
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In matters of corporate decision-making with respect, for example, to
the expenditure of corporate assets for advocacy speech, decisions might
theoretically be made other than by management or by holders of a mere
majority of stock.15° Society might plausibly seek to disentangle the
individual's investment opportunity from his or her support of corporate
advocacy activities on issues that affect the individual in a capacity other
than, or in addition to, his or her role as investor. Severing corporate ad-
vocacy speech from other corporate activities frees investors from the
need to yield to the corporation some of their advocacy voice as part of
the price of investing, 5' and such severance does not prevent investors
from spending their own funds to advocate public policies in their own
economic interest either individually or through advocacy groups.
The matter has civic import... as well as some economic signifi-
cance for investors,'53 whether the problem is seen as one of agency
costs to control management which effectively makes the corporate deci-
the dispersed participants for whom it is saving the transactions costs. All states impose
certain restrictive rules of internal decision-making on state chartered corporations in
order to limit the power of the enterprises' agents. Possibly also those rules reflect. def-
erence to a theoretical need to limit the impact of group choice on individual prefer-
ences of members, or recognition of the limits on the volition and knowledge of dis-
persed public investors when they buy or vote their stock. Many of those rules cannot
be avoided in the initial corporate charter arrangements, nor can they be altered by even
unanimous consent. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 148. Notwithstanding the current
fashion of characterizing corporate arrangements as a nexus of contract, there is reason
to conclude that the state's power to prescribe the terms for such arrangements is, and
should be, considerably broader than its power to restrict the terms of the general run of
commercial contracts between two parties, particularly in view of the externalities that
the state creates by granting limited liability.
"50 In theory, the parties could arrange their private ordering or the state could estab-
lish requirements, inter alia, so that the essentially transient stockholders decide any or
all questions by majority or super-majority vote, simply by delegating authority to
agents to act, or by some other mechanism. The corporate take-over decisions make
plain that the state's special powers over the operation and structure of corporations in-
clude the power to shift the locus of decision-making in corporate affairs from the
stockholders individually to the stockholders collectively. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 81-86, 91 (1987). The considerations that have induced
most states to prescribe limits and requirements on such decision-making processes in
general suggest that there may also be reason for a state to impose limits on the process
by which the corporation makes decisions to engage in advocacy speech or ideological
activities.
s ' Severance also relieves stockholders of the need to spend personal funds to offset
messages paid for by their share of collective funds.
132 See infra note 158.
153 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 264-65 (1981).
[Vol. 4:1
1995] ASSOCIATION, ADVOCACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 61
sions, 154 or one of collective choice. The notion that the holders of a
majority of the shares of stock must be the decision-makers on the ques-
tion of use of corporate funds for advocacy activities, even on. questions
said to affect corporate affairs, assumes that such questions must be
decided in corporate solution. Nothing requires that assumption,' 55 even
13 Whether the interests of management and the interests of stockholders in political
decisions are the same is an open question. No doubt there is a substantial overlap of
interest, but there are many holders of substantial portions of stock of larger corpora-
tions, particularly institutional investors like churches, universities, and pension funds,
that are likely to reflect political, moral, and social viewpoints that differ substantially
from those of corporate managers on many issues. A state may take that potential dif-
ference into account in enacting restrictive legislation designed to prevent the agents'
use of their principals' assets to espouse the agents' political or social preferences. That
the state in fact permits loose (perhaps too loose) stockholder control of management's
behavior does not imply that the First Amendment prohibits the state from precluding
management's use of corporate assets to speak either personally or on behalf of stock-
holders. If a manager unlawfully removes funds from the corporate till and deposits
them in his own personal account, the manager's speech purchased with such funds
may be protected by the First Amendment, unless 'stockholders are able to enjoin use of
funds misappropriated by their unfaithful agents. But cf Ribstein, supra note 71, at 125-
26. But nothing in the First Amendment precludes the state from seeking to prevent
management from using cash actually in the corporate till to pay for the managers'
personal speech.
It does not detract from this conclusion that unbundling might induce even higher
agency costs for investors by enabling (and possibly encouraging) managers to appropri-
ate corporate assets through extra compensation and by using that cash to fund separate
advocacy collectives, like PACs. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 71, at 140-44.
"' On the contrary, requiring stockholders to be bound by their fellow investors'
political choices for the advocacy use of corporate funds conflicts with expectations of
many investors, and in any event is at odds with the simple premise of investing for
profit. That premise relieves stockholders of the need to deal with the complex prob-
lems of social choice when they make investments. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The
Social Responsibility of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32.
It has been suggested in the literature that hailed the Bellotti decision that the very
passivity of dispersed public investors and the liquidity of their investment coupled with
the special competence of management argues for a need to delegate to management the
corporate voice on advocacy matters. See, e.g., Francis H. Fox, Corporate Political
Speech: The Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti upon Statutory Limita-
tions on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 KY. L.J. 75, 95 (1978-79); John R.
Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech,
22 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 415 (1980); Robert A. Prentice, First Amendment Protection of
Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 639-40 (1981). That suggestion implau-
sibly assumes special managerial competence in matters of public policy and ignores the
agency cost of delegating such power to managers without any real accountability to the
constituents. Moreover, such an arrangement is at odds with democratic political values
because, in effect, it requires investors to delegate to the management of the economic
collectivity the political power which is normally exercisable by individuals acting alone
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if it were valid in the case of compelled professional association or un-
ion membership. Indeed, the process of voting by share rather than by
person raises questions about the wisdom of allowing corporate assets to
be used to influence political decisions.156
b. Limiting Corporate Advocacy Power
More is involved than the interest which the state may have in pro-
tecting the individual investor against tie-in sales of advocacy voice to
investment in business enterprises. The state also has a legitimate interest
in limiting the advocacy activities of investor-owned business corpora-
tions by decoupling the corporation's advocacy speech and ideological
activities from its economic functions. Quite apart from concern with
"corruption" of candidates, the potentially distorting impact of
corporations' advocacy is a legitimate source of concern to a democratic
or in organizations having substantial political purposes. The arrangement assumes that
the virtues that are claimed for interest group pluralism are served by (or require) treat-
ing the large business corporation as one of the many competing interest groups. EDWIN
M. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 221-30 (1969); Bolton, supra,
at 414-16; Ribstein, supra note 71, at 130-34; cf DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, supra note 4, at
180-81. That notion is neither self-evident nor necessary for such validity as the
pluralist hypotheses may have. On the contrary, the case remains to be made for assimi-
lating those enterprises that attract capital so overpoweringly for narrow economic pur-
poses and so opaquely for advocacy activity with expressive associations or multi-pur-
pose membership associations with advocacy roles. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARKETS 161-233 (1977); CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE RISE AND
FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE 92-100 (1987). That modulating or stilling the corporate
advocacy voice will leave the field to other multi-purpose associations and advocacy
associations that can be formed by investors reinforces the conclusion that there is little
reason to infuse interest group virtues or entitlements to investor-owned business corpo-
rations.
56 The practice of share voting determines corporate decisions by aggregate wealth
rather than by aggregate number of persons. The views of stockholders on political,
moral, or social matters would therefore be reflected by the share rather than by the
person on votes to use corporate assets for advocacy or public speech. Moreover, the
assets of all, not merely the majority, of the shares would be used to support the partic-
ular views that prevail. The premise of equal weight per individual vote to reflect politi-
cal preferences is eroded more significantly by the use of corporate expenditures than
by the use of individual voters' expenditures, notwithstanding the disparity in wealth
among individuals. The distortion is even more complicated by reason of the ownership
of stock by institutions, both for-profit and not-for-profit. The fear of undue political
power inhering in a system of voting by the share was reflected in the early require-
ment in some states of voting by the shareholder rather than by the share. See David L.
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of
"One Share, One Vote", 56 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1970).
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government.'57 The distortion is in part a function of the content of a
message that does not emanate from, and is not subject to the full range
of motives and preferences of, individual human beings.'58 In part also
... Cf HOBBES, supra note 84.
15' David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 541, 577-84 (1991); cf Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3rd
Cir. 1983). In prevailing economic theory, investor-owned corporate business enterprise
exists principally, if not solely, to maximize returns to the enterprise, and thereby its
shareholders' wealth and the productive use of social resources. To be sure, human
investors in such enterprises are not less profit-focused in making their investments than
is (or should be) "the corporation" in performing its functions. See Jeffrey Nesteruk,
Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 683,
689-96. Nor are individuals who engage in businesses that they own directly less profit-
focused than the corporation; but the corporation does not have the personal autonomy
that implicates exercise of non-economic preferences and the possibility of self-realiza-
tion or self-fulfillment by expression (or by listening to expression) that the First
Amendment seeks to assure for individual human beings. In practice, large business
corporations are rarely recorded as intentionally departing very far from wealth maxi-
mizing theory, notwithstanding so-called "charitable" giving or touted social responsibil-
ity. See, e.g., Charles R. O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited:
The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1349-51 (1949); William
Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: Social and
Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 494, 498, 509-510; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
804-05, 809-10 (1978).
Presumably in a free market economy the players require some restraints in their
pursuit of society's resources and creation of externalities, and those restraints are to be
imposed by government acting in response to the preferences of individual human be-
ings who have a much broader range of preferences than simply wealth maximization.
To allow the wealth maximizing business corporation a powerful voice in determining
how social resources are to be allocated by government is to give that corporation sig-
nificant power in determining how the rules of the only game it is playing should be
changed, rather than confining it to play under the rules preferred by human individuals.
If'market forces are the energizing source of economic creativity, corporate political
power should not be allowed to impede operation of those forces by seeking govern-
ment alterations or favors. Nor should such power be allowed to shift (or to avoid inter-
nalizing) externalities or to produce excessive public goods. Not only may such power
divert managerial attention from focusing on optimal economic results, but it also tilts
the operation of the processes of choice in the political system to affect allocations of
market power, the costs of externalities, taxes, defense expenditures, foreign policy, etc.
If the "private" long-term economic decisions of large for-profit corporate business-
es significantly affect the economic condition of the entire society, it is difficult to
legitimate their entitlement to the power to prevent the imposition by society of con-
straints on their economic behavior. Society could reasonably conclude that allowing
authority in such firms to make political expenditures goes too far down the road to
such power. It is not necessarily true that what is good for General Motors is good for
the country.
To be sure, individual owners of businesses or individual investors who accumulate
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it is a function of the magnitude of the public investor-owned
corporation's power to communicate by use of collective assets thus
assembled (from persons who may not wish to support its advocacy
voice) which are apt systematically to be larger than individuals' assets.
It is not inconsistent with the premises that the audience should be,
and is, able to comprehend and parse political messages to recognize that
the process of comprehension and parsing is made more difficult if con-
testants with agendas that are substantively colored and structurally nar-
rowed can systematically present more (and more timely) messages than
others, whether in connection with referenda,'59 other electoral contests,
or otherwise. The result is a distortion in the character of the aggregate
information disseminated to, and the content of the messages received
by, the public. 6 ' Moreover, the audience is left with an impression of
human support for particular viewpoints that may well be inaccurate, and
personal wealth also have such power to seek political action to favor their economic
interests. To acknowledge that it may be undesirable or impossible to restrict such polit-
ical power does not mean that it is equally (or at all) undesirable or impossible to re-
strict corporate power that is fueled by investors with differing civic aspirations.
"' See Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the
First Amendment after Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 410-13 (1992). Justice Powell's
references in Bellotti to the absence of evidence that corporate expenditures "exert an
undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote," see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90;
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-99 (1981), con-
trast with the substantial evidence of researchers on the subject, both before and after
the Bellotti decision. See STEVEN D. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS 1-3 (1979);
S. PRAKASH SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS 14-15, 191-
204 (1977); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent
Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505,
517-33 (1982); Steven D. Lydenberg & Susan Young, Business Bankrolls for Local
Ballots, Bus. & SOC'Y REV. 51 (1980); Randy M. Mastro et al., Taking the Initiative:
Corporate Control of the Referendum Process through Media Spending and What to Do
about It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315, 317-27 (1980); Comment, Corporate Advocacy
Advertising: When Business' Right to Speak Threatens the Administration of Justice,
1979 DET. C.L. REV. 623, 623-27; see also Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at
307 n.3 (White, J., dissenting). The longer term history of the relationship of corporate
power to referenda suggests a rational basis for fear of undue influence. See Carl E.
Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1275-79 (1986). If the research does not show that
one sided spending can effect victory for a proposition, it plainly suggests that one
sided spending can secure a proposition's defeat.
That support for the same causes or candidates may not always be given by all
investor-owned business corporations does not mean that corporate advocacy voices are
as diversified as individual voices. To that extent, corporate advocacy voices have a
systematic economic advantage that alters the process of electoral choice that advocacy
action only by individuals (separately or organized in advocacy groups) would produce.
"6 See, e.g., Shelledy, supra note 158, at 568-77.
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in any event is costly to offset. 6' To curtail the distorting effects of the
structurally restricted advocacy speech offered by business corporations
by confining those enterprises to the economic roles for which they are
specially empowered, does not require so restricting expenditures by
wealthy individuals who inevitably have broader potential advocacy
agendas. Identification of the legitimate reasons that society may have
for limiting the power of business corporations to engage in advocacy
speech thus raises the question whether vindicating those legitimate
interests violates the First Amendment.
162
161 Whether or not corporations outspend individuals in elections or referenda, they
can focus the light they shed more powerfully on particular candidates and causes than
can dispersed or less organized individuals. See Shelledy, supra note 158, at 543, 573-
77. In addition, notwithstanding the constitutionally-authorized power of individuals to
expend their wealth in electoral matters, there is little reason to doubt that the demon-
strated corporate ability to skew the results of referenda, see supra note 158, applies, at
least to elections in which corporate managers tend to favor the same' candidates.
Against those results, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that more speech fueled
from corporate sources necessarily means a more enlightened electorate. See Schneider,
supra note 159, at 1280-83; Shelledy, supra note 158, at 568-77; cf Novosel, 721 F.2d
at 901.
To be sure, the audience may discount the content of the message because of, or
notwithstanding, the name recognition of the sender. However, the extent (and direc-
tion) of that discount is not self-evident, and in any event a question is raised as to the
appropriate role of such corporate "name recognition" in the rational process of making
a voting decision. Moreover, to offer speech to offset the sender's message is costly.
Hence, the possibility of such discount does not preclude the state from appropriately
concluding that the investor and society are best served by requiring a greater congru-
ence between the speakers and the funders.
162 Other questions may be raised with respect to curtailing the property rights of the
corporation and its investors by precluding the corporation from engaging in speech that
conditions the public on political issues or in lobbying or other activities which would
affect government policy having an impact on the corporation's operations. There is, for
example, no doubt that in today's society the role of government regulation on the pro-
ductivity, efficiency, and profitability of corporations is very large. Therefore, business
corporations have a property interest in determining how those regulations should be
adopted and which ones should be adopted. That interest, however, generates no more
and no less than the normal interplay of tensions between regulating the uses of proper-
ty and the requirements of due process or equal protection of law. Deep deference is
given to the legislative judgment in such matters by judicial review limited simply to
inquiring whether there is, or whether there can be said to be, a reasonable basis for the
stricture. If restricting advocacy speech of investor-owned business corporations not in
the communications business were tested by that standard, the reasonable basis question
would be asked in response to a claim under the Equal Protection, Due Process, or
possibly the "Takings" Clauses. It is possible that in some circumstances, prohibition of
advocacy activity that seeks to avert government intervention (or failure to intervene) in
its affairs will fail to meet that standard. But that possibility approaches the vanishing
point if access to courts as part of the right to petition is not hampered and if corpora-
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c. The Relevant Criteria for Judicial Review
In the classic formulation, regulation directed at classifications that
implicate curtailing expression is not valid unless it is the least restrictive
alternative adopted to meet a compelling state need. That formulation,
which may appropriately test government suppression or even lesser
intrusions on the speech of individuals or expressive associations is not
so clearly the appropriate standard in the case of multi-purpose enter-
prises. A puzzling configuration of tensions appears in the case of busi-
ness corporations that is comparable to that which affects the constitu-
tional question in the case of compelled association. It is comparable but
not identical because the stockholder's participation is more voluntary
than compelled. Hence the individual's negative speech interest may
plausibly be regarded, in current constitutional jargon, to be of lower
value than the interest in not being compelled to speak. But that interest
is yielded when a stockholder makes an investment; and it is not as
freely given up as it would be if that interest were not surrendered in
exchange for collateral rewards, particularly rewards of a magnitude that
obscures the actuality of the choice being made.
The question whether the First Amendment prohibits the state from
limiting corporate advocacy speech by restricting a corporations' internal
decision-making rules or its advocacy power163 must be answered in
the light of the inevitability of some state-imposed burdens on the speech
interests of some investors. 6 Moreover, each choice of allocation of
tions are permitted to appear by counsel before legislative committees or administrative
agencies in response to requests for information or advice with respect to proposed leg-
islation or rules. Compare the proposal of President Theodore Roosevelt to prohibit any
use of corporate funds "in connection with any legislation save by the employment of
counsel in public manner for distinctly legal services." 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905).
163 The state's rules governing the power of stockholders to contract for the alloca-
tion of corporate funds to advocacy speech may favor those who become holders of a
majority of the stock by allowing them to contract (initially or by amendment) to allo-
cate the minority's interest as well as their own. The rules instead may favor those who
become the minority by precluding any allocation of corporate funds to corporate
speech without the minority's consent. The rules may fracture the participants' power
by limiting the majority to some sort of proportional use of corporate funds, or they
may totally prohibit use of such funds for advocacy speech. Under any of the rules, the
state is denying to some individuals unrestricted choice in the use of their invested
funds for advocacy or public speech.
" The problem is not solved by authorizing the founders or later members of the
corporation to choose for themselves how to allocate decision-making power over col-
lective advocacy activities because, as we have seen, "free choice" by investors in such
matters (on the conventional moral assumptions underlying the notion of freedom of
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decision-making powers within the corporation that the state makes inev-
itably affects the speech the audience receives.
Hence, although the issue confronting the reviewing court is posed
by the prohibitions of the First Amendment, the issue does not involve
the validity of a "compelling need" simply to silence a message to the
detriment of the "speaker" and the audience. 65 To treat the corporation
as the "speaker" entitled to protection under the First Amendment is to
reify an association of human beings at the expense of the First Amend-
ment interests of some, perhaps many, of the human members of the
association. Such reification is as improper as it is unnecessary. The
problem is not whether the speech of "the corporation" is suppressed.
The questions are: (a) who in the association, which is "the corporation,"
should have what decision-making role on whether the group collectively
acting as the corporation should speak; and (b) whether the members
should be remitted to speaking individually or through an expressive
association. The emphasis in the decided cases on the audience's interest
in hearing corporate speech'66 quite ignores the question whether the
corporate speaker has power-in the sense of authority-to speak. If the
government validly defines the internal mechanism of authority to enable
contract) is not a feasible possibility either in the initial formation of the enterprise, see
supra text accompanying notes 141-45, or by way of the amendment process, which
encounters late-comer problems.
165 The issue is not, as the Bellotti Court suggested, comparable to the issue in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (deciding whether "government may re-
strict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others"). See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978) (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49). Nor does the First Amendment claim challenge the validity
of a legislative choice to put a cap on the sums that may be spent on speech by persons
who can claim a personal individual right or power to speak, or by expressive associa-
tions which they form to speak.
"6 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35
(1980); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-83; see also Martin H. Redish, Reflections on Federal
Regulation of Corporate Political Activity, 21 J. PUB. L. 339, 344-45 (1972); cf. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986). The Court's analysis
in Bellotti and its progeny purports to focus on the abstraction of "speech" and to sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny" a denial of the audience's entitlement to receive it. The Court's
analysis assumes (although the Court purports to deny the relevance of its assumption)
that the speech emanates from a "speaker" that has a natural and ineluctable authority to
express itself, so that impeding that speech deprives the audience of an entitlement
protected by the First Amendment.
If the corporation is not reified, and its decision-making structure in the form that
the state law provides is viewed as the mechanism that powers its speech, there is noth-
ing natural or ineluctable about "the corporation's" speech. See David L. Ratner, Corpo-
rations and the Constitution, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 19 (1980); Mayer, supra note 148,
at 627-29, 633-34, 637-38.
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the corporation to speak or limits its power to speak other than by its
members, the audience's entitlement to the speech is thereby equally
defined. If there exists a right to hear, it is only the right to hear what
others can and wish to say.'67 Listeners do not themselves generate the
speech that the First Amendment protects; nor can they be "enriched" by
it unless willing and able speakers exist.
That the corporation's collective voice may differ from the voices of
any or all of its stockholders168 does not require that "it" be authorized
to speak for the benefit of listeners or society. The cost of doing so
entails (apart from individual investors yielding part of their advocacy
power) empowering a "speaker" that lacks the autonomy or aspirations
of a human being to furnish messages for individual listeners to digest
and for society to consider,'69 and amplifying that speaker's message to
a volume that may well distort the menu from which the audience is
asked to choose.' 70
If society seeks to anchor the corporate advocacy voice in the author-
ity of those who own the corporation 7' or to limit the corporation's
power to exercise that voice as a component of its "property," the "com-
pelling" quality 7 1 of society's need to do so must be assessed in the
67 For a critical interpretation of the cases relied upon by the Court in Bellotti as
spawning and developing the notion of a right to hear that operates quite independently
of a need for a willing and able speaker, see Schneider, supra note 159, at 1246-51.
168 See supra note 37; see also Bolton, supra note 155, at 387-88; Ribstein, supra
note 71, at 134; Shelledy, supra note 158, at 579-81.
169 Efforts to impute aspects of a human's value preferences to a corporation, see
ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.01 & comments (American Law Inst. 1994), do not suggest that the corporation has
the equivalent of human autonomy, particularly in ordering preferences for government
action. Apart from any theoretical challenges to such imputation, the reality of corporate
behavior suggests how limited is the range of non-profit-maximizing preferences thus
imputed.
70 As a practical matter, the substance of the corporation's message (as distinguished
from its volume) can be offered by a separate advocacy organization of stockholders.
Any resulting reduction in amplification of the message may curtail some aspects of
robust public debate, but that curtailment is not without its virtues for enhancing the
quality of the debate. See Shelledy, supra note 158, at 568-71.
... See Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1241-43; Shelledy, supra note 158, at
577-84; Prescott M. Lassman, Note, Breaching the Corporate Walls: Corporate Politi-
cal Speech and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 78 VA. L. REV. 759,
786-87 (1992). The justification for thus limiting the wealth-powered speech of "the
corporation" does not extend to curtailment of the speech of wealthy individuals.
72 The criteria for determining whether there is a compelling need are vague. See,
e.g., Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The historic fear in the United States of the power of aggre-
gated wealth in corporate solution may have diminished in the latter half of this centu-
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context of the state as necessary intervenor in allocating power over cor-
porate advocacy activities among stockholders, because the state, as
architect of the corporate enterprise, has large discretion over its de-
sign.173 Judicial review of restrictions on corporate advocacy poses
problems for the reviewing court that do not differ from those posed by
restrictions on advocacy by multi-purpose associations whose support is
induced by compulsion, although the question is closer.'74
ry. But it is not without basis as a predicate to support a compelling need. See supra
note 159.
"13 If viewed as a problem in unconstitutional conditions by reason of the
government's special assistance, judicial assessment of the propriety of conditioning
enjoyment of corporate privileges on foregoing advocacy speech need not preclude that
restriction. See supra note 122. The government's discretion in granting privileges is not
unlimited. For example, furnishing amplifiers for speech expressing some viewpoints,
but not others, or for use by some persons but not by irrelevantly different others, or on
irrelevantly different terms, must meet the strictest scrutiny and presumably would not
be upheld. Within the limits permitted by those considerations, judicial review of the
propriety of the government grant, if the grant is neutral as to content (e.g., if it permits
only limiting decibel volume or use only to amplify music) and is backed by a sanction
that merely requires the recipient to forego such use, may be less strict than it should be
if the sanction were to require not merely foregoing use of the amplifier, but prohibition
of use of privately available amplifiers. Cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-92 (questioning
validity of subsidy). At least in a minimalist state, the test of the propriety of conditions
on such government grants, while demanding in order to preclude favoring some views
or speakers or substantial monopolization or suppression of speech, need not be as strict
as would be required in a welfare state. But see Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of
First Amendment Neutrality, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 53-58.
Thus, to the extent that the privilege foregone (collective advocacy speech) may be
exercised without difficulty other than through the special government-empowered in-
strument (e.g., by forming another group to speak) there is less need for a court to test
the propriety of the condition (i.e., the limited use permitted for the government-created
instrument) as rigorously as if it were a mandated proscription of the message.
"' Arguably, restrictions on the advocacy speech of business corporations may be
more closely related to the general tenor of viewpoints than comparable restrictions in
the case of other organizations. The possibility that restrictions formally addressed neu-
trally to subject matter will indirectly address particular viewpoints requires careful
judicial examination for such an occurrence. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-93;
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1991). In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court upheld the validity of a Michigan prohibi-
tion against corporate contributions and independent expenditures in assistance of, or in
opposition to, the nomination or election of candidates. Id. at 658-69. The Court's opin-
ion disavows support for any broader restriction on corporate political or public speech
(e.g., in referenda or speech in support of or opposition to legislation). Still, the Austin
decision implements the logic and import of footnote 26 in Bellotti (see Austin, 494
U.S. at 659), in terms that imply that footnote 26 of the Bellotti opinion offers a loose
thread which might be pulled hard enough to unravel the decision. See Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 788 n.26; cf. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 814 F. Supp 186, 190-91 (D.R.I.
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Whether the compelling need is to relieve individual investors of a
tied-in obligation or to limit the corporate power that has been created or
facilitated for special purposes, the question of the scope of the permissi-
ble restriction remains. Is a prohibition against advocacy speech, as con-
trasted with a super-majority requirement, rebate requirement, or a lesser
intrusion with respect to such speech, the least restrictive alternative to
effect the compelling state need?' 75 The criteria by which to determine
what constitutes a "least restrictive alternative" are no more discernible
or illuminating than those that determine what constitutes a "compelling
state need."' 76 As Justice White pointed out in his dissent in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,177 the state may appropriately consid-
er whether the rebate scheme is either feasible or enforceable, and in any
event whether the porosity of its stricture will adequately meet the need
to enhance stockholder freedom of advocacy choice or to curb corporate
political power.17 1 If a broader restraint is to be considered-e.g., a
proscription of corporate advocacy speech or a requirement of stockhold-
1992); Vote Choice v. DiStefano, 814 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (D.R.I. 1992); Alan J.
Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 305, 314-17
(1993).
17' Although a disclosure requirement is not adequately responsive to the problem,
see supra note 75, there is room to argue, as in the case of labor unions, that a propor-
tionate rebate or the like to dissenting stockholders is the only appropriate technique for
protecting the individual, the group, and the social interest in free speech. To be sure,
the relationship of union members to the union differs from that of investors to their
corporations in ways that may justify the rebate technique more than the prohibition
technique in the case of unions but not in the case of publicly-held corporations. See
supra note 139. There is also room to argue that corporate existence and operation are
more intricately and pervasively connected to the state than are labor unions. Like the
integrated bar or government-supported institutionally-compelled association, govern-
ment limits on the scope of the enterprise's power, including neutral prohibition of
some kinds of speech by the group, are an appropriate technique for protecting the vari-
ous interests in free speech. Cf Austin, 494 U.S. at 665-66.
176 Cf Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 710-11 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Commentators have long noted the difficulty in developing and applying
criteria for the "least restrictive alternative," criteria which require weighing the adequa-
cy of the stricture to effect the permitted goal against the cost of different degrees of
restrictiveness. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Cat-
egorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1484-
90 (1975); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 464-
74 (1969).
17 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
71 See id. at 817-19 (White, J., dissenting); see also David A. Grossberg, Comment,
The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contribu-
tions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 158-59 (1974). But cf United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 595-96 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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er consent for such speech' 79-the question is whether the restraint is
sufficiently narrow to be constitutionally tolerable. 8 ' In answering that
question, it is relevant that even if practical difficulties make a require-
ment of stockholder consent the equivalent of prohibition of advocacy by
the corporation, the stockholders individually or collectively through
another association may engage in such advocacy activity. 8' The costs
179 To require stockholder consent presents problems that may make that remedy
inadequate or too costly. The votes of corporate, particularly institutional, investors
(such as investment companies, pension funds, banks, or insurance companies) in the
stock of the portfolio corporation may require "pass-through" to the human investors in
those institutions. Without such pass-through, there is a replication at the institutional
investor level of the problem met at the portfolio corporation level-except possibly for
institutional investors which are themselves advocacy organizations or their equivalent.
In addition, there is the question whether in principle anything less than a requirement
of unanimity protects the interests of dissenters.
80 That the states are authorized to charter corporations under our federal system
does not deprive the federal government of power to restrict (or allocate internal power
over decision-making with respect to exercise of) the corporate advocacy voice, at least
for corporations with publicly traded stock. If protecting or enhancing stockholders'
freedom in making advocacy choices is (as it can well be) seen as a national problem
with respect to investor-owned enterprises, even if states "create" corporations, federal
intervention is not precluded, as the securities laws and the union shop cases make
plain. See also United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2700-01
(1993).
Interstate anomalies may generate obstacles to such restrictions if they are imposed
by state legislation. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The
Proper Law of a Corporation, 44 Bus. LAW. 693, 709-15 (1989); Fisch, supra note
141, at 634-35; Lowenstein, supra note 159, at 408-09; Nat Stem, Circumventing Lax
Fiduciary Standards: The Possibility of Shareholder Multistate Class Actions for
Directors' Breach of the Duty of Due Care, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1993). But cf.
Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 248-55 (1993).
Whether the federal-state dichotomy in the regulation of corporations' affairs should
thus operate to deprive each state of a sufficiently compelling need for adopting such
restrictions or requirements that might be sufficiently compelling if wholly intrastate
behavior were involved is a puzzling question. Nevertheless, the federal system presents
a less troubling analytic problem if the 'question is determining whether State B's need
to restrict the behavior of State A's corporation is sufficiently compelling when the
restriction is designed to protect the electoral system and citizens of State B from advo-
cacy activities in its territory by corporations (including State A corporations) that are
financed by contributions induced by collateral rewards. Cf Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1991).
181 To prohibit corporations from urging views on "ideological" questions does not
preclude the formation by stockholders of groups to do so, a possibility to which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly attributed significance in assessing the permissibility of
restrictions on a group's speech. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-
36 (1977) (prohibiting union from fueling its speech with dues from coerced payers
does not prohibit "the union" from financing its speech with voluntary contributions);
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are principally: (a) the loss of the use of funds available in corporate
solution and the use of the corporate organization, 82 coupled with the
need to set up a new organization; and (b) the free-rider problem, i.e.,
the uncertainty of collecting funds for the new organization from stock-
holders as voluntary individual contributions. That very uncertainty un-
derscores the propriety of imposing such a requirement. It is the state's
act of empowering management or holders of a majority of shares to
allocate corporate funds that effectively denies to individual investors the
opportunity to separate their political and economic interests, and expos-
es society to the expression of views that many of the owners of the
assets financing the expression of those views may oppose. Substituting
individual contributions for agency centralization in this area comports
more with the theory of democracy than does the bundling of economic
and speech interests. 83
The audience may lose something that might be contained in corpo-
rate speech because of the costs of forming an independent group to
speak collectively and the free-rider problem in financing such a
group.'84 If stockholders do not have sufficient incentive to band to-
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874-75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that voluntary bar associations could offer "speech" which would be forbidden to be
offered by integrated bar associations); Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985)
(noting availability of alternate channels for claimant and audience to vindicate speech
rights); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22. Compare Regan v. Taxation With Repre-
sentation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) with id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring) and
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1984). To be sure, the avail-
ability of an alternative mechanism of expression does not aid in justifying restriction of
speech if the alternative precludes or does not offer effective dissemination of the mes-
sage. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988). In the case of investors in public
corporations, the notion is not unknown that stockholders can band together or that
political action committees of stockholders of particular corporations can be created
(albeit without the use of corporate funds or assets) to solicit funds solely to effect
advocacy speech.
182 Cf Austin, 494 U.S. 652 at 657-58. The notion that only the corporation can pro-
duce certain kinds of information relevant to the message to be sent, see Austin, 494
U.S. at 681 n.* (Scalia, J., dissenting); Prentice, supra note 155, at 636, does not pre-
clude the corporation from sharing the information with stockholders organized in an
advocacy group.
183 See supra note 156.
184 For example, unbundling may result in reduction of public debate on issues of
concern to "business" such as taxes, regulation of pollution or working conditions, etc.
In theory, the independent group may lose, or unwittingly filter out, some of the content
that would be focused in corporate speech. See Ribstein, supra note 71, at 134. In prac-
tice, such loss of content does not seem likely. Compare the suggestion that loss of the
free-rider effects is a significant impediment to purveying the corporate message,
Meese, supra note 174, at 318-24, with the suggestion that this effect may not be a
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gether and form a new group to support speech that they or management
would otherwise make through the corporate mechanism, the audience
has lost nothing to which it is entitled. The state is not obliged by the
First Amendment or otherwise to create speakers. Nor is there reason to
oblige it to permit all collectivities formed for non-speech purposes,
particularly those it specially empowers, to fuel their public advocacy
powers by way of tie-in sales of their investment returns.185 Where, as
in the case of public corporations, the collateral incentives drown out the
advocacy activities as inducements for individual support of the
serious interference with robust debate, Shelledy, supra note 158, at 568-77.
1' It has been argued that imposing restrictions on the advocacy speech or activities
of publicly-held investor-owned business corporations, but not on those of other busi-
ness associations or individuals, is unconstitutional because the restriction is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 688-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793-94. Those arguments turn in part on the terms of the specific
restrictions. However, insofar as the arguments address the failure to cover all corpora-
tions or to cover non-corporate aggregated wealth amassed for commercial purposes,
they are flawed. Close corporations and most partnerships are relevantly different from
large publicly-owned corporations. The restricted role that corporate law leaves for the
individual investor in a public corporation contrasts sharply with the multi-dimensional
role which the same law and different institutional parameters leave for investors in
close corporations or their partnership equivalents. In close corporations, individual
owner-participants can contract more or less effectively for collective decisions on all
matters, including advocacy activities. State corporate law recognizes this distinction in
a variety of ways that do not offend the Constitution. There are probably systemic lim-
its on individual cognition and volition in so contracting. But any government effort to
curb the advocacy speech of close corporations in order to reflect more fairly individual
participants' preferences is not needed by the participants or the audience nearly as
much as in the case of public corporations; and such intervention approaches restriction
on the individual's speech. Restrictions on advocacy speech by close corporations are
not made more tolerable because the speech is funded by proceeds from the individual's
business rather than from the individuals themselves. But cf Edwin Baker, Commercial
Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1976). The
similarity to individual speech justifies a more protective stance for speech of close cor-
porations than of public corporations.
Aggregation of wealth in other collective non-corporate forms may or may not
present the same need for restriction of speech as does aggregation of wealth in public
business corporations. Whether the failure to include publicly-held limited partnerships
in the associations whose advocacy activities are restricted is justified depends upon
examination of relevant differences between publicly-held limited partnerships and cor-
porations. Nothing in the Constitution should prevent including public limited partner-
ships in the coverage, or excluding them if the differences are relevant to the regulatory
purpose, in the absence of any suggestion of viewpoint discrimination or suppression of
content.
Advocacy speech of expressive associations organized in corporate form is protect-
ed as expressive, notwithstanding resort to corporate form. Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 262-63 (1986).
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corporation's activities, the state's effort to assure that it is the advocacy
rather than the collateral returns that the member contributions support
need not offend the protection the First Amendment affords to the indi-
vidual speaker or to the audience.
2. Other Multi-Purpose Associations with Voluntary Membership
To conclude that investor-owned business corporations may constitu-
tionally be subjected to restrictions on advocacy speech does not imply
the constitutionality of similar restrictions on all voluntary multi-purpose
associations, whether or not they receive special government support.
The magnitude of the impairment of the individual's free choice in sup-
porting advocacy activities resulting from the overwhelming power of the
non-advocacy incentives offered to stockholders by business corporations
is much reduced for members of most other multi-purpose associations.
Few enterprises offer investors collateral benefits with greater drown-
out effects on attention to advocacy activities than the business corpora-
tion. But enterprises like stock exchanges and some farm organiza-
tions ' 6 offer membership on terms that make the sound of the econom-
ic benefits little less powerful as an inducement to participate, and the
voice of advocacy activities not much more audible as an objection to
potential members. Similar relationships may well exist with respect to
benefits offered by associations of real estate brokers, pharmacists, op-
tometrists, plumbers, and others. On the other hand, a vast range of
associations offers social and cultural attractions or other very modest
non-advocacy benefits as an inducement to participation and relatively
more prominent advocacy activities connected to the association's func-
tion. Enterprises like the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), the Sierra Club, and many veterans associations or social or
community groups are of that variety. Other groups such as unions with-
out union shop arrangements, voluntary bar associations,"' the Ameri-
can Automobile Association, some farm associations, and various occu-
186 See David C. Crago, Cooperative Dissent: Dissenting Shareholder Rights in Agri-
cultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. L. REv. 495, 496-97 (1994) (discussing farm producer
cooperatives); see also TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 81-89
(1980) (discussing the American Farm Bureau Federation).
817 Government intervention in the advocacy speech of voluntary bar associations
generates special problems. To the extent that lawyers' functions entail the subject mat-
ter of the First Amendment (e.g., petitioning government), any restriction on the group's
activities implicates the First Amendment. Restrictions on the association's advocacy
speech may present problems comparable to restrictions on the advocacy speech of a
union of journalists or of a media enterprise. Cf supra note 82; infra text accompanying
notes 208-11.
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pational associations offer a balance of non-advocacy benefits and advo-
cacy activities that is more even, but in some cases closer to that of a
business corporation, stock exchange, or real estate brokers' associations
than to the AARP or many veterans associations.
The essential justification for unbundling advocacy speech from non-
advocacy activities of those associations is to enable advocacy voice to
be uttered and decisions to be made relatively free of entanglement with
pursuit of other benefits from membership which are strong enough to
obscure the advocacy voice linked to those non-advocacy benefits.'88
To the extent that the non-advocacy benefits offered to individuals as in-
ducements to support the association are modest, particularly if they are
social or cultural rather than economic, the entanglement of participation
with advocacy activities is apt to present little trammelling of the
individual's advocacy choice. In many such enterprises, the social or
cultural activity is functionally related to the advocacy activity and so
visible that the choice of the former entails little or no pressure on free-
dom of choice with respect to the latter. For such associations, particu-
larly if advocacy activity is heavy in the scale of their operations and
their non-advocacy benefits are obtainable in other associations, the
individual's decision to support the association is more consciously ad-
dressed as a choice to support its advocacy activity. By the same token,
joining the enterprise on those terms suggests a collective voice that is
not significantly distorted by contributions from people whose incentive
to get collateral benefits that the association offers obscures their support
of its advocacy activities. In sum, the lighter the comparative weight of
selective non-advocacy benefits in the enterprise's agenda and as induce-
ments to participate, and the closer the content and meaning of those
activities are to its advocacy activity, the more the members' support of
the advocacy activities of the group can be said to be volitional--or at
least sufficiently volitional to be analogized appropriately to member
support given to an association pursuing only advocacy activities.
The variety of associations that offer visible advocacy activities along
with some collateral benefits is large; and the benefits offered and their
relative importance in associations' agenda vary considerably.'89 Inter-
88 Removal of the advocacy power may encourage broader membership in some
organizations such as voluntary medical or legal societies, with resulting social benefits
from diversity among the participants. Diversity benefits carry some weight in cases
addressed to discrimination. However, the protection of individuals against tie-ins to
race or gender generally implicates less impairment of the group's speech than would
comparable efforts to encourage diversity by protecting individuals against tie-ins with
the group's advocacy activities.
189 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 103-08 (1982); MOE, supra note
186; OLSON, supra note 58, at 135-65.
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vention to restrict the group's speech (by rebate, super-majority vote re-
quirement, or restriction of its subject matter) cannot be justified in all
such cases if, or merely because, they can be justified in any of them.
Restrictions on associations' advocacy activity or speech solely because
that activity is tied in with offers of non-advocacy (particularly non-eco-
nomic) benefits entails an absolute proposition that is as doubtful in prin-
ciple as it is infeasible in practice. In a world in which few enterprises
engage only in advocacy activities and so many engage in joint activities
(if only to overcome free-rider problems), even membership in a wholly
political club often offers some non-advocacy benefits. If the logic of
collective action presses for tolerance of some tie-ins, it does not require
tolerance of tied-in benefits that overwhelm the impact on members of
the advocacy activities in the group's agenda and substantially encumber
the participant's freedom of choice to support such activities.'
A norm for testing the propriety of government intervention in a mul-
ti-purpose association's advocacy activities by reference to how large a
place (absolutely and relatively) those activities occupy on the agenda of
the association presents obvious difficulties in implementing the com-
mand of the First Amendment.'' A context sensitive to chilling effects
190 Except where visions such as the civic republican vision inform the members of
society, it may be necessary (not merely helpful) to offer some sorts of collateral bene-
fits to individuals in order to produce a collective advocacy voice. But to yield to that
necessity may imperil the validity of the collective advocacy voice and may do so more
intensely as the lure of the collateral benefits more substantially obscures the fact of the
group's advocacy power.
"g The complex relationships described in OLSON, supra note 58, MOE, supra note
186 (particularly in the various farm organizations), and HARDIN, supra note 189, illus-
trate the difficulties.
An added complexity is involved if the organization is heavily dependent upon, or
enmeshed with, government support. An organization like a government-authorized and
subsidized veterans' association attracts members for the social and community benefits
it offers as well as for its advocacy activities. There is room to argue that such organi-
zations are not simply expressive associations and that anti-tie-in considerations (of the
sort, albeit not the magnitude) that support unbundling in the case of investor-owned
business corporations also support unbundling for veterans' associations. But even
though a government-supported veterans' association involves activities in addition to
those of an expressive or advocacy organization, advocacy activity plays a role in the
agenda of many such associations that is not simply proportionately larger than it is in
the business corporation, but is toto coelo different. Advocacy activity can fairly be said
to be central to many veterans' associations' operations; without advocacy activity, it is
likely that veterans' association membership would be considerably smaller. In any
event, their non-advocacy activities do not offer the immensely dominating incentive for
participating that collateral benefits do for investors in a business corporation. Member-
ship in an enterprise such as a veterans' organization may more accurately be
analogized to membership in an indisputable advocacy organization than to investment
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calls for sharp critical assessment of the weight of non-advocacy (partic-
ularly non-economic) benefits that induce membership, and a generous
readiness to recognize the weight of advocacy activities in the
association's agenda.192 When non-advocacy benefits cannot be easily
severed, cannot be found substantially to outweigh the advocacy benefits
in the group's agenda, and are found to be modest in incentive power,
restrictions on the group's advocacy activities must be tested more like
an advocacy or expressive association. That it is difficult to fashion clear
subsidiary rules to implement those guidelines need not leave the matter
without constitutionally adequate boundaries for judicial review of re-
strictions that actually are imposed in particular cases.'93 The Supreme
Court has suggested a capacity to mark such boundaries.'94 And the
in a business corporation. To the extent of the "fit" of that analogy, the constitutional
objection to unbundling that is insurmountable in the case of an expressive association
is also insurmountable in the case of the veterans' association, notwithstanding its gov-
ernment support. The problem arises over a range of enterprises with varying degrees of
enmeshment with government, varying kinds of non-advocacy benefits to induce mem-
bership and various balances of non-advocacy and advocacy activities in their agendas.
Compare, for example, the drawing power and relative weight of non-advocacy benefits
offered by the New York Stock Exchange or the American Farm Bureau Federation
with those offered by the American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars.
.92 Indeed, the problems have arisen most acutely with the claims of gays and lesbi-
ans to be included in some enterprises that plausibly claim to be expressive as well as
social associations, like the St. Patrick's Day parades in New York and Boston. See
New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358,
366-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of
Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Mass. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995);
Yakle, supra note 44, at 859-62. Similar problems are encountered when the govern-
ment requires that African Americans not be excluded as a condition to authorizing a
parade by the KKK. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of KKK v. Mayor of
Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 288 (D. Md. 1988). In a different genre is the claim of an
association like the Boy Scouts, that is organized to give education, skills training, or
social activities, but which desires to be treated as an expressive association for pur-
poses of determining the impact on its voice of its membership and employment poli-
cies with respect to homosexuality. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy
Scouts of America, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580, 585-88 (1994).
' Specific statutory or regulatory language backed by appropriate study and report-
ing narrows the scope of the reviewing court's task.
9' Cf. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13-1.5 (1989); Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634-38 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Compare cases dealing with intertwined commercial speech and political speech. See
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511-17 (1993); see
also Kay Kindred, When First Amendent Values and Competition Policy Collide: Re-
solving the Dilemma of Mixed-Motive Boycotts, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 710-12, 719-28
(1992); Clark A. Remington, Note, A Political Speech Exception to the Regulation of
Proxy Solicitations, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1468-74 (1986). Compare also distinc-
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need to do so is inescapable because there can no more be permission
for all tie-ins than there can be prohibition of all tie-ins.
IV. INTERVENTION IN ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES OF EXPRESSIVE OR
ADVOCACY ASSOCIATIONS
In contrast to the multi-purpose associations thus far examined are a
large number and wide variety of associations that may be designated ex-
pressive associations. Their dominating (and often exclusive) activities
consist of expressive behavior, sometimes including ideological or advo-
cacy speech. Thus, there are groups like political parties or other advoca-
cy enterprises 95 that seek to aggregate funds and members in order to
amplify (and possibly integrate) their voices, and thereby more effective-
ly generate public support for particular opinions, views, causes, legisla-
tion, or candidates that their members prefer. Other kinds of associations,
like book publishers, the print and electronic media, and theatrical or
motion picture exhibitors, engage in communication or information-pur-
veying generally, without being limited to advocacy roles. Unlike advo-
cacy associations, their role, at least in the case of for-profit enterprises,
focuses on the exchange value of the information they offer, often with-
out much concern for advancing the views of their members. The activi-
ties of still others, like educational institutions, implicate to a greater or
lesser degree the speech that is the subject matter of the First Amend-
ment, but with an import that differs from that of advocacy groups or the
media. 96 For some associations, the participants' interest in associating
tions drawn between political boycotts and economic boycotts, see FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425-28 (1990); NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-15 (1982); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied
Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 224-26 (1982), and "contributions" to, and "expenditures" to
support, candidates, see Federal Elections Comm'n v. National Conservative Political
Action Conference, 470 U.S. 480, 494, 496, 500 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
47 (1976).
' Advocacy organizations may include groups such as PACs, Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life, the American Civil Liberties Union, or the NAACP. When such associa-
tions adopt the corporate form they are no less expressive associations than if they
simply aggregated membership. But cf Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 256-65 (1986).
"9 Educational institutions, particularly universities, have been the subject of frequent
litigation over rights of members (students and faculty) to access and to be free from
restraints on their expression. Moreover, at least in the case of students, there has been
controversy over the right to refrain from contributing to speech or other ideologically-
tinctured activities which the university sponsors, but they oppose. Occasionally the
litigation involves private universities. The substantial differences between the roles or
functions of the university and the roles of advocacy associations or multi-purpose asso-
[Vol. 4:1
ASSOCIATION, ADVOCACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
and their interest in the enterprise's speech are not disentangleable.'97
For still other associations like media enterprises or universities, the
matter is more complex. Government efforts directly or indirectly to
regulate the expression of any such associations implicates the operation
of the First Amendment Speech Clause significantly differently than does
comparable government intervention in the advocacy speech of multi-
purpose associations.
The level of protection to be offered to expressive or advocacy asso-
ciations derives in fair part from the notion that such associations are
essentially amplifiers and possibly integrators, or in any event communi-
cators, of individual expressive interests, albeit strained through the
process of collective decision-making.'98 As such, their speech is pre-
sumptively entitled to no less protection than is that of individuals, par-
ticularly as the justification for the latter's protection is to be found in
the autonomy values or interests of the speaker,'99 not merely of the
listener. To the extent that the justification for protecting speech rests on
the social or political values of exchange of ideas or information, the
expressive association's demand for protection of speech may well be
stronger than that of the individual.
Relevant differences between multi-purpose and expressive groups
may be illustrated by examining and comparing the usual inducements to
join and remain with the former with the inducements to join and contin-
ue as members of the latter-particularly (a) political parties and other
advocacy or voice aggregative groups and (b) media corporations. Be-
cause the political party or advocacy group exists essentially, if not ex-
clusively, to amplify the advocacy voices of its members, both the prin-
ciple and the import of the First Amendment require powerful justifica-
tion for any attempt by the government to interfere with the membeis'
ciations that offer other benefits generate different questions and implicate different
considerations than are entailed in assessing restrictions on students' or other
participants' negative speech interests--such as students' opposition to contributing to
programs that the university reasonably deems to be part of its educational mission, or
to medical facilities that offer advice on matters such as birth control, abortion, surgery,
etc.
' For such associations, as Justice O'Connor has suggested, "the selection of mem-
bers is the definition of [the association's] voice." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 633 (1984); see also New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 12-15; Dickson
v. Taylor, 105 F. Supp. 251, 255 (W.D. Tex. 1952), appeal dismissed, 202 F.2d 426
(5th Cir. 1953); McClain v. Fish, 251 S.W. 686, 689 (Ark. 1923); Brandenburger v.
Jefferson Club Ass'n, 88 Mo. App. 148, 158-59 (1901).
198 See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294
(1981). Special historically rooted considerations underlie the speech rights of the press.
'9 See Dan-Cohen, Freedoms, supra note 4, at 1248-54; Shelledy, supra note 158, at
546-55.
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efforts to generate a collective voice. The possibility that the members
may not always agree on the content of the collective voice does not
alone justify interference. An intrinsic cost of fashioning the collective
advocacy voice of an association is the necessity for some members to
yield to the preference of others, presumably a minority to a majority,
when action is to be taken. Government intervention to protect the mi-
nority, by way of a dues rebate prescription, for example, will pro tanto
weaken the collective voice; and intervention to forbid advocacy speech
will ultimately preclude any of the amplification of the speech which it
is the essential objective of the members to achieve. In each case, the af-
fected speech is substantially reduced or suppressed, not merely, as in
the case of a multi-purpose association, left to be uttered through another
amplifying mechanism. The crucial difference in the consequence of
government intervention stems from the different incentives that stimu-
late joining or supporting the two kinds of associations.
Multi-purpose associations such as business corporations, medical
societies, the Jaycees, and unions, attract members because they wish to
participate in, or share the benefits from, the enterprises' non-advocacy
activities; those persons may or may not wish to participate in or support
the group's advocacy speech activities. In contrast, members of political
parties or advocacy groups are attracted by, and seek to share in or sup-
port, the enterprises' dominant or perhaps only, function-advocacy
activity or speech. Potential members may be moved by the non-speech
benefits offered, but would not join or support the enterprise if not for its
advocacy activity.
The existence of the non-advocacy functions of a union, trade associ-
ation, or business corporation furnishes the principal basis justifying state
intervention to restrict the group's advocacy activity. The restrictions
would be imposed, in part, in order to encourage, or require, access to
the group for individuals, in order to make more readily available to
them the benefits of the group's non-speech functions and to society the
benefits of their members' participation in the group.2"' And in part,
200 Requiring individuals to join an association is also justified essentially on the
basis of the group's non-advocacy function when the need arises to make those non-
members who benefit from the function share the group's costs of performing it. The
considerations that impel overriding the individual's claim of liberty not to associate
with a multi-purpose enterprise such as a union or the integrated state bar are not pres-
ent with respect to an advocacy group. Such non-advocacy benefits as may be attainable
from forcing individuals to join the non-advocacy group are entirely derivative from the
group's non-advocacy role. For an advocacy association, there are no comparable non-
advocacy benefits; and the act of associating cannot be separated effectively from the
act of supporting advocacy activity. To force an individual to enter into an advocacy
association is to implicate the protection of the First Amendment for the individual's
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the state's effort would be to make the process of choosing to support
advocacy activity independent of the incentive to obtain the non-advoca-
cy benefits of joining the group. In the case of political parties or advo-
cacy groups, there is little or no function other than advocacy, and thus
little or no non-advocacy benefits, that society can seek to make avail-
able to outsiders by prescribing decision rules that impinge upon the
group's advocacy activities or speech. Any intervention in the speech
activity of political parties and advocacy groups, whether to protect the
individual against supporting the group's voice or to curb the group's
function, is necessarily an intervention that has little to do with access to
the benefits of the group's non-speech functions but can serve only to
intrude in the speech or advocacy function. By the same token, there is
no need to disentangle the process of choosing an advocacy voice from
collateral inducements to yield part of one's advocacy voice to the
group.
Moreover, any intervention in the group's advocacy activities in
order to protect those members who do not agree with, or are not within
the range of, the association's then prevailing views, not only threatens
distortion of the group's avowed purposes, but inevitably mutes its col-
lective voice.2"' Those who support its purposes and objectives must
then form another advocacy group from which the dissidents are exclud-
ed in order effectively (i.e., collectively) to articulate or communicate
their message. A rule of law that requires curbing the old group's voice
in deference to potential dissidents.,or diluents also requires tolerance of
similar dissonance in the new group, and simply starts the cycle over
again.20 2 In short, restricting the group's advocacy speech in the interest
negative speech rights with no offsetting non-speech benefits that might justify overrid-
ing that protection by forcing such association upon the individual, even if the group
desires compelling association. If compulsion to join is generated by the monopoly
power of the advocacy organization (e.g., the monopoly held by a political party), some
government intervention in the association's affairs that may affect its voice may be
defended, but not at the cost of thinning its voice to the extent that requiring pro-ration
or super-majority approval would do. Compare supra note 110 with infra note 203.
20 It is essential to the function of such groups that members share in at least some
large part of the enterprise's ideology or aspirations. The point of aggregating persons
in the group is to attract persons who share the ideology and to amplify their voices and
powers in achieving public acceptance of whatever it is that they deem it appropriate to
advocate. To allow the state to interfere with the group's membership or to relieve the
members of the obligation to help fund the group's speech would be to impair the es-
sential purpose of the group's existence-its shared ideology and its advocacy role. Cf.
New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13-14; see also supra note 200.
202 The existence of constitutional power to restrict the speech of one advocacy group
by regulating access to the group or its funding by its members threatens the same re-
striction on the speech of alternative advocacy groups formed to convey the messages
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of protecting individual members' preferences may not only distort its
function, but may leave the members of the group with no viable alterna-
tive for collective speech. As a result, the audience will also be deprived
of the group's advocacy speech; its content will be suppressed, not mere-
ly diverted for presentation through alternate channels.
In sum, the multi-purpose group invites society's interest in protect-
ing the advocacy preferences of individual members at the expense of
group advocacy. The political party or advocacy group emphasizes
society's interest in the group's advocacy preference at the expense of
the individual's preference, particularly because protecting the
individual's preference is apt to deny (rather than divert to another
speaker) the benefit of the speech to the audience.
To recognize this fundamental distinction between the multi-purpose
association and the advocacy enterprise is not, however, to deny that fac-
tors which are significant in determining the propriety of government
intervention in the former may also play a role in the latter.2"3 Incon-
that the old majority wished.
203 For example, the political party is linked to a government function and empow-
ered by an elaborate system of special government authorization because the govern-
ment must both prescribe rules for the election process (e.g., time and place for voting,
eligibility, etc.) and because only government can bridge the "private" action of the
party (including particularly candidate selection) with the "public" process of voting in
the government electoral system. It does not lessen the necessity for such government
intervention that it is also a response to the felt need to avert or cure perceived corrup-
tion or bureaucratic distortion of the organization. The scope of such intervention during
the past century suggests deeply felt and widely perceived societal needs for govern-
ment prescription or restriction of internal decision-making processes and membership
practices of political parties. The consequence of such state regulation has been substan-
tially to diminish the parties' "nearly autonomous common law status." G. Theodore
Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party Organizational Autonomy, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 245, 258 (1957); see also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Associa-
tion: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 191, 196-
200 (1982); Robert Kerstein, Unlocking the Doors to Democracy: Election Process
Reform, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 687, 696-709 (1987); Note, Developments in the
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1151-54 (1975). Thus, the groups' member-
ship and decision-making rules have been required to yield to government restriction in
the interest of implementing and preserving the social goal for which the special gov-
ernment support was fashioned-e.g., a fair and undistorted electoral process.
Similarly, to the extent that the group is the sole source of a "practical necessity"
for aspiring members, its exclusivity may have to yield to government efforts to open it
up. Thus, for example, a political party may have an effective monopoly on access to
the ballot, in part because of its assigned role in the state-created electoral process and
in part because of the history of its assigned role in the community, as was true in the
white primary cases. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953); Julia E.
Guttman, Note, Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Freedom of Association,
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gruities, if not contradictions, have appeared in the case law that re-
sponds to the tensions generated by the conflict between the unavoidable
necessity for state regulation in order to integrate the political party into
the electoral process and to avoid corruption and distortion of voice
within the enterprise on one hand,2" and the command of the First
Amendment to refrain from government abridgement of the participants'
freedom of speech through association on the other." Those tensions
and incongruities are reflected in courts' efforts at assessing the "com-
pelling need" for the intervention and whether the form of the interven-
tion is "the least restrictive alternative."2"6
94 YALE L.J. 117, 124-25 (1984). But see Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460, 463 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946). Such a party may be required by government
to refrain from excluding people, even at the cost of affecting the positions or views
ultimately taken by the party.
204 On another level, the cases upholding intervention in party membership and candi-
date selection in order to dilute the consequences of monopolistic access to the ballot by
one party, as in the white primary cases, rest uneasily alongside the more recent cases
giving the party autonomy in the matter of open primaries. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Repub-
lican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986); cases cited infra note 206.
205 The felt necessity for extensive government regulation of political parties requires
courts to create a filter to separate those party activities that are sufficiently related to
the mere mechanics of the electoral process to be legitimately constrainable in the inter-
est of assuring the integrity of that process from those activities that engage the party's
advocacy role and substantive decisions. The latter are presumably protected by the
First Amendment, and the former are protected by the First Amendment only as their
regulation impinges upon the latter. Nonetheless, many party structures and activities
related to the mechanics of the electoral process-e.g., selection and operation of state
committees with specific functions-so closely affect party advocacy activities that
regulation addressed to one must intrude upon the other. More significantly, some party
activities---e.g. candidate selection-implicate equally the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess and the party's advocacy role. The Court's decisions reflect the tensions generated
by the need to regulate the one and the command of the First Amendment not to
abridge the other. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 790-806 (1983);
Bellotti v. Connolly, 460 U.S. 1057, 1057 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting), dismissing
appeal from Langone v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 446 N.E.2d 43, 50-51 (Mass.
1983); see also Gottlieb, supra note 203; Kerstein, supra note 203; Daniel H.
Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993); Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and Political Primaries:
Supreme Court Jurisprudence and its Implications for Party Building, 8 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 433 (1991); Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution:
Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL.
L. REV. 213 (1984); Guttman, supra note 203, at 117, 118-19 & n.9; Nancy Northup,
Note, Local Non-Partisan Elections, Political Parties, and the First Amendment, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1677 (1987).
26 Compare Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-33
(1989) and Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213-25 and Democratic Party of United States v. Wis-
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If the government were to seek to restrict the advocacy speech of for-
profit communications enterprises such as the electronic or print
media"°7 in order to enhance or protect the role of individual preferenc-
es in the group's advocacy voice, other (possibly more intractable) diffi-
culties would be encountered. The principal (or only) product of the
media, like the product of political parties and advocacy groups, is the
special subject matter of First Amendment speech protection. However,
advocacy speech is only a part of the media's product; separating it from
the other parts would present more costly obstacles than would
unbundling an industrial or commercial enterprise's advocacy speech
from its non-speech products. Identifying advocacy speech, separating it
from the media enterprise's other speech, and restricting, or requiring
stockholder consent to, the advocacy parts of the enterprise's speech is
consin, 450 U.S. 107, 120-26 (1980), and Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-91
(1975) with Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1849-58 (1992) and Nader v.
Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 844-48 (D. Conn. 1976), affd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976); com-
pare also Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2062-68 (1992) and Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 728-35 (1974) with Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 786-806 and Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756-61 (1973) with Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-61
(1973). But cf Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788. Compare the theory of those latter cases
with Terry, 345 U.S. at 466-70, and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 655-66 (1944).
Some of the considerations that justify government regulation of political parties
may affect political action committees. Those committees range from groups composed
of large numbers of widely dispersed contributors that attract millions of dollars in
contributions from millions of people who do not relate to one another or participate in
the enterprise beyond making the contribution, to small groups (some very well funded,
some poorly funded) with active membership participation. Many advocacy groups are
formed to litigate, to lobby, or to "educate" the public on particular issues and in sup-
port of particular views. They function more or less continuously in such advocacy
roles and rarely engage in support of, or opposition to, candidates in elections. Other
kinds of advocacy groups, like many political action committees, function wholly or
principally in connection with election of candidates to office. There may be more rea-
son to protect the collective voice and autonomy of the former (most political groups)
more than of the latter (political action committees). The episodic functioning of the
latter groups (principally in connection with elections) often generates internal bureau-
cratic conditions that invite regulation for the same reasons that invite regulation of
political parties, even though they do not involve the extensive structural government
support or linkage that obtains between political parties and the electoral process.
207 The import of the protection offered by the First Amendment for broadcast media
(both cable and over-the-air) is considerably different from that offered to the print
media. See supra note 48. The difference may follow from some underlying perception
of the broadcast media, in' contrast to the press, as more a forum than a voice. See cases
cited supra note 48; FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 386-95 (1984).
But neither the differences between the print and electronic media nor the differences
between the levels of First Amendment protection offered to each need alter the inquiry
about advocacy speech interests of members in the affairs of those enterprises.
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likely to chill otherwise protected speech. Because the enterprise's daily
operations consist of producing speech, requiring stockholder consent for
advocacy speech would have a paralyzing impact on the enterprise's
operation."8 The costs to society of such unbundling implicate virtual
suppression of speech, as distinguished from the increased cost of using
other mechanisms for speech.
That the media enterprise may be organized as an investor-owned,
for-profit corporation does not assimilate it to the non-speech investor-
owned business corporations." 9 To be sure, a media enterprise general-
ly attracts investors for the same profit-making purpose as does a non-
speech business corporation. However, the advocacy interests of inves-
tors and of the public that are served by unbundling the non-speech
enterprise's advocacy speech from the activity which is the essential
source of the economic benefits it produces for investors cannot be
served in the case of media corporations, except at prohibitive costs. On
the contrary, the investor's interests are likely to be disserved by any at-
tempt at unbundling. Hence, society may more appropriately subject
individual investors to the bundling and corresponding restraints on indi-
vidual negative speech interests embodied in conventional corporate
decision-making rules in the case of media enterprises than in the case of
the commercial business corporation.2 0
208 The process of identifying advocacy speech and separating it from the media's
protected product presents difficulties that at worst cannot be overcome, and at best
chill the product. For example, a column or commentator may "support" or merely
"report on" a candidate or a legislative proposal in terms that are formally identical. But
cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1976). Moreover, separating the two products
(forms of speech), even if possible, imposes larger proportionate costs on the profitabili-
ty of the enterprise than would be incurred in the case of a non-speech enter-
prise-costs that are likely to stifle operation of many enterprises. Unbundling by way
of pro-ration would present similar difficulties, albeit not quite as paralyzing.
2"9 As in the case of commercial or 'manufacturing corporations, there is room to
debate whether the persons to be protected in their access to the "association" and from
supporting the "association's" speech should be only those in the "stockholder" catego-
ry. Employees might, by some standards or in some contexts, appropriately be included
as members of the association (or indeed form a separate category in the association) to
be given protection in such matters. The rights to be accorded to such persons and to
the association in relation to them, however, raise considerably broader and more diffi-
cult questions than those thus far addressed. They are appropriately subjects for a anoth-
er inquiry.
210 If society were to deny corporate status to media enterprises in order to avoid the
question of unequal treatment of different types of corporate enterprises, substantial
objections to thus disadvantaging them would be generated from both equal protection
and First Amendment considerations. In contrast, neither set of considerations precludes
more speech protection for media enterprises than for others whose speech is otherwise
justifiably curtailed.
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Aggregating capital for non-communicating businesses gives power
to the controllers of that capital, whether management or majority stock-
holders, by reason of contributions that are not made in connection with,
or expectation of, the advocacy speech potential of the enterprise. On the
other hand, when contributions or investments are accumulated for a
business engaged solely in operating a communications or advocacy
enterprise,21" ' the power over expression is a contemplated and an un-
avoidable aspect of the aggregation of wealth which the contributions
seed. Society's interest in checking (or protecting) the power of wealth
so aggregated may be comparable to, but is not identical with, its interest
in checking (or protecting) the power of any wealthy individual who
chooses to engage in, or support an association engaged solely in, such
conduct or speech. But even though the former may be entitled to less
rigorous protection under the First Amendment than the latter,212 noth-
ing in the Constitution or acceptable policy requires protection of the
advocacy voice of corporate wealth accumulated for expressive purposes
to be extended to the advocacy voice of corporate wealth accumulated
almost entirely for non-speech purposes.213
21 So long as the group is a non-profit expressive or advocacy group, it should make
no difference whether it is in corporate form or not, although the Supreme Court is less
than clear on the point. Thus, non-profit advocacy groups and their members are said to
be entitled to no less protection under the First Amendment if they are in corporate
form than if they are not. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-65 (1986). It is difficult to reconcile the result in Massachusetts
Citizens For Life with Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right To Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197 (1982), which held that an advocacy group organized in corporate form
was subject to the same restrictions in soliciting contributions for its segregated political
fund as was a commercial for-profit business corporation. Id at 207-10.
212 Assuring the integrity of an association's voice as the transmitter of the aggregate
of its individual members' preferences involves complex problems such as internal
institutional obstacles and difficulties in effecting collective choice that are not involved
for an individual's voice. Hence, the considerations that may justify government inter-
vention in the affairs of an association are not likely to support intervention in the be-
havior of individuals. Some considerations that justify intervention in the affairs of
multi-purpose organizations, see, e.g., supra note 17, may justify more extensive inter-
vention in the case of investor-owned for-profit expressive enterprises than in the case
of non-profit expressive associations. The latter, particularly if like the electronic media,
they may be viewed as a forum more than a voice, may in any event not be immune
from such intervention, as the regulation of political parties shows. See supra text ac-
companying notes 203-06.
23 To acknowledge significant differences between the power to regulate advocacy
expression by communications businesses and advocacy speech by other businesses
generates problems about conglomerates that have some enterprises in each category.
Similar problems are encountered in addressing the advocacy speech of professional or
trade associations, where the question is how to determine whether the service function
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V. CONCLUSION
Both principle and doctrine have long established that the First
Amendment does not protect all speech or all protected speech equally.
Variations in content and context are inescapably relevant. It is a fixture
in American political theory that participation in public discourse and
advocacy activities by elective associations of all sorts significantly
serves the governance of a democracy and enriches the individual partici-
pants and audience. However, not all associations serve those goals, and
even those associations that do differ in their contributions to their
achievement. Hence, in assessing the propriety of government interven-
tions in the advocacy speech of associations, recognition of differences
in the composition and roles of different associations is essential.
To accord such recognition implicates classifying or categorizing
associations. On one level are the problems of delineating categories of
speech and of associations, and of justifying differential restrictions on
the advocacy speech of associations in particular categories, assuming
that adequately separable categories can be delineated. On another level
are the problems resulting from the inability to separate cleanly the de-
fined categories by operational rules that draw bright (or at least feasibly
administrable) lines, and the consequent difficulties in fitting particular
associations into one category or another and applying appropriate stan-
dards in assessing the propriety of the restrictions on the advocacy
speech of the association.
This Article addresses the first level of problems. It explores criteria
by which to define categories of elective public associations whose advo-
cacy speech may appropriately be limited by government. It also seeks to
and the advocacy function are comparable, or which predominates, and at what point
the enterprise's advocacy activities sufficiently "tilt" it so as to entitle it to protection as
a communications enterprise. Despite these difficulties, the problems are not intractable.
Practical, constitutionally feasible, solutions are possible. Cf. New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 634-38 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But cf. City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511-17 (1993).
Legislation could provide for stockholder consent only for advocacy speech by the
non-media corporation or division of the conglomerate. In order for the media division
to be free of a stockholder consent requirement for its product, that division must be
publishing a bona fide publication of general circulation, not merely a trade "give-
away." The definitional problem is not without its difficulties. Moreover, evasion may
be possible by use of the media division to advance political policies favorable to the
industrial division. The constitutionally adequate distinction drawn in Buckley, between
"independent" and controlled or coordinated expenditures, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46,
suggests that the problem is solvable.
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explain and justify differential limitations on such speech by reference to
the possible conflicts between speech interests and preferences of indi-
vidual members and those of multi-purpose associations, as distinguished
from expressive associations. Within the multi-purpose association cate-
gory, sub-classifications may be delineated by considering whether mem-
bership is compelled (by government mandate or economic necessity) or
is voluntary, and, if it is voluntary, whether the enterprise depends upon
special government support and whether its agenda offers non-advocacy
benefits which dwarf its advocacy activities as incentives to join and par-
ticipate in the association.
Wholly different inquiries are involved when the issue is the propri-
ety of government intrusion in the advocacy speech of associations dedi-
cated solely or principally to expressive conduct, with or without ideo-
logical content. The sole (or virtually the sole) basis for membership in
an advocacy group is to affect its voice, in contrast to the.reasons for
joining non-advocacy associations. The voice of an advocacy or ideologi-
cal association cannot readily be replaced through the mechanism for
replacement available to members of non-advocacy groups-i.e., by the
members forming another group to perform the advocacy activities. Any
government intervention in the group's voice not only raises intractable
questions under the First Amendment, but is unlikely to have any of the
justifications that support such intervention in the affairs of non-speech
groups.
Other difficulties affect the propriety of government intervention in
the advocacy speech of other expressive or communications enterprises
like the electronic or print media or educational institutions. The func-
tions of those enterprises differ significantly from those of advocacy or
ideological groups and also differ between themselves; so do the incen-
tives for individuals to participate. Those differences implicate differing
costs and benefits and differing equilibria in assessing the propriety of
particular government intervention in membership rules, operations, or
speech of such groups. Those differences emphasize the necessity for
focusing on category and context in developing principles to define the
"right" to free speech and the protection offered by the First Amend-
ment.
To identify the relevant considerations affecting the propriety of gov-
ernment intervention is not to offer formulae that dictate clear results.
The considerations upon which categorization depends produce less than
precise definitions. Hence, it is difficult to separate some of the catego-
ries at the margin-for example, determining when the pressure to sup-
port or join an association is strong enough to amount to compulsion,
separating advocacy speech from other speech, or separating multi-pur-
pose enterprises from expressive associations by determining when the
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association's non-advocacy benefits sufficiently outweigh advocacy activ-
ities in its appeal or its agenda. The flexibility of the resulting process
puts a premium on careful legislative drafting and on judicial self-con-
sciousness with respect to the discretion available to the court and the
values imported in invoking that discretion.
The ambiguous boundaries of the categories that this Article suggests
may make some categories more acceptable and others less acceptable as
predicates for constitutionally permissible restrictions on particular asso-
ciations. Where speech or advocacy is the focus of concern, ambiguities
in limiting the category of those whose speech is affected or the kind of
speech involved may have prohibitively chilling effects. However, if the
premises on which the categories rest are valid, if the categories and the
proposed consequences can be justified in the easily recognizable cases,
it is worth further effort to explore the possibilities for clearer delinea-
tion of categories that will be constitutionally acceptable.
